Under the Auspices of the University of Calcutta

Shree Gopal Basu Mallik Lectures on

VEDĀNTA PHILOSOPHY

DELIVERED (DECEMBER, 1925) BY

S. K. BELVALKAR, M.A., Ph.D., I.E.S.,
Professor of Sanskrit, Deccan College, Poona

Part 1: Lectures 1-6

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HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

In Eight Volumes

BY

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Preface to Part One

The terms of the Foundation according to which I was called upon, in October 1925, to deliver at Calcutta, under the auspices of the University, a course of at least twelve lectures in English on "Vedānta Philosophy" required the Lecturer to deal in particular "with the place occupied by the Vedānta in the philosophical systems of the civilised world, and of its merits as compared with Western Schools of Thought." The terms at first sight appear as though they want to impose a specific view-point about the Vedānta; but considering that, if thus narrowly interpreted, they would tend to render the Series of Lectures proposed to be delivered year after year uncommonly dull and stereotyped, I chose to follow out my own way of interpreting the term Vedānta and my own method of dealing with the subject. And as this may seem to differ from the average notions about the "Vedānta Philosophy," I may here permit myself a word of explanation.

In common parlance the term Vedānta is restricted to the "Advaita" or Monistic Vedānta of the type of Śaṅkara's "Māyāvāda"; but this is not only unfair to the types of "Vedānta Philosophy" promulgated by Rāmānuja, Madhva, Vallabha, Śrīkaṇṭha, and others, but it is even unfair to the *actual* Vedāntic teaching as contained in the several Upaniṣads and in the Bhagavadgītā: texts which no Vedāntic School refuses to admit as possessing an authority parallel to that of the Brahmasūtras themselves. If the ultimate teaching of the "Vedānta"—whether derived from the earlier and the later Upaniṣads, or from the Gītā and the Bhāgavata, or from the Vedāntasūtras proper (to say nothing of the various propounders of the "Navya" or Modern Vedānta)—were exactly identical, as the orthodox opinion would have us accept,

what would be the earthly interest of copying out the same formula now in the upright Roman Characters, now in the Cursive Italics, now in Asokan "Brāhmī" and now in the current "Devanāgarī"? The fact nevertheless that we are genuinely interested in following out the same form or formula in its divergent *interpretation* should prove that what really arrests our attention and deepens our interest is the environmental difference which must have led the promulgators of the "Vedānta" Philosophy to shift the emphasis from one aspect to another, and to vary the metaphors and the arguments to suit the specific cases before them. Like Literature and Art, Philosophy is ultimately "a criticism of life," and unless we possess a tolerably definite notion as to how the "life" presented itself to a given people or to a given age, we cannot be in a position to grasp the very core of the issue. Philosophy is *not* a formula in Mathematics which you can study and analyse and criticise without giving any heed to its author or to the circumstances that may have led to its enunciation.

This naturally involves at each stage the question of fixing the texts and settling the dates—at least relatively, where absolute certainty may be unattainable. In Indian literary history, where all dates are like "pins set up to be bowled down again," this would no doubt be a peculiarly difficult task, affording widest scope for guess-work; but we cannot well avoid it. We may not, for instance, even now arrive at a consensus of opinion about the date of the Bhagavadgītā; but I feel no hesitation in confessing that my philosophical estimate of the Poem regarded as Pre-Buddhistic would be entirely different from my estimate of the same Poem regarded as falling between 200 before and 200 after Christ. Further, the facility with which most texts regarded as authoritative have suffered from sundry contaminations or "pious" interpolations makes it necessary to introduce in a study of Philosophy much matter which is of purely philolo-

gical interest, mainly because so very few of our important basic texts are available in reliable critical editions. Consequently, even at the risk of being dubbed 'hypercritical,' we have to re-arrange texts like the Upaniṣads into chronological strata; we have to weed out all proved excrescences from texts like the Brahmasūtras and the Bhagavadgītā; and we have to preserve the most critical attitude in admitting as an authentic work of Śaṅkarācārya anything and everything which masquerades as a genuine piece, no matter under whose sanction and authority.

All this virtually means writing a regular "History" of Vedānta Philosophy, and I may be said in a sense to have done that, although I hope that I have not absolutely given the go to the purely philosophical side as such. Within limits I am prepared to follow Hegel's dictum as to the identity of History and Philosophy. And as this part of the programme, in view of the paucity of systematic works bearing on the theme, naturally took up considerable space, I had to throw the matter bearing upon the comparison between the Indian and the Western "Vedānta" into the briefest possible compass. Comparisons very often tend to become superficial because no two things or systems, in their sources, surroundings, and life-purpose, are like enough to afford adequate basis for really helpful generalizations.

Between the notice of my election to the Lecturership and the date fixed for the delivery of the Lectures at Calcutta there remained an interval hardly sufficient for even the mechanical task of writing out the Lectures in a form that could be at once placed into the hands of the printer. Hence, with the exception of the first two, I had to deliver these Lectures, from brief jottings only. These I was permitted to elaborate subsequently. This has made the Lectures, in the bulk and form in which they appear in this book, no longer "lectures" that could be orally delivered in the course of an hour or so. This was inevitable. It meant also more expense and delay.

But I had no idea that the latter would be so great as to compel me to issue the Lectures in two Parts of about 250 pages each. I at first estimated for a volume of about 350 pages of the present *format* for all the Lectures, and secured Swadeshi paper of a uniform quality and colour to suffice for the purpose. But when I found that the estimate would be exceeded, I also discovered to my surprise that it would be very difficult to secure from the Mill further stock of paper of exactly the same colour and quality unless I chose to wait and take a chance. This was the immediate circumstance that led to the decision of issuing the Lectures in two separate Parts, which may or may not be afterwards welded into one Volume. The pagination will not be continuous, although an Index for all the Lectures, as also a Glossary of Sanskrit words with their English equivalents, will be given only at the end of the Second Part.

The material for the Second Lecture included in this Part is derived from the Second Volume of the History of Indian Philosophy by Professor R. D. Ranade and myself, published in 1927. It is here presented in a succinct and somewhat improved form. The major part of the Third Lecture, including the "Summary of the Gītā," was put together in connection with my lectures on that philosophical Poem which I delivered three times in the course of the last six years to my Sanskrit B. A. students at the Deccan College, successively touching and revising the same. My main differences with the late lamented Professor R. Garbe of Tübingen regarding the interpretation of the Gītā I had communicated to him by letters, and I am really sorry to see that he has not been spared to read my arguments in extenso and pass his judgment upon the same. My views about the constitution of the Brahmasūtras as developed in Lecture IV I am submitting with deference to the judgment of scholars like Professor H. Jacobi, whose arguments about the date and the interpretation of the Sūtras I find myself unable to accept

in toto. I admit that the Brahmasūtras deserve to be made the subject of a much more thorough-going study than what I have been able to comprise within the brief span of forty pages. This I hope to do elsewhere. For the fifth Lecture I was eagerly waiting for the appearance of the long announced Volume on the "Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda" by Professor Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya of the Sāntiniketan, which, so far as I am aware, is not yet out. For many of the *Kārikās* I have been led to arrive at distinctive renderings of my own, which could not all be embodied in the Lecture, but which could now be possibly included in a critical edition of the Gauḍapādīya-kārikās, which I have been, from several quarters, urged to undertake. On the vexed question of the age and the literary *entourage* of Śaṅkarācārya, dealt with in the last Lecture contained in this Part, I have had the rare privilege of discussing the whole question personally with my old *Guru*, Professor K. B. Pathak, upon whom the University of Tübingen has recently most deservedly conferred the Doctorate in Philosophy (Honoris Causa), and who, even at the advanced age of 80, is now engaged in writing important original papers and bringing out a collected edition of his Works. I have also derived considerable help from a careful compilation of the data deducible from all the minor and major works attributed to Śaṅkarācārya made by my student, friend and colleague, Mr. R. D. Vadekar, whose constant cooperation in my literary undertakings may now be said to have passed the limits of a formal thanks-giving.

In conclusion I must express my indebtedness to the University of Calcultta who honoured me by its invitation to deliver this Series of Lectures, and who granted me all other facilities concerning the publication of the same. I only hope that these humble Lectures of mine are deemed a tribute worthy of acceptance by the Premier University of India.

Bilvakuñja, Poona
24th September, 1929

S. K. BELVALKAR

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Corrigenda

Page and line	Incorrect	Correct
35–33	(T. B., Ex. 27)	(J. B., Ex. 27)
91–13	as whole	as a whole
93–23	peom	poem
97–29	Brahmsūtras	Brahmasūtras
100–20	texts	text
107–34	afferd	afford
126–20	of the the	of the
140– 1	Bhagavadgīta	Bhagavadgītā
140–24	Bādārayaṇa	Bādarāyaṇa
140–32	Audulomi	Auḍulomi
141–25	Sāriraka-	Śārīraka-
142–20	8–8	1–8
142–32	Satapatha	Śatapatha
144– 4	sampatteṣ	sampattes
147–35	Græco-Persion	Græco-Persian
150–33	Sabarabhāṣya	Śābarabhāṣya
152–28	(I. iv. 7, etc.),	(I. iv. 7), etc.,
156– 3	summous	summons

Page and line	Incorrect	Correct
156–14	material and and	material and
158–11	sa well	as well
162–34	he	the
170–13	conciousness	consciousness
172– 2	tothe	to the
175– 4	seveval	several
177–19	comtemporary	contemporary
183–19	miltates	militates
192–26	(lii. 23)	(iii. 23),
193– 1	vāṛttika*	vārttika*
198–30	Saṅkara	Śaṅkara
203–24	-conciousness	-consciousness
208–14	Non-self	Not-self
210–27	Rāṣṭrakūta	Rāṣṭrakūṭa
212–76	some	some-
216–23	differont	different
216–26	Balavaman,	Balavarman,
219–28	-Vṛtti- . īkā	-Vṛtti-Ṭīkā
220– 3	Sataślokī-	Śataślokī-
225–36	Vivekacūḍāmani,	Vivekacūḍāmaṇi,
226– 5	altributed	attributed
226–27	Saṅkara	Śaṅkara
228–27	ef	of
228–37	Saṅkara	Śaṅkara
229–11	(1905)	(1909)
230–30	discernable	discernible
231–25	Sāṅkaravijayas	Śāṅkaravijayas
231–36	dèbris arehardly	débris are hardly
232– 4	Kāladī	Kālaḍī
235–14	would seems	would seem
237–24	Saṅkara,	Śaṅkara,

LECTURE I

INTRODUCTORY

IN the Katha Upaniṣad we read (II. i. 1)—" The Self-subsisting [Creator] fashioned apertures [of the sense-organs] with an out-wending tendency; and hence it is that man looks outward, and not within himself." This is of course merely a poetic way of stating the fact that the data of our knowledge must come from without; that man, in other words, is confronted here with a world which is outside of him and which it is his unending task in life to interpret and " make a part of himself." It is in this act of interpretation, this endeavour to reduce the phenomenal manifold to a more or less consistent system, that Philosophy takes its birth and reaches its culmination; and this is what is virtually implied when it is stated that Philosophy everywhere begins normally with Cosmology: with the attempt, that is to say, to trace the world, by a critical consideration of the facts of outward experience, to its ultimate unitary starting-point. Such an attempt to discover the First Cause of the Creation, to be scientific, must obviously be based upon an actual objective experimentation; but it is not everywhere that Philosophy occupies itself for any length of time with such an objective and scientific analysis of the facts and phenomena of the world without. For, before he has gone very far on his quest in this manner, our primitive philosopher finds ready to hand in his own will-power a principle of unity which, as far at any rate as the diverse purposeful activities into which he finds himself engaged from day to day are concerned, is felt by him to be an adequate unifying principle; and then, by a simple process of analogical transference, he posits a similar but infinitely more potent Will behind the recurrent and non-recurrent, regular and cata-

clysmic happenings of the world around him. And corresponding to the stage of social and political evolution that he may have attained, he delights in weaving around this unitary Will-power a fabric of poetic mythology and religious superstition, of which such wonderfully varied specimens are preserved to us in the early civilisations of India, Assyro-Babylonia, Scandinavia, and Greece. This we may call the first or the "anthropomorphic" stage in the evolution of Philosophy.

The Creator of the Universe reached in this first more or less primitive stage of speculation is, as we have seen, a mere reflex of the authority which in that early society is enjoyed by the head of the family or the chieftain of the tribe. And just as, in course of time, the *Pater familias* or the Tribal Chieftain discovers, within the sphere of his proper jurisdiction, certain wills or forces opposed to himself and so resisting the operation and the free exercise of his own will, even so our mythologizing philosopher comes in course of time to realise the necessity of isolating and investigating certain connected facts of outward life with a view to discover if they, per chance, have any laws of their own existence which may be independent of, if not always antagonistic to, the Great Will which he had anthropomorphically posited at the centre of the Universe. Such a discovery of the presence of other wills and other independent laws governing the process of the world leads to the rise and growth of individual Sciences such as we know them, although it must not be forgotten that generations and centuries of patient, unflagging effort are required before these diverse branches of human knowledge get pruned of all superstitions and become 'scientific' in the modern acceptance of this term. Philosophy which began its career, as we saw, by setting forth the whole Universe as its own exclusive field of study has a very hard time of it when these special Sciences, one by one, appropriate different corners

from the philosopher's field of inquiry; nay, it may be even threatened with extinction. At the most it comes to be regarded as a mere intellectual pastime: as the 'handmaid' who has no power of independent motivation, but who must for ever carry the trail *behind* her 'mistress' Science. But inasmuch as the individual Sciences evolve forth categories which are often very limited in their application, and which fail utterly when applied beyond their proper sphere—e. g. the categories of Chemistry or Mathematics when extended to Ethics or Sociology—Philosophy now steps forward claiming for itself the right to evaluate the different categories of the Sciences and so of correcting the tendency of the specialist to make his own postulates and deductions the measure of all existence. The handmaid who was merely to carry the trail of her mistress is seen now holding the candle *in front* to light the way for her mistress. In place of—or rather underlying—the particulars which the isolated Sciences had reached, Philosophy endeavours to find the truly universal, so that the unity which it had once "anthropomorphically" reached, it may again "rationally" re-discover amidst the changing, fleeting manifold. It is just this all-comprehending and adjudicatory function of Philosophy that Plato probably sought to convey when he declared Philosophy to be 'syn-optic,' and it is this very idea that Aristotle stressd when he defined Philosophy as the "Science of existence as such." Philosophy accordingly goes deeper than Science. It asks questions which the scientist finds it unnecessary to raise. It goes to the very foundations of experience (which the scientist is often content to take for granted), and so is able to provide the ultimate vindication of scientific knowledge itself. Philosophy begins where Science ends, and ends where Science begins. It is an attempt, in other words, to trace the Universe back to the ultimate First Principle, and having attained it, to deduce from it, without any logical leap or sleight of hand, the very Universe from which the inquiry originally started.

While therefore the beginnings of Philosophy and the ultimate goal that, if it has not already attained, it at least endeavours and eventually aspires to one day attain, are in all countries and in all ages more or less alike, the most absorbing interest of the study of the philosophies of diverse times and peoples consists in the critical observation of the modes in which the problem of Philosophy presents itself, and the lines along which its solution is attempted by a given people living under a given set of circumstances and environments. A people (like the Ancient Greeks) living in too close an association with Nature, and compelled for their own safety and sustenance to carefully record and study her varying moods, are prone to cultivate the "scientific" spirit rather too early and so reach a physical First Principle before they come to think of Mind or of Man. On the other hand, a people (like the Aryan colonists in India) living under a constant menace of marauding enemies around, and hence fully appreciating the services of a strong warrior chieftain, are likely to give an anthropomorphic turn to the speculation and early establish a faith in an all-powerful Godhead with an appropriate cult of worship. There are times when—either because of the victory which a particularly gifted nation of warriors has been able to win against overwhelming odds—e. g. the victory of Athens over Persia—or because of the other more peaceful victory which a towering personality such as that of Gautama the Buddha is able to achieve over the heart and spirit of his fellow-beings, or, finally, because of the triumph which human Reason has been able to obtain over Nature through the great and wonderful achievements of Modern Science,—man feels such an overweening confidence in himself that he comes to regard his own Self as the centre of the whole Universe, and so evolves idealistic systems of philosophy in all their shades and varieties. Contrariwise, on occasions of great national distress or personal humiliation, when one feels the grip of the darkest despair, being bereft of every hope of

preferment and consequently of every incentive to work, one comes to think so very disparagingly of the tiny speck of mortality named man, and of his little span of life here below, and feels so utterly cowed down before an irresistible, all-pervading Omnipotence, that he rears up a philosophy in which the individual is absolutely effaced and lost sight of in an all-engulfing Absolute. These are only a few typical examples of the results which, under a specific set of conditions, particular groups of thinkers belonging to a given age or country can be, and have been, able to reach; but in an actual history of Philosophy there arise infinite modifications and combinations of these; and even where the final conclusions evolved in different philosophical periods seem to agree in their essentials, it is interesting to observe from what starting points and through what intervening stages the conclusions in question were reached. For, it must never be forgotten that the impulse to Philosophy, that particular fact in our political, social, or religious environment which evokes what has been aptly termed the 'divine discontent' which is the parent of all Philosophy, differs from age to age and even generation to generation. It is only when the present ceases to satisfy us and restricts our legitimate liberty of action that we begin to enquire into the why and the whence and the wherefore, and so endeavour to restore the broken harmony of our life by either mending what can be mended, by ending what must needs be ended, or—not being able to achieve either—by fleeing away from the present and building Utopias or Ideal Republics for the future. Philosophy, no less than Poetry and the Fine Arts, is 'a criticism of life' and cannot accordingly be properly studied when divorced from life. Consequently it is possible to speak of the distinctive philosophy of a given age or a people, in a sense in which it is not permissible to speak in the case of Physics, Mathematics, Astronomy, and the several other abstract and objective Sciences of the present day.

A good deal of vague talk and hazy notions prevail concerning 'Indian Philosophy' even amongst the average educated men of our own Country, to say nothing of those in Europe or in America. A couple of paradoxical propositions concerning Brahman and Māyā and Karman, and a number of wonderful anecdotes about Indian Yogins and Indian Mystics, practically exhaust all that one cares to know concerning Indian Philosophy, altogether ignoring the fact that, howsoever poor the Hindu achievements in exact Sciences might be as compared with the phenomenal developments of the modern Sciences in Europe, the results attained by India in the domain of *philosophical* speculation—for instance her investigations into the problems concerning the relation of the Deity to the Individual—can challenge comparison in both their variety and depth with those elicited during the speculative career of any other nation or people ancient as well as modern. Beginning with the dimmest dawn of speculation in the hymns of the Ṛgveda, through the Upaniṣads, the Gītā, Buddhism, the Darśanas, Purāṇas, Tantras and what not, right up to the days of Swāmī Vivekānanda and Dr. Rabīndranāth Tāgore, there lies stretched before our vision a vast tract of continuous philosophical productivity that in mere length easily exceeds three times the duration of historical Greek Philosophy. And during all this vast period of some five millenia India has passed through vicissitudes of fortune—has seen great empires rise and culminate and fall, only to be succeeded by still greater empires springing out of the very débris of their predecessors; has experienced social and religious convulsions of a stupendous character, giving birth to soul-stirring lyrics and soul-captivating faiths; and has revealed human nature in all its sublime elevation and all its appalling degradation through all its highways and byways of existence—on a scale and in a manner which has hardly any parallel in the history of the world. As a consequence there is scarcely any system

of philosophy cultivated in Ancient Greece, propounded by the Mediæval Church, or set forth by philosophers of the present day that has not its analogue somewhere in the long, checkered, but none the less fruitful history of Indian Philosophy. Of course it is not intended to deny that the philosophical problems of a people are more or less coloured by their scientific theories about the world, and that where the latter have attained the wonderful depth and precision of, say, the Modern Age of Science, the philosophical problems of that age are naturally set forth and argued with corresponding depth and precision. But it is nevertheless contended that, in relation to the data that evoke it, the *quality* of the intellectual reaction that ensues should be the same, and should deserve the same degree of credit, the actual intellectual contribution of a seer being proportionate to the speculative and scientific back-ground of his activity. In the particular case before us, we must also take note of the fact that while literary records of some fifty different Indian philosophical systems are still preserved to us, perhaps as many more philosophical systems have perished and are no longer available to us for study in extenso. It is, for instance, well known that the Lord Buddha, attempting a succinct review of the 'heretic' cults, creeds, and doctrines that were known to be current in his own day, enumerates no less than sixty-two such Darśanas, giving occasional details about a few of them; while the more formalistic enumeration in the more or less contemporaneous Jain Suttas under the four heads of Kriyāvāda, Akriyāvāda, Ajñānavāda and Vinayavāda totals as many as three hundred and sixty-three philosophical views known to Lord Mahāvīra; and although some of these views, possibly, might owe their existence merely to the Indian partiality for schematisation, we have still to remember that since the time of these enumerations a very large number of further and newer philosophies have also been originated and perfected by more than one thinker in different parts of India. Of

course, this very plethora of philosophical systems carries with it its own danger and drawback especially in a country like India which is so characteristically lacking in the historical sense, so much so that an eminent Indian scholar, not many years ago, was heard to declare from a public platform that he did not believe in such a thing as chronology in the case of the Indian philosophical systems, but that they have been existing all along more or less contemporaneously, so that every system could and did at will borrow from every other system. The method of studying philosophy in close correlation with history that has been advocated above and that is going to be followed in the sequel cannot of course subscribe to any such view. To take a concrete example, it is, in my opinion, absolutely impossible to determine the philosophical teaching of the Bhagavadgītā unless we have clear-cut views as to the relation of that work in its final form to Buddhism. Most people who have written on the subject assume *a priori* and, in my humble opinion, without sufficiency of evidence, that it is Post-Buddhistic, and thereby miss, as I hope to be able to show in a subsequent Lecture, an important *raison d'être* of that philosophical masterpiece. The exact allocation of the position of any one link in the chain necessarily involves the fixing of the relative position of the other links in the same, so that, except on the basis of a precise determination of the relative position of the different extant religio-philosophical works produced in Ancient and Mediæval India, it would be vain to think of building a superstructure of what might reasonably claim to be a reliable History of Philosophy.

Our present course of Lectures is not concerned with the whole History of Indian Philosophy in all its ramifications, but with only one branch of it: the Vedānta Philosophy. But even so, the field covered by it is sufficiently extensive, and presents its own peculiar problems and

difficulties. For, Vedānta does not denote any one specific school of thought in the sense in which we speak of the Philosophy of Plato or of Hegel, but it is a name which covers a tendency of thinking which is in evidence not only in some portions of the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads, or in the Bhagavadgītā and the Epics and the Purāṇas generally, but — not to mention the half-a-dozen and more Vedāntic schools strictly so called—it underlies and gives its peculiar tone to the devotional utterances of the Mediæval mystics and is not without its influence even upon the literary and philosophic writings of the present day in all the Provinces and Vernaculars of the Country. In fact it can be said without exaggeration that the present-day beliefs and practices of the average Hindu—diverse and divergent as they are from place to place and house to house—are ultimately projected upon the back-ground of the Vedānta Philosophy of some denomination or the other. So true is this that writers and preachers have arisen from time to time who have ascribed to Vedānta Philosophy the credit and the responsibility for all that India has achieved or suffered during the course of her long and eventful history, some calling Vedānta an unmitigated curse of the Land while others seeing in it the only hope of India's salvation. It is evident that when two such diametrically opposed judgments are passed with reference to one and the same subject, the authors of these judgments must be held to be rather thinking of two different aspects of the same. For, the term Vedānta—and here lies the real difficulty of our study—has not always and everywhere meant the same thing. Monism and Pluralism, Monotheism and Polytheism, can alike obtain their sanction from the Vedānta; and people claiming traditional allegiance to different deities, and differing entirely in their modes of life and worship, may yet proclaim themselves as followers of the Vedānta Philosophy and so wage an unending warfare amongst themselves. The only safe course under the circumstances is to pursue the strictly historical method

and determine what the term Vedānta has meant at the different stages of its evolution. It may ultimately turn out that, amidst all its vicissitudes of meaning, the term Vedānta does represent a specific unitary tendency in speculation, with a large option and latitude concerning certain minor aspects of its denotation. But, to begin with, the term will have to be understood in a sense appropriate for each of its developmental stages.

The term 'Vedānta' is generally explained to mean the *anta* or concluding portion of the *Veda*, taking Veda, with the commentators, to denote the Saṁhitās and Brāhmaṇas (including the Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads) of the different recensions of the Vedas (*mantrabrāhmaṇātmako vedaḥ*). This is a correct enough statement as far as it goes: only, not all the 'Vedānta' texts come at the end of the Brāhmaṇas. Some, like the Īśa or the Bāṣkala, form portions of the Saṁhitās themselves, while others, like the Aitareya and the Taittirīya, come in the middle of the Āraṇyakas and not at their very end, as is the case with the Chāndogya or the Bṛhadāraṇyaka. But merely to designate the location of a text is not to say anything about the nature of its contents. As a consequence, another mode of interpreting the term Vedānta is at times resorted to whereby *anta* is taken to imply the 'final or ultimate teaching' of the Veda. The major portion of the Vedic texts, it is well known, concern themselves with the details of the ritual, with the 'Karmakāṇḍa;' but the final teaching of the Veda is salvation through knowledge, or the 'Jñānakāṇḍa,'* and by the term Vedānta we are expected to understand those texts—irrespective of their relative position in the Scriptures—which preach the latter doctrine. But whether we

* We ignore for the present the doctrine of 'salvation through faith,' since faith can, from a certain point of view, be identified with knowledge.

understand Vedānta in the first or in the second sense, one inevitable corollary follows, viz., that Vedānta believes in the existence of a revealed and infallible Scripture, which it is the task of that Philosophy to correctly interpret. In this sense Vedānta is often styled the Uttara-mīmāñsā, or the science of exegesis as applied to the latter portion of the Veda, to distinguish it from the Pūrva-mīmāñsā which deals with the earlier or ritualistic part of the Veda. Now, although exegetics cramps the freedom of philosophic speculation, inasmuch as it has to acknowledge the unquestioned authoritativeness of a given body of texts, it has been proved more than once in the History of Philosophy—so, for exammple, in the case of Christianity in the Mediæval Ages—that a considerable freedom of speculation can prevail in spite of, and even along with, an absolute allegiance to a received dogma, in consequence of the extraordinary ingenuity of the human mind to deduce a desired meaning from the words of a given text. This in any case has been so outrageously true in the case of the Indian Mīmāñsists that one is prone to exclaim in despair—"Logic lacks foundation; the Scriptures widely diverge; and not a Sage is there whose word can be the final authority. The essence of Dharma lies deep in the cave: the path to follow is the one which the great majority (or, some outstanding Personality) retreads." Those however who do not like to see Vedānta reduced to a mere process of text-torturing—at times dignified with the name of Theology—propose a third way of understanding the term Vedānta. *Veda*, according to this interpretation, signifies 'knowledge' and *anta* 'the final aim or purpose.' Vedānta thus denotes the highest knowledge that man is capable of reaching, the knowledge, in other words, of the true Reality or the Absolute. This mode of interpretation certainly brings Vedānta on a par with the function and goal of Philosophy as it is generally understood in the West; but the interpretation, I am afraid, will have to be pronounced as unhistorical.

But quite apart from this question of the exact interpretation of the term Vedānta, it is worth considering in all its implications the charge that is at times brought against the Vedānta when it is described as being merely a system of Theology, and not Philosophy in the modern acceptance of the term. And in any case, before we launch upon a series of Lectures on 'Vedānta Philosophy' it is meet that we should consider if Vedānta deserves to be called Philosophy at all. Now, it must at once be conceded that Vedānta of every denomination subordinates Reason to Authority, admits the impossibility of the disciple realising the ultimate goal of existence, howsoever divergently conceived, without the intervention and assistance of a qualified *Guru*, and considers its only task and supreme purpose to consist in attempting a 'Samanvaya' of the Scriptures, in trying to establish, that is to say, that the apparently divergent Scriptural texts, on ultimate analysis and by a rigorous application of the canons of interpretation, agree in proclaiming a harmonious and self-consistent body of teaching in metaphysics as well as in ethics, in psychology as well as in epistemology, and in the details of world-creation no less than in the minutiæ of the ritual and the graded sequence of emancipation. All this would seem to decide the question against Vedānta being Philosophy; but there are important considerations on the other side that it will not do to ignore outright. In the first place it is essential to remember that the ultimate Scriptural texts upon which the whole fabric of Vedānta Philosophy rests—the Upaniṣads—are, for the most part and with the well-known exceptions excepted, inquiries after the Truth conducted more or less along the approved methods of philosophical disquisitions in the average European text-books of Philosophy. The most outstanding example of this is of course the instruction of Śvetaketu by his father (Chān. Up. vi. 12–16), where the lesson that a mysterious unitary principle can underlie the phenomenal manifold is brought home to the pupil by the experimental

illustrations of (1) the seedkin within the seedkin, which is beyond the ken of the eye (and the other senses) but which in fact has developed into the expanding and down-wending Banian tree before us ; of (2) the salt that is lost in the water but that is revealed by taste and can be re-perceived once more (śaśvat saṁvartate) if the liquid is allowed to settle or dry up.* Then, passing on to non-physical categories, of (3) the idea of a familiar scene (the Gandhāra country) which is present in the back of the consciousness of the man from Gandhāra, but which has to be made explicit bit by bit by contrast with scenes differing from the one already familiar to him ; † of (4) the gradually failing consciousness of the dying man, the spark of whose life, if per chance revived by a potent medicine, can resume the functional activities which otherwise exist only in a dormant embryonic state in the warmth of the body, with the extinction of which the man dies ; and lastly, of (5) the guilt or innocence of the person undergoing the trial by ordeal, which, although present as an ethical fluid—if I may so call it—in the man all along, becomes manifest only after the actual ordeal. There are other Upaniṣadic texts besides the one just expounded where conviction is sought to be produced by an appeal to the experience of the wakeful, dreaming and sound-sleep conditions ; so that when the authoritative Vedāntic texts which are, so to say, the corner-stones of the whole philosophical edifice make a free appeal to

* Reading *abhi + pra + asya*. With the reading *abhitāpya*, the idea would be to recover the salt in the water by evaporation. — The illustration of the salt is slightly more convincing than that of the seedkin, because the lost salt is still perceivable by taste. Not so the seedkin.

† A very good parallel to illustration No. 3 is the way in which we solve a geometrical rider. We have an implicit idea of the correct solution, which enables us to reject the false solutions and recognise the true one the moment it dawns upon us. For No. 4 a modern parallel would be the slowly vanishing consciousness of a man placed under chloroform.

rational experimentation, and seek to establish their conclusions by a more or less strictly objective method, we cannot object to these conclusions being later cited as authorities, any more than we can object to Euclid when he cites a theorem already proved, in establishing a subsequent theorem.

In the second place, we must not lose sight of the fact that Indian Philosophy in general, and the Vedānta Philosophy in particular, has always had an intensely practical aim. It was never taken up in the way in which we cultivate Philosophy in our modern Schools and Universities, viz., as a mere intellectual discipline. Its votary was an earnest seeker after Truth who, worried by certain problems of the world, was prepared to risk everything for their correct solution, and never remained content unless and until he realised the object of his quest. He never cared to *study* Philosophy: he preferred to *live* it and die for it. This being so, the ultimate sanction for the Vedānta is not so much *Śruti* or Scriptures as the *Sākṣātkāra* or Self-realisation. We have in fact in our standard texts* clear enough statements where the Śruti is distinctly relegated to the realm of *Avidyā* or Nescience. The Scriptures at the most can only perform the negative service of eradicating all false notions about the Reality. They bring the pupil upto the brink of the ocean of Reality, but the plunge into the ocean and the joy of swimming into it is what he must achieve *by his own individual effort* (Uddhared ātmanâtmānam). The Scriptures, in so far as they are the faithful records of the experience of those that have achieved the swimming, may be relied upon merely to establish the *possibility* of such achievements, but no word-descriptions as to how one feels while swimming can take the place of actually feeling it for one's own

* Saṅkara's Brahmasūtrabhāṣya (iv. 1. 12)—*Aniyojya-brahmātmatva-pratipatteḥ śāstrasyâviṣayatvāt.*

self. It is thus evident that Vedānta is much more than mere Mīmāṅsā. The Guru has achieved the "Sākṣātkāra" in his own person and he makes the approved pupil see eye to eye with himself. The pupil's only 'Scripture' is the Guru, who is to point him the way to Self-realisation; and if in subsequent disquisitions, for whatever purposes undertaken, the usual Scriptures are cited at all, they are merely to support a conclusion which has been already reached *independently of the Scriptures.* There is of course a world of difference between such subordinate use of the Scriptures, and an absolute dependence on them for all arguments and findings whatsoever.

Then too it is worth noting that Modern Philosophy which lays claim to a strictly objective and rationalistic procedure cannot absolutely dispense with an appeal to experience. When the Psychologist tries to explain how we come to have the perception of Space and Time; when Descartes, looking within himself, avers that one of the most clear and distinct and innate ideas that he finds therein is the idea of God, the most perfect being; when Kant, being driven to extremes, makes his famous statement about the starry heaven above and the moral law within; when Hegel, thinking out a thought in the abstract, educes from a given thesis its own antithesis, and then their synthesis in a higher positive; or finally when, in the present-day philosophical controversies between Pragmatism, Idealism, and New Realism, arguments are adduced to carry a given conviction home: is not the appeal in each case eventually to the introspective consciousness of the average intelligent man? This will be clear if we consider for a moment the way in which our mind reacts upon a given philosophical argument before pronouncing upon its adequacy or otherwise. If our Vedāntic philosopher in the same way carried his final appeal to Sākṣātkāra, that is no reason why we should deny to him the title of a philosopher. It has of course to be

conceded that the Sākṣātkāra was not to be attained by any average man on the street. Neither however is such a man always capable of following all the arguments in Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*, or in Einstein's *Law of Relativity.* And the case was rendered further complicated in the case of the Indian philosophers who, in consequence of their breath-control and other Yogic practices, (to the possibilities of which modern Science is only just waking up), appealed to certain peculiar "Yogic" experiences which only the trained adepts could realise in their own person. In fact, it was just because the experiences to which the Vedāntic philosopher appealed did not always lie within the easy reach of all, that he found it necessary to appeal, as a *pis aller*, to the Scriptures which might be taken to embody the capitalised experience of the peculiarly gifted section of humanity, gathering down from precedent to precedent.

In actual practice, if we find our Vedāntic writers frequently citing authorities and bandying them to and fro in the course of their argumentations, it must not be ignored that their controversies are in most cases waged against opponents who do not disclaim the authority of the Scriptures: for instance, against the rival Vedāntic schools. In such cases of course we cannot take any exception to their procedure. When however, on the other hand, the controversies lie with opponents who do not acknowledge the authority of the Veda—say, the Buddhists—the Vedāntin is invariably seen to make the appeal to no tribunal higher than Reason. And even otherwise, Śaṅkarācārya, for instance, is creditably anxious to carry on the warfare even with his rival "Vedāntins" within the domain of Reason as far as possible. We can even say that this was the distinct advance that Śaṅkarācārya made over the philosophical view-point of Bādarāyaṇa, as I hope to be able to show in another Lecture. To the Scriptures the Ācārya assigns (Br. Sū. Bhā. III. i. 25) a two-fold function, in regard to

which their authoritativeness according to him must pass unchallenged: (1) where it is a question of deciding what human activities produce what *apūrva* the fruition of which may come in this life or in the next; and (2) where it is a question of ascertaining the nature of an admittedly ultra-sensuous Reality like Brahman. But beyond this even the Scriptures cannot go. They cannot claim to determine for us the nature of ordinary phenomena,* where the *anubhava* of the senses, and the deductions of reason as based upon the *anubhava* of the senses, are and must remain the sole authority. Nor is their assistance needed in determining the probable consequences of ordinary secular actions, where induction and deduction may be safely trusted to be our guide. Our philosopher goes still further. He admits that even in matters which fall within the exclusive sphere of the Scriptures, inasmuch as these texts have to be interpreted aright, the help of Tarka or reasoning of the right type is an essential requisite: the question as to whether this particular interpretation supported by this set of reasons or that other interpretation supported by another distinct set of reasons is really the correct one being ultimately determined only at the bar of *anubhava* or *sākṣātkāra*—preferably your own, but so long as you are not in a position to attain it yourself, that of a reliable Guru or Āpta. The ultimate position then with reference to the relation of subservience between Experience, Reason, and Authority is as follows: Reason—and by this term we should be understood to include Analogy and the other Pramāṇas admitted by traditional Vedānta—gets its eventual sanction from Experience, and so likewise does the authority of the Scriptures. Scriptures are therefore subordinate to Reason where we are concerned with matters of actual sensuous *anubhava*, such as the heat of the fire. On

* As Saṅkara clearly says (Gītābhāṣya, Ānand. Ed. p. 535)—"Even a hundred Śrutis, declaring fire to be cold and without light, cannot prove authoritative."

the other hand, Reason has to yield the palm to the Scriptures where it is a question of matters where Scriptures can appeal to a distinct supra-sensuous experience of their own. Eventually the Vedānta acknowledges only *one* criterion of truth, viz. *anubhava*. Such being the case, it will certainly not do to style Vedānta as mere exegetics, or dogmatism, or theology, or whatever other appellation it may be fashionable to use to characterise the system.

The remarks made in the preceding paragraph will be found to hold true in the case of all the schools and denominations of the Vedānta. With reference to the Vedānta of the Śaṅkara school an objection is at times urged which, for the sake of completing the present topic under discussion, I prefer to dispose of at this place, although it should more properly have formed part of another subsequent Lecture. As is well known, Śaṅkarācārya acknowledges two grades of truths: the *vyāvahārika-satya* and the *pāramārthika-satya*, or the conventional and the absolute truth, the one sense-born and hence rooted in the ignorance of dualism, and the other intuitive or ultra-sensuous and so leading to absolute non-dualism. Passages enough can be quoted from the Ācārya's writings wherein the former is compared to darkness which cannot co-exist with, which is in fact entirely negated by, the illumination of the latter. Every attentive reader of Śaṅkara's works knows how he constantly shifts from the conventional to the absolutistic point of view in interpreting texts from the Upaniṣads. But however convenient, it is urged by certain critics of the Advaita Vedānta, such a double-pouched procedure might have proved in the task of effecting a *samanvaya* between the divergent utterances of the Scriptures, it evidently betrays "a radical philosophical defect in the system" seeing that it admits no one certain criterion of truth. If against this we essay to point out that *anubhava* can be that "one certain criterion of truth" for *vyavahāra* as well as *paramārtha*, we are reminded that inas-

much as the *anubhava* of *vyavahāra* is falsified by the *anubhava* of *paramārtha*, *anubhava* per se can no longer stand as a real criterion of truth. It seems however to be forgotten by the other side that, according to the Śaṅkara Vedānta, even the *anubhava* of *vyavahāra* does not derive its validity because of a supposed "correspondence between the thing outside and its representation by our mind;" for, if that were so, inasmuch as the agency which is to vouch for this "correspondence" or *saphala-pravṛtti* is no other than the subsequent sense-perception, the argument could be seen to clearly proceed in a circle. The validity of ordinary sense-perception follows because, as a later text points out, in every perceptive act there does ensue an identity between the 'Caitanya' or Brahman underlying the percipient and the same 'Caitanya' as underlying the object perceived, leading to an eventual knowledge of their essential identity in being or *sattva*, without any consciousness of such knowledge, or, for the matter of that, of the distinction between the subject and the object, the instrument and the fruit. This *sattva* is the only element of truth in an objective perception. The particular attributes of perception—e. g., the colour and the taste of the orange—are mutable, subjective, unreal; and it is vain of any system of philosophy to endeavour to compile evidence of the correspondence between my present representation of the orange and the actual objective qualities inherent in it. — And, now, wherein consists the truth of the *anubhava* of the *pāramārthika* state? Why, just in the realisation of the identity of the 'Thou' with the 'That' without the consciousness of that realisation. The drop that was taken out of the ocean has been funded back into it so that it no longer retains its individuality as a drop or even the consciousness of it. Its life henceforward has become one with the infinite life of the ocean, the cramping limitations of individuality having fallen away not only with reference to the future, but also with reference to the past—if indeed we can at all apply the category of Time to

that truly "timeless" existence. That the temporary identity between the percipient and the perceived of the type above described does take place in any act of ordinary (*vyāvahārika*) sense-perception, of this one can very easily convince oneself by analysing one's experience while reading, say, an absorbing novel. When deeply engrossed in the act, there no longer persists the distinction between the reader and the pages read, and there is not even any consciousness of the joy that is being derived from the reading. When, a moment later, the reader becomes self-conscious and thinks how very charming the story or the description has been, he is no longer reading the novel. Similarly, in the other case, that the permanent or timeless identity between 'Thou' and 'That' does take place you can, by the grace of Guru, realise in your own life; though you must, till that happens, rely upon the Scriptures that vouch for its possibility. It will thus be seen that, strictly understood, there is not in the Advaita system any setting up of a double standard of truth. The '*sattā-advaita*' of the *vyāvahārika anubhava* is true, and is *not* sublated, but is only accentuated in the *pāramārthika anubhava*. All the other factors of the *vyāvahārika anubhava* are but the envelopes of untruth; and they alone disappear in the *pāramārthika anubhava,* which is made up exclusively of the truth alone and not of a combination of truth with falsehood. We thus see that there are not two truths in the Vedānta, but only one truth, which happens, in one condition, to be diluted with untruth: *satyânṛte mithunīkṛtya.........naisargiko 'yaṁ lokavyavahāraḥ*, as Śaṅkarācārya puts it (BS. Bhāṣya, Intro.). Because the *asatya* factors are excessively preponderant in the vyavahāra state, it is somewhat loosely stated that the whole of vyavahāra is negated in the Paramārtha: what is really negated in the Paramārtha are only the *asatya* factors. If a hundred percent of the vyāvahārika anubhava were false, Śaṅkarācārya could not have logically lifted his cudgels against the Buddhistic Śūnyavâda. Compare also the familiar distinction which the author of the

Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya makes between the Vedāntic and the Negativist positions:

> Saugata-Brahmavādinor ayaṁ viśeṣo yadādimaḥ ।
> Sarvasya mithyātvam brūte, dvitīyas tadananyatām ॥

But it is perhaps unnecessary at this stage to labour the point any further. Sufficient, it may be presumed, has been urged in what precedes to expose the hollowness of the view which refuses to designate the Vedānta as Philosophy properly so called. To do so would, in our opinion, be as great an injustice as to ignore the claims of the great Schoolmen of Mediæval Europe to the title of accurate thinkers and philosophers. Such aspersions very often come from persons who have not taken the trouble to read the original sources deeply and critically. Those that have taken the trouble to do so have given ungrudging testimony to the logical acumen, the breadth of vision, the closeness of argumentation, and the general soundness of the philosophical conclusions of the mighty Schoolmen of India as well as of Europe.

While therefore Advaitic Vedānta, viewed as an abstract and rational System of Philosophy as set forth in certain independent tractates as also in the "utsūtra" *obiter dicta* of the Bhāṣyakāras, can be safely trusted to maintain its own position, it has to be conceded that the majority of the Vedāntic works—to whatever school or persuasion they may belong—aim at little more than exegesis, and as such rise rarely above the level of dogmatism or theology. The orthodox Vedāntin, believing in the revealed character of the Scriptural Text or Texts that he selects and comments upon, naturally wants to establish the veracity of every single word or statement contained in that Scripture. "The Truth can be only one," and all revealed texts early as well as late must pronounce just that one Truth correct in every single phase or detail of it, and must contain nothing

else and nothing more and nothing less. To the modern critic such a position is untenable and unhistorical. He takes an evolutionary standpoint and believes that man's knowlege of the world, the accuracy of his conception of it, and the success of his efforts to reduce the phenomenal manifold to an orderly system, must grow with time and bear an ascertainable relation to his social and intellectual surroundings. In my opinion there seems to be no reason why the normal orthodox view-point and this evolutionary view-point should exclude each other. Why can it not be supposed that a given philosophical doctrine would be revealed to man only gradually and in strict conformity with the needs and conditions of the age? In any case, the "Vedānta" has appeared historically in more than one school and through more than one setting; and for the impartial student it becomes impossible to accept any one of these schools exclusively as teaching the absolute and final truth in all matters of theory as well as of practice, and to condemn the others as heresy. The different "schools" of Vedānta can, on ultimate analysis, be shown to exhibit agreement on certain basic principles, although they may seem to shift the emphasis now on this aspect of the problem, now on that aspect, and to incidentally raise a number of very minor and subordinate and often unphilosophical issues, which the followers of the different antagonistic schools accentuate and magnify out of all proportions. Why not assume that these differences are not only *pratipattibhedāt* or *vineyabhedāt*, but also *deśakālaparisthityanusārāt*: are, that is to say, a direct consequence of the power of comprehension and the outlook on life, as well as the factors peculiar in the social, intellectual and religious environments of the people amongst whom the specific doctrines and practices came to be first preached and propagated? Our study of Philosophy can be made uncommonly interesting as well as instructive if, taking the Hegelian attitude in the matter, we endeavour to explain each system and each school of philosophy as a

criticism of, and a reaction against, the Society which brought it forth. Such a view need not exclude absolutely the appearance, once in a while, of an individual philosopher here and there with a towering genius who may be several stages in advance of the average level of thought reached by the age, any more than it need shut out the converse phenomenon of some straggling and antiquated system of thought putting in a belated appearance, if warranted by certain exceptional circumstances congenial to its growth. The march of evolution indeed very rarely proceeds in a direct rectilinear course of advance; nor is it always a wave-like propagation with periodic summits and troughs, but maintaining a steady progress beneath its alternating ups and downs: it may often be retrograde and whirlpool-wise, and we may need all the faith that we can summon up to our assistance to believe that the motion is not circular, but is at least spiral. Hence, even in the historical view, there is available to the believing orthodoxy all the scope that it needs for the working of an omniscient and merciful Providence occasionally coming to the assistance of the struggling and thinking humanity. At any rate, in this course of Lectures that I am here called upon to deliver, I propose, to the extent that it may be feasible with the scanty evidence that can be marshalled out in proof, not merely to present a logical exposition of the specific schools and tendencies of "Vedānta" Philosophy, but to show the relation that each of them bears to the peculiar social, political, moral, and religious features and problems of the age, and the way in which each essayed the task of solving them. Such an attempt to elucidate the developmental History of Indian Philosophy in close association with the cultural background, so far as I know, has not yet been consistently made from beginning to end; and I am led to think that, if successfully carried out, it may help to mitigate the rivalries of the schools, and promote amongst them, in no small measure, a general friendly understanding of each other's point of view.

In this preliminary Lecture we considered the general nature and function of Philosophy, pointing out how the varying social and cultural environments of a people give rise to distinct Histories of Philosophy for different ages and peoples. We next took up the question of the History of Indian Philosophy in general, and of the "Vedānta" Philosophy in particular, discussing incidentally the connotations and implications of the term "Vedānta." Lastly, we disposed of the question as to whether the Vedānta could properly be called "Philosophy" in the strict acceptance of the term, or whether it should not more accurately be ranked as exegetic theology, especially in view of the alleged setting up of a double standard of truth by one denomination of the Vedānta in particular: the Māyā-Advaita of Śaṅkarācārya. We are now in a position therefore to proceed to a study of the origins of the Vedānta Philosophy in the Upaniṣads, and then critically examine its varying forms and aspects, cults and schools, throughout its long and eventful history of more than a score of centuries. We have of course agreed to proceed in our study on strictly historical lines, treating the philosophical products of an age as the consequences, more or less, of the racial and cultural factors at work within the society. It is only at the end of such a historical study that we can be in a position to profitably indulge in certain broad generalisations about Vedānta Philosophy in the abstract, comparing the Vedāntic movement in India with some of the cognate movements in the philosophical histories of Greece, and of Mediæval and Modern Europe, bringing out in bold relief the characteristic excellences and limitations of Indian achievements in the field.

LECTURE II

UPANIṢADIC VEDĀNTA

THE Upaniṣads constitute the first "Prasthāna," starting-point, or body of authoritative texts, that the "Vedānta" recognises. But the question that has to be raised at the outset is, which of the two hundred and odd texts that claim this hallowed name—whether all of them, or only some of them; and these some again whether in their entirety or only in selected parts; and finally, whether any other Upaniṣads now no longer extant and any other texts, say from the Saṁhitās and the Brāhmaṇas, that are extant, but happen not to be designated Upaniṣads—are intended to be included in this first "Prasthāna"? Now, it would seem clear that nearly nine-tenths of the listed Upaniṣads are late sectarian products discussing Symbolical-Ritualism, Tāntrism, Occultism, and what not, but no Philosophy as such. These texts, therefore, chronologically and otherwise, may safely be ignored for the present, although they may not have been without influence upon certain late phases of Vedānta Philosophy that we have to deal with on a subsequent occasion. Secondly, even the recognised score or so of the principal Upaniṣads—take the Chāndogya as the most outstanding example—contain portions dealing with certain "Upāsanās" and the like, which, albeit discussed at length in the 'Guṇopasaṁhāra' section of the Vedānta-sūtras, will have to be practically ignored by us because they do not, strictly speaking, have anything to do with the "anta" or the ultimate metaphysical teaching of the Veda. But more important still, amongst certain portions of the Ṛg and the Atharva Vedas, and more particularly in parts of the Brāhmaṇas that happen not to be called Upaniṣads, there are texts that deserve to be, and have in fact actually been, cited as the authoritative Ved-

āntic texts. And it is a minor consideration that some of the texts so cited are known to us only from these citations,* so that we can have only a partial and incomplete idea of the nature and contents of the texts that passed as the first Prasthāna for the majority of the Bhāṣyakāras.†

But confining our attention to the texts that are extant and universally recognised as the First Prasthāna, is it not somewhat surprising to find amongst these a number of texts —at times indeed identically worded texts—a few hailing equally from the Ṛgveda and the Atharvaveda and the Brāhmaṇas, by the side of those derived from the Upaniṣads properly so called? Thinking in the groove set up by Max Müller, if we consider the age of the Ṛgveda as separated from that of the Atharvaveda, that of the Vedas again from that of the Brāhmaṇas, and this last once more from the age of the Upaniṣads—no matter by how many centuries of years —we have to account for the appearance of the same, or practically the same, philosophical or speculative doctrine in literatures divided from one another by so many hundreds of years. It cannot be the case of a later text invariably borrowing from an older one, because some of these later texts seem evidently unconnected with the older; nor a case of gradual philosophical development, because there is little developmental difference between some newer texts and their originals or analogues in the earlier literature. Here then we have to do with one of the most common but none the less puzzling phenomena that meet us at every stage of the History of Ancient Indian Literature; and the way to explain it is not to assume that the age of the

* This is glaringly so in the case of the "Śrutis" cited by Madhvācārya, although sporadic instances of the type are not wanting in the works of the other Ācāryas.

† In this connection it will do if I mention that four genuinely old Upaniṣads I published for the first time only a few months ago. See the Report of the Madras Oriental Conference, 1924, pp. 17–40.

Saṁhitās or that of the Brāhmaṇas was completely terminated before the subsequent literary age began. The Vedas, no less than the Brāhmaṇas and even the more ancient Upaniṣads, contain portions older and portions newer; and there is nothing to prevent the newest productions of one literary period being actually contemporaneous with the earliest productions of the next.

We know for instance how the case stands with the Ṛgveda. That Veda itself speaks of some of its hymns as belonging to the older period, some to the middle, some to the new, and some even to the newer and the newest. But when it comes to find actual proofs, it is well known how the grammatical and stylometric arguments of Arnold (*Historical Vedic Grammar*) were counterbalanced by those derived by Bloomfield from the "Repetitions in the Ṛgveda," so that it became a drawn game and the "pins could at any time be set up to be bowled down again." In a paper that I had the honour to read in this very place some three years ago* I thought I was able to adduce, from a consideration of the 'Aikapadika' section of the Nighaṇṭu list of Ṛgvedic words, an independent *objective* evidence for regarding certain hymns in that Veda as forming a newer addition to the Canon. And if we attentively compare these hymns with the bulk of the others, we seem to notice in them some of the characteristics that we are taught to associate with the next or Ātharvaṇa period. There are some features of this accreted portion, such as unfamiliar ethnic and geographical names, rise of newer god-types, change in the spirit of worship, dominance of magic and priest-craft, and a more dismal outlook upon life here and hereafter, which I propose to explain by the hypothesis—I wish to call it at present by no other name—that the earliest part of the Ṛgveda was composed "beyond the Hindukush, to the West and North of it" if not actually

*Report of the Second All-India Oriental Conference, Calcutta, 1922, pages 11 ff.

nearer the shores of the Caspian Sea; and that at the time of this 'newer' Veda the people were moving in the direction of the Land of the Five Rivers. In the course of this advance we have further to assume that the "Aryans" encountered a people who resembled in their cult and features those that they had already come across in the Caspian Steppes and in Assyro-Babylonia.* This probably led to a race-fusion, involving a change in the economic basis and the religious practices of the two peoples; and this change we see further accentuated in the period of the Atharvaveda.

As to the general character of the Atharvaveda I have only to refer to the accounts detailed in the current histories of Sanskrit literature, and as to the relation of that Veda—or certain portions of it—to the religion and mythology of Chaldea or Assyro-Babylonia, to B. G. Tilak's paper† on the "*Chaldean and Indian Vedas.*" It was at one time usual to explain the change from the simpler nature-worship of the Ṛgveda to the magic and demonolatry of the Atharvaveda as a degeneration effected under the machinations of the priesthood. As against this it was urged by Bloomfield‡ that, inasmuch as magic and demonolatry were, normally, the earlier phases in the history of a people, rather than postulate the degeneration of the historically posterior into the historically prior, it would be more reasonable to regard

* To style them "Dravido-Sumerians" would be premature, if not actually inaccurate; but it would seem that they had much in common with both the constituents of the hyphenated name, and the view seems to be gaining ground that the "Dravidians" had once occupied Central Asia and were the predecessors of the Aryans in the invasion and colonisation of India. That this colony once spread from Central Asia right upto the deserts of Rajputana is what the new finds at Mohenjo-Daro and elsewhere would seem to point to.

† R. G. Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume, pp. 29 ff.

‡ Religion of the Veda, 1908, pp. 76 f.

the two phases as at least contemporaneous, the one confined to the 'hieretic' class and the other permeating the rest of the people. Now, Bloomfield seems to be influenced by a slight prejudice against the 'hieretic' class, which has at times landed him into some not very happy or tenable positions.* But as regards the present point at issue, would not the above hypothesis of a continued race-fusion explain the facts much more easily and cogently? That many portions of the present Ṛgveda were composed during the era of this Ātharvaṇic influence it will require very little persuasion for a Vedic scholar to admit; and hence probably it is that the philosophic sections of the two Vedas breathe nearly the same spirit and at times even exhibit the same set expressions and formulas.

Coming to the tracts known as the Brāhmaṇas, we have, to begin with, so early an authority as Pāṇini (iv. 3. 105) informing us that some Brāhmaṇas were, in his days, regarded as ancient as compared with the others which were relatively modern. Also there is a mass of linguistic and other evidence which easily enables one to assign the different Brāhmaṇas and even different portions of one and the same Brāhmaṇa to different chronological periods. The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa in the Mādhyaṁdina recension, for instance, falls into five disparate parts, namely, (1) Kāṇḍas vi to ix; (2) Kāṇḍas i to v; (3) Kāṇḍa x; (4) Kāṇḍas xi–xiii; and (5) Kāṇḍa xiv—while portions within these parts can be suspected of being still later interpolations. And this is the case with most of the extant twenty-odd Brāhmaṇa texts so far known to us. The whole literary activity of the Brāhmaṇas can, on the basis of evidence which it is perhaps unnecessary to here specify, be divided into seven or eight distinct chronological groups, each separated from the other by a distance

* For example, his attempt to regard ṚV. X. 121. 10 as constituting an original part of the Sūkta, in spite of the fact that the stanza was unknown to the Padapāṭha.

of at least two or three generations.* All this is generally conceded, and consequently the whole Brāhmaṇa activity believed to have extended over some five centuries or more. And if Yāska the author of the Nirukta is to be taken to have quoted one of the latest of the Brāhmaṇa texts, the Gopatha, the chronological limits of the Brāhmaṇa period will have to be placed somewhere between B. C. 1800 and B. C. 1000.†

The real problem about the Brāhmaṇas, however is to explain their *raison d'etre.* The Brāhmaṇas constitute a literary phenomenon for which there is no other parallel in the whole history of the world, and as such most engaging and original epithets have often been showered upon them by more than one scholar. Thus Max Müller compared them to "the twaddle of idiots and the raving of madmen," characterising their contents as "marked by shallow and insipid grandiloquence, by priestly conceit, and antiquarian pedantry." Oldenberg spoke of the way in which the authors of these texts rivalled with one another in "trumping up an older contradiction with a newer and yet more eccentric contradiction;" and writers enough have commented adversely upon their superstitious faith in the efficacy of the sacrifice and their most childish appeals to the Deva-Asura

* See the Table in Belvalkar and Ranade's *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 36.

† In spite of the evidence for its relative lateness based upon a careful tabulation of the facts of grammar and syntax, to regard the Śatapatha as a very early Brāhmaṇa, because it is accented, or because it contains an astronomical reference like the oft-cited passage about the constellation of the Kṛttikās, is of doubtful probative value. Originally all the genuine Brāhmaṇic texts must have been accented. That only some of them have kept the accents to the present day merely proves their careful preservation at the hands of an unbroken line of teachers and taught. The astronomical reference also admits of an easier and more natural explanation, which would be consistent with the data in the Śatapatha as well as the other Brāhmaṇas.

stories to explain even the flimsiest details of ritualism, their outrageous etymological quibbles, and their proneness to posit relations and assign reasons where none really exist or are called for. And yet, buried in a mass of chaff, the Brāhmaṇas afford such valuable linguistic and literary and mythological material, and form such an "inexhaustible mine for the history of the sacrifice, religious practices, and the institutions of priesthood" that even Bloomfield has to concede that these Brāhmaṇas "compel the student of Hinduism that comes to scoff to stay to pray." It is also generally admitted that the Brāhmaṇas constitute so-to-say the veritable seed-bed for the Upaniṣadic Philosophy, and in orthodox India they are considered as Revealed Scriptures quite on a par with the Vedic Saṁhitās themselves, although they are known to have been merely discursive commentaries on the latter. Finally, the most puzzling fact about these Brāhmaṇas is the relation in which their religion and mythology stand to those of the Avestic people, the deities and the demons of the former becoming respectively the devils and the gods of the latter, the ritual of the one being made deliberately antagonistic to that of the other: if the Brāhmaṇas, for instance, considered the North-East as the great direction of triumph and auspiciousness, the Avesta not failing to locate their Hell in that region! The problem accordingly is to find out what peculiar facts in the social, political, and religious histories of these peoples it must have been that gave rise to such a strange phenomenon and such an "enigmatic" literary activity as the Brāhmaṇas present before us.

Once more, I prefer to have recourse to an hypothesis, which can be disproved positively by the discovery of facts that would not square with it, and negatively by the formulation of another rival hypothesis that could explain the actual facts of the case better and more consistently. Let us assume that during the Ātharvaṇic period and before the

Āryans actually entered the Land of the Five Rivers, they made a prolonged stay on the other side of the Indus and the Hindukush, magic and demonolatry slowly but steadily invading their religious life in which the priesthood played the dominating rôle. And then suddenly — either through the working of internecine rivalries in the ranks of the priests, or possibly through the arrival of a fresh colony of nature-worshipping Āryans on the scene, or through some such assignable cause—a section of the people start a cry for a "return to the purer worship of our forefathers" and raise a standard of revolt. Let us call these revolters the Devas, who were of course kith and kin with the Asuras, as the Brāhmaṇas never fail to tell us. The Devas struggled long but in vain, and were eventually compelled to secede from the common country, making a détour by *their own* North-East (the direction of triumph) into the Panjab, and bringing with them the knowledge of just a few traditions and of only such Scriptures—say the Sāmaveda of the later period—as they carried in their memory. The great task before this seceding minority of the Devas, once they were securely in possession of their new home, was to *establish newer traditions* of cult and worship and to *justify* them, and also to recover the knowledge of their 'Scriptures' from their Asura cousins, if possible. The familiar Paurāṇic story of the recovery of the stolen Vedas in the Fish Incarnation, or of the deception practised by Kaca upon Śukrācārya the Asura preceptor, may in this connection be regarded as only the disguised and perverted versions of actual facts. The Devas probably did recover the Ṛgveda in parts, and it is not unlikely that a part may have been composed by them and added to the original canon.* And in the matter of justifying the ritualistic traditions of which they claimed to be the fathers, it will be remembered that,

* It will be seen that the hypothesis places only the latest phases of Vedic literary activity on the soil of India proper.

when even fanciful etymologies, clap-trap identifications, *ad hoc* mythologies, and the sundry other aetiological devices which the Brāhmaṇas were in the habit of calling in, failed, there was left to these seceders one device that invariably proved their *open sesame* for all difficulties whatsoever: such and such a practice is the practice of the Asuras; that we should not be Asuras, *therefore* we should follow this other practice which is, and becomes, the practice of the Devas. — It is only fair to add that the authors of these traditions themselves believed in the reasons that they put forward, because of their unique faith in the efficacy, omnipotence and world-significance of the Sacrifice.

I have thought it necessary to go out of my way to put forth a couple of hazardous hypotheses without even supporting them by adequate facts (which I have to do elsewhere) because there appeared to be no other equally satisfactory way of explaining the peculiar point of view that underlies the lucubrations of the authors of the Brāhmaṇas. As this peculiar point of view shaped the course and determined the purpose of the philosophical speculations of the following or the Upaniṣadic period, let me succinctly summarise here its main features: The basic factor of the Brāhmaṇic ratiocination was an immaculate faith in the omnipotence of the Sacrifice. Every single detail of it was believed to be full of untold potentialities for good or for evil according as it was well or ill performed. In fact all the happenings of the Universe—the Sun, rain, and harvest; births, deaths, and pestilences; the courses of the planets in their orbits, the success and stability of kingdoms, and the peace and prosperity of the people: nay, even such things as "the raw and red cow yielding hot, white milk" or the boneless semen producing creatures possessing bones — were believed to be the direct result of this or that feature of the Sacrifice. The gods and even the highest of them, Prajāpati, derived their god-hood from the Sacrifice. Even the world-

creation was a process of Sacrifice, as well as of *Tapas* as the indispensable preliminary of the Sacrifice; and it was the continuance of that process of Sacrifice that alone could sustain the world,—provided the Sacrifice was performed correct to the smallest detail of the prescription. In a knowledge of the minutiæ of the Sacrifice, knowledge of the why and the how of each of these infinite minutiæ, was naturally believed to lie the salvation not only of the sacrificing patron and of his household, but of the whole Universe; and this is worth emphasising in the light of the subsequent teachings of the Upaniṣads regarding the Jñāna-kāṇḍa. Secondly, since everything in the world could be somehow or other brought into direct or mediate relation with the Sacrifice, its performance formed, so to say, the bond of unity connecting all the diverse facts and phenomena of the Universe. Indra, for instance, was normally invoked with mantras in the Triṣṭubh metre, each quarter of which consisted of eleven syllables. The number eleven thus became sacred to god Indra, and everything to which that number could be applied was sacerdotally related to Indra as being a manifestation of his power, which peered through it—the number itself being, in due course of time, actually identified with Indra. In this way every single object in the world had some kind of a bond or *bandhutā* (to use the Brāhmaṇic technical term for it) with certain part or aspect of the Sacrifice, and therefore also, with every other object in the world which came under this *bandhutā* relation. From this ritualistic generalisation of the Brāhmaṇas the way was easy to the realisation of the Unity of the All in some such mystic potence as the Brahman of the Upaniṣads, which, be it remembered, was originally an expression for the mantras chanted at the Sacrifice and for their mystic power. It will thus be evident that the *apotheosis* of the Sacrifice and the "Bandhutā" or the Identification philosophy of the Brāhmaṇas paved the way not only for the famous Upaniṣadic identification of the 'That' with the 'Thou,' but also

for the later-day notions that everything in the world had immanent in it a portion or an *aṁśa* of the Highest Principle, or that the best of a class had the largest *aṁśa* of the same or was its *Vibhūti*, or that the Absolute could descend down and incarnate, or assume an *Avatāra*, in the shape of the most eminent member of a class.*

There are a few other familiar features of Upaniṣadic speculation for which also the responsibility must rest with the Brāhmaṇas. For example, the Upaniṣadic tendency to huddle together all kinds of physical, metaphysical, psychological, and physiological categories—speaking of Beatific Bliss in one breath and bodily nourishment the next (cp. Tait. Up. iii. 6)—can properly be explained by the Brāhmaṇa theory of "correspondences" according to which every category of the physical world was believed to have its correlate or prototype in the domain of the Sacrifice, in the world of the Gods, in the sphere of human society, and in the province of the inner or psychological Self. And similarly it is to Brāhmaṇic methodology that we have eventually to trace the Upaniṣadic *penchant* for the argument by analogies—taking a proposition, that is to say, to have been established the moment you are able to adduce *one* similar case or adequate *dṛṣṭānta*—a mode of procedure which not only the Vedānta but the several other Systems of Philosophy also did not entirely discard. The Brāhmaṇas are extraordinarily rich in similes, metaphors, and analogies, which are sometimes quite original and striking, and are not-rarely drawn-out into minute details.† Similarly the Upaniṣads have been largely indebted to the Brāhmaṇas for their very frequent use of the *Pratīkas* or symbols, especially for the purpose of the *Upāsanas* or the meditations, which figure so

* Compare the Bhagavadgītā, Chap. 10.

† E. g. the Sacrifice as a Celestial Car (T. B., Ex. 27), the Bahiṣpavamāna as a Ship (ŚB. iv. 2.5.10), or the Human Body as the Heavenly Lute (AĀ. iii 2–5).

largely in the Upaniṣads and in which some scholars go to the length of even seeing their real essence. The doctrine of *Karman* or rather of the *Apūrva* or the novel and mystic fruit, which every detail of the ritual correctly performed was believed to produce, and which was bound to invariably ripen at its appointed period, was another idea which the Upaniṣads found ready to hand in the Brāhmaṇas. And above all else comes the keen thirst for knowledge—for discovering the why and the whither of things—which the 'Bandhutā' philosophy of the Brāhmaṇas engendered, but which it could not always quench, and which, therefore, was compelled to seek other channels, as we shall see, in the period of the Upaniṣads. The actual theme of the Lecture and the limits imposed by an evening's session will not permit my making any further observations on the nature of the contents of the Brāhmaṇas and on their philosophical contribution to the Upaniṣads properly so called. My immediate purpose here will be adequately served if, after what has been said above, we learn to credit the much maligned and generally neglected Brāhmaṇic texts with an honourable share in the shaping of the Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, which by itself has received at times an indiscriminating meed of praise.

Before attempting a nearer review of the Philosophy of the Upaniṣads which forms the main purpose of this Lecture I must advert to and discuss a popular notion about these texts that has found a place in most manuals on the subject, namely, the theory that the Upaniṣads constitute a revolt against the sacerdotal system of the Brāhmaṇas; and what is more, a revolt led by the Kṣatriyas against the dominance of the priests. The few actual passages from the Upaniṣads which form the basis of the theory have been so often quoted and requoted (and even misquoted and misinterpreted), that I shall give a mere reference to them in a foot-note.* Now

* Ch. i. 8–9, v. 3–10, v. 11–24, vii; Bṛ. ii. 1, v. 2; Kauṣ. i, iv; etc.

can this theory of the so-called Upaniṣadic revolt be adequately substantiated? On this question it has to be recalled, in the first place, that looking to the circumstances under which and the methods by which the new "Deva" ritual of the Brāhmaṇic period was elaborated and defended, it is evident of course that the ritual could never have become a perfect and self-consistent system. It must not be forgotten in this connection that the Brāhmaṇic ritual and theology was itself a revolt, practically, against the Asura traditions of worship, its constructive aspect being the habilitation of some sort of a newer sacerdotal tradition, provided it differed noticeably from that of the Asuras. This important work had to be achieved to justify their very existence; and due credit must be accorded to the fathers of this new tradition in that they accomplished the task and so set the newer tradition on all fours. The generation that endured the travails of bringing this tradition into being, and probably also the succeeding generation, was perfectly satisfied with the achievement. But the successors of these must have looked askance at the clap-trap method and humdrum aetiology which they found current there. The Brāhmaṇa Theologians had in fact elaborated their sacrificial machinery to an impossible extreme; for, when every one of the infinite minutiæ of the Sacrifice claimed an exclusive attention and importance for itself, the Sacrifice was bound to become a battle-ground for warring potences and prescriptions. As a result we find exhibited before us, even in the Brāhmaṇic texts themselves, the sorry spectacle of theologians wrangling and cursing and defying one another—the curses at least as often failing in their efficacy as succeeding. Such a state of things was bound to provoke another further revolt, and such a revolt against Brāhmaṇism did come in time; but the question that concerns us here immediately is, did the Upaniṣads as we have them before us raise the first standard of revolt? My answer to this, as will appear from the sequel, is in the negative. Then again, as regards the share belonging to the

"Kṣatriyas" in this so-called revolt, it may be quite true that Pravāhaṇa Jaivali (Ch. Up. I. 8 and V. 3. 7), Aśvapati Kaikeya (Ch. Up. V. 11), Ajātaśatru (Bṛ. Up. II. i.), Citra Gāṅgyāyani (Kauṣ. Up. I. 1), and Janaka (Ś. B. xi. 3. 1. 1 ff.) were all Kṣatriyas in possession of certain *vidyās* unknown to the Brahmans; but we must not forget that Yājñavalkya, the teacher of King Janaka, and Uddālaka Āruṇi the father of proud Śvetaketu—the two most outstanding Upaniṣadic personalities—were Brahmans; and what is yet more pertinent to note, that Kavaṣa Ailūṣa in the newly edited Chāgaleya Upaniṣad was a Śūdra, and that Sayugvā Raikva (or Raikva with the cart) was even an Atiśūdra or Pariah. We can, on the strength of the last mentioned cases, no more say that the Upaniṣads, *in their present form*, represent the Wisdom of the 'Depressed' classes than, on the strength of the earlier set of examples, declare that the Upaniṣads represent the Wisdom of the Kṣatriyas and not of the Brahmans, especially when it is remembered that the form in which some of the admittedly Kṣatriya *vidyās* (e. g., the Pañcāgnividyā in Ch. Up. V. 3ff.) are presented is quite sacerdotal or Brāhmaṇic. Ritualistic symbolism as also speculations *à la mode de* "Bandhutā" philosophy do occur in all the Upaniṣads,—a circumstance which would, under the theory of the "Wisdom of the Kṣatriyas," be rather unusual. We have to conclude therefore that if there took place a revolt at all, and if amongst its leaders a few Kṣatriyas were to be seen by the side of a few Brahmans and a few men of yet lower social status—all that must have happened *before* the Upaniṣads in their present form came to be compiled. Attention has to be invited in this connection particularly to the present form of the Upaniṣads. For, along with an occasional introduction of the newer doctrine, the majority of our Upaniṣads exhibit so much affinity to the Brāhmaṇic mode of reasoning that it is more proper to regard the Upaniṣads as a *compromise* with the Brāhmaṇas *after the revolt.* A 'compromise' of course implies a common danger, and in order to properly understand the

source and nature of this we must cease to think of the problem of the Upaniṣads along the groove set up by the controversy regarding the Upaniṣads being the "Wisdom of the Brahmans or of the Kṣatriyas" but rather turn our attention towards an adequate evaluation of factors such as the probable shifting of the geographical back-ground as well as of the ethnic and social environment that must have taken place between the age of the Brāhmaṇas and that of the Upaniṣads, and that gives us the proper *raison d'être* of the Upaniṣads in their present form.

In the first place, texts enough can be cited to prove that the centre of Vedic culture, which in the period of the earlier Brahmaṇas was located on the bank of the Sarasvatī in the Panjab, was, during the late Brāhmaṇa and the early Upaniṣadic period, shifted to the Delta between the Ganges and the Jumna and even still farther to the East and South. A well-known passage from the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (I. iv. 1. 10) speaks of the parts of the country then newly brought under the fold of Vedic culture as being originally without the cult of the Fire and of the Sacrifice. This would mean that the present spread of Brāhmaṇism presumably involved the question of occupying the homes of a people belonging to a different race and religion, after driving them still farther to the South and the East. It is easier to assume, on other grounds besides the presence of a sporadic Dravidian word like *maṭacī*, *miḍaci* in the Ch. Up. i. x 1, that these were the same people that, as we saw, the seceding Devas met at the threshold of India.* But, on the occasion of this second encounter of the two ethnically and culturally diversified peoples, the times were changed. The older danger from the "Asuras" was, for the late Brāhmaṇa period, of

* This would appear to be corroborated by the new finds in Sind. It is not unlikely that similar finds yet await the spade of the archaeologist in parts of Central India, and in the country still further to the West.

course a thing of the past. The new enemies whom they now tried to press further and further into the interior of India had probably already obtained a much firmer footing in the land, where they established a venerable and distinctive culture of their own. It was not possible that these would now easily bow down before the culture of their Aryan conquerors. On the other hand, the conquerors themselves probably found it convenient to borrow certain ideas and practices from the conquered, whom in course of time they were only too glad to admit within the fold of 'Aryanism.' Amongst such (adopted) ideas which we find now gaining prominence for the first time is the idea of "Bhakti" or devotion to such a personal god as Rudra-Śiva of an admittedly "Non-Aryan" origin; also the idea of the Transmigration of the Soul, having its ultimate origin in animism or totemism and being now placed on a philosophical foundation through an alliance with the Brāhmaṇa ideas of *Karman* and of retribution; possibly also the impulse to a life of renunciation and of a homeless wandering, apparently in search of the Highest God or Principle immanent in the world. With reference to this last item, it would seem quite possible that the 'homelessness' of the new peoples might have really been an after-effect of their defeat and their expulsion from home; but it is equally possible that, at this stage of their progress inland and eastward, the advancing Aryans came across some tribes of peoples who had not progressed beyond the nomadic stage. India never has been without a sufficient sprinkling of such *bairāgī* tribes carrying on their weird religious rites in the recesses of mountains and other sequestered places. To assume a contact of the Aryans with a swarm of such wandering tribes at this stage affords a better explanation of the sudden appearance, a few centuries later, of hundreds and thousands of the wandering orders of monks, separated into distinctive denominations, whom not only does the Buddha, but also Mahavīra and the earlier Epic texts mention. The conjunction of all the circumstances above

recited very probably reduced the older sacerdotalism of the Brāhmaṇas to a subordinate and by no means an enviable position. For, Brāhmaṇism seemed to afford now little that was new or inspiring, and remained only as the glorious skeleton wherein a spirit had once resided. Compared with such an effete cult, even the repairing to the seclusion of the forests and mountains in search of the ultimate cause and goal of existence was an attractive and inspiring creed, which, as we learn, was beginning to become so very popular during the Upaniṣadic period.*

A revolt against Brāhmaṇic sacerdotalism must have therefore taken place, but the Upaniṣads did not lead it, and others besides the Kṣatriyas were the real responsible agents of it. The Upaniṣads as such rather represent the alliance between the older Brāhmaṇism and some of the less radical of the newer destructive forces, on the principle of give and take, with a view to avoid complete disruption of the older social institutions as they were brought face to face with a new ethnic danger. There was hence formulated the theory of the 'Āśramas' or stages of life, of which there seem to have been only three at first—Student, Householder and Forester—the fourth, the Recluse, being rather a subsequent creation. Brāhmaṇism was allowed to have everything its own way during the first two of these stages. Thereafter, in the case of those duly qualified for the task, Brāhmaṇism was quite willing to release its hold and allow them freedom to cultivate the newer Philosophy of the "Brahman" or the "Ātman" to their heart's content. This Philosophy of the Brahman-Ātman in all its forms and presentations Brāhmaṇism incorporated into its own Canon after so-to-say *Brāhmaṇising* the mode and texure of it. Hence it is that we find so very hetero-

* Compare Br. Up. iii. 5—"It is through a knowledge of this very Self that Brahmans fly away from the desire for progeny, wealth, and worlds, and straight-way take to the beggar's career." Compare also Bṛ. Up. iv. 4. 22.

geneous a body of texts as the Brāhmaṇas, the Āraṇyakas, and the Upaniṣads made to constitute parts of one whole Revealed Scripture; and if Upaniṣadic texts like the Muṇḍaka or the Īśa startle us by the flagrant contradiction of their thesis of the Karmakāṇḍa and the antithesis of the Jñānakāṇḍa placed in close juxtaposition, we must never forget that the synthesis of the two on the basis of the "Āśrama" theory is generally afforded by the same texts in fairly close sequence. A point to note in this connection is that Brāhmaṇism was induced to effect the compromise in question, largely because the tendency of its own inward speculation* was already advancing from the direction of the "dravyamaya" or material sacrifice in flesh and blood to the "mānasika" or meditative sacrifice technically known as the *Yajñakratu* or the "symbolic" sacrifice. Secondly, it has to be recognised that the compromise was not expected to, and did not, satisfy the extreme opponents of ritualism, of whom there were not a few in the land, and whose opposition was destined to come to a head and nearly succeed in overthrowing the Vedic Society during the Post-Upaniṣadic period.

There is just one other topic that we must here briefly treat before we attempt an exposition of the Philosophy of the Upaniṣads properly so called, and that is the *relative* (if not also the *absolute*) chronology of those twenty and more texts that are normally classed as the earlier and the principal Upaniṣads. The subject has been worked out by me in fuller details elsewhere,† and so a few categorical statements may be deemed quite sufficient here. Deussen's well-known classification of the Upaniṣads into (1) Ancient Prose, (2) Early Metrical, (3) Later Prose, and (4) Ātharvaṇa Upaniṣads, besides its one or two glaring inaccuracies, labours under the great disadvantage of regarding each Upaniṣad as a

* Ch. Up. iii. 16–17, Ś. B. xi. 3. 1. 1ff., A. B. v. 25, etc.

† Vide Belvalkar–Ranade's *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 2, Chapter 3.

complete unit, whereas Deussen himself knows full well* that the Upaniṣads fall into different and chronologically disparate units. It is these units really that ought to be re-grouped into definite chronological strata, care being taken at the same time to bring into one line with these "Upaniṣadic units" certain short texts or "units" occurring in some of our present Brāhmaṇas and Āraṇyakas, the form and contents of which clearly bespeak their Upaniṣadic character. It is easy to select from these precursors of the Upaniṣads about twenty representative "units." The Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads fall naturally into nearly a hundred "units" to which we may add the four newly edited Upaniṣads, three of which at least appear to be quite old. And it is obvious that the more scientific basis for the re-grouping of these hundred and more texts would be not their external form—Prose or Verse—but their pervading tone. The more natural designations for these Groups would be Brāhmaṇic, Brāhmaṇo-Upaniṣadic, Upaniṣadic and Neo-Upaniṣadic; and it is these that I have formulated in another place, further subdividing the Groups into Early and Late, or Early and Middle and Late, according to the circumstances. The entries within each group-subdivision can also be arranged (on grounds like inter-quotations, cross-references, etc.) into an approximate chronological order, and it is this Table that I take the liberty to reproduce overleaf, with the dates for the several Groups inserted. The whole Upaniṣadic period will thus be seen to have covered a period of some six centuries, with its beginnings reaching well into the Brāhmaṇic period, while its conclusion brings us quite on the threshold of Buddhism, which, I belive, was preceded by some two centuries of "Thought-ferment," against which Orthodoxy seems to have put forth its last creditable fight through the Mahābhārata.

* See *Transactions of the International Congress for the History of Religions*, Vol. 2, pp. 19–24.

CHRONOLOGICAL GROUPING OF

GROUP ONE (BRĀHMAṆIC)		GROUP TWO (BRĀHMAṆO-UPANIṢADIC)		
B. C. 1250-1100		B. C. 1100 — B. C. 900		
Early	Late	Early	Middle	Late
A.Ā. ii. 1–3	A. Ā. iii.	Īśāvāsya	Tai.ii. 1–5,9	Ch.iii.15
Br. U. i. 1–2	Tait. i.	Bāskala	Ch. iii. 14	—iii.16-17
Ch. U. i	Kena iii-iv	A.Ā. ii. 4–6	—v. 1–2	—iii. 18
Br. U. i. 3	...	Br. i. 4	Br. vi. 1, 3	—iii. 19
Ch. U. ii		Ch.iii. 1–11	Tait. iii.1–6	—iv.16-17
...	J.U.B. iv. 11–13	—iii. 12	Kena i–ii	Chāgaleya
		—iii. 13	...	
Ś. B. x. 3. 3	—iii.1.1–2	Br. i. 5		
J.B.,Ex.209	—i. 25,30	—i. 6	as well as the several Brāhmaṇa texts dealing with developed psychological speculations	
J.B.,Ex.152	Ś. B. xi. 6. 1			
as well as many other Brāhmaṇa texts which deal with Agni & the other Gods or entities symbolically	—x. 6. 2 as well as other texts detailing myths and stories of the Gods Vāyu, Sun, &c.; symbolic rituals linked to some crude philosophising about Prāṇa; etc.			

THE PRINCIPAL UPANIṢADIC TEXTS

GROUP THREE (UPANIṢADIC)			GROUP FOUR (NEO-UPANIṢADIC)	
B. C. 900 — B. C. 750			B. C. 750 — 550	
Early	Middle	Late	Early	Late
Kaṭha i.1-2 Ch. v. 3-10 Bṛ. vi. 2 Kauṣ. i Kaṭha i. 3 Muṇḍaka Śvet. i ... A. B. v. 32 T. B. ii. 2. 9 Ś.B. vi.1.1.8 —xi.3.2.1ff. as well as the several Brāhmaṇa texts dealing with advanced cosmological speculations	Ch. iv. 1–3 ——iv. 4–9 ——iv.10–15 ——v.11-24 ——vi Bṛ. ii. 1 ——ii. 4 ——iii. ——iv. 1–2 Praśna Ārṣeya	Kaṭha ii Tait. ii. 6–8 ——iii.7-10 Ch. viii.1–6 ——viii.7-12 Bṛ. ii. 2 ——ii. 3 ——ii. 5 ——iv.3–4 ——iv.5 Kauṣ. ii ——iii ——iv Śvet. v–vi Mait. i ——ii	Bṛ. ii. 6 } ——iv.6 } Vaṃśas ——iv.5 } Ch. viii.13-14 ——viii. 15 Bṛ. v ——vi. 4 Ch. vii Śvet. ii Mait. iii ... as well as the several short but late interpolations into the regular Upaniṣads	Śvet. iii–iv Māṇḍūkya Mait. iv. i–3 ——iv. 4–v.2 ——vi. 1–8 ——vi. 9–17 ——vi.18-30 ——vi.31-32 ——vi.33-38 ——vii ... and many still later interpolated passages especially those at the end of the several Upaniṣads
	Early ←	THOUGHT- B. C. 750	FERMENT —B. C. 500	→ Late

↑ Mahābhārata cir. 650 ↑ Buddhism cir. 475

The Upaniṣadic Philosophy has been set forth in so many special treatises old and new that it is hardly possible to say much that can be original on the subject. For the brief treatment that I am going to give in the short limits now available to me the only virtue that I may claim is that it follows the sequence of the chronological grouping just given, stating what the earliest and the latest of our texts have to say on a given topic, and, where possible, indicating the general line of the advance. First, then, as regards the *Method of Philosophising*, while practically almost all the Upaniṣadic texts have the Brāhmaṇic habit of indulging in fanciful word-plays, redundant repetitions, ritualistic conceits, thread-bare symbolising, and sacerdotal rewards and imprecations and prescriptions and puerilities without number, these tend on the whole—as we pass from the earlier to the later texts—to gradually diminish or, at least become less insistent. The earlier texts consist of short and simple disquisitions on single isolated problems. Then come attempts at treating a specific single topic in a large variety of ways—either by a mystic etymology, or by an exposition about the psychic and cosmic correlates, or by the essaying of more or less sustained metaphors and analogies, or by the narration of apt stories and parables. As we approach the centre of the period, conventional openings, such as the chance encounter of a few learned Brahmans falling into a discussion and repairing to someone else to finally resolve the riddle, give place to single sustained episodes with a prevailingly poetic story-form and exhibiting a growing artistic consciousness, its highwater mark being reached in the great "Symposium" at Janaka's court, where the language is made to alternately rise and fall in answer to surging inward emotion, breaking out into the exquisitely polished periods of the Antaryāmi-Brāhmaṇa (Bṛ. iii. 7) and terminating in the solemn pathos of the verses with which Yājñavalkya concludes the scene. Towards the very end of the period there is a temporary relapse into the defects of the earlier period, intensified by

repetitions of beloved philosophic formulas, a piling up of *verbatim* quotations, and a tedious spinning out of thread-bare arguments. Passages of genuine philosophical interest occur in the texts of the earliest of our groups only incidentally and merely as the by-products of ritualistic symbolism. They afford a few philosophically significant stories, and contain the earliest endeavours to raise deities like Vāyu-Prāṇa, Āditya, Rudra-Śiva, etc.—through their Upāsanas in one form or another—to monotheistic and even pantheistic position. In texts of the second group the philosophical interest deepens, the knowledge of the Ātman as the first principle being undertaken as a quest in itself, though still under a setting not yet completely free from the incubus of ritualism. The philosophical problems are, however, now correctly formulated, although even in our third and the most developed group, the discussions of these problems are not always what we would, in our modern days, call strictly philosophical—similes, and identifications, and *ad hoc* proofs being still made to subserve every purpose, there being no attempt ever put forth, as by a Socratic method, at educing knowledge from out of ignorance. Toward the end, the style becomes bald and the method disagreeably dogmatic, the original zest for knowledge as such being overlaid by a more or less pronounced pessimistic tinge.

Coming to specific philosophical problems, the first to engage our attention is the *Upaniṣadic Account of the World-Creation.* We need here only single out the most outstanding characteristics of the cosmological theories presented by the texts falling under the several groups. These are: (i) an adequate grasp of the correct nature of the First Principle, which is monistically set forth as the Uncaused Cause, as the Self-subsisting Absolute, and as the Realmost Essence, "from which the whole creation proceeds, in which it subsists, and into which it is to ultimately merge." The Absolute is thus an all-pervading, all-penetrating Substance

which at once permeates the Creation and transcends it. It is the source of all the energy in the world, and is at the same time the controller of all the movements in it, thus resulting in a deft and subtle welding together of Theism and Pantheism. Of course it is not all texts that consciously effect such a philosophical synthesis. The earliest of our texts, as being still under the shadow of sacerdotalism, put forth a purely ritualistic entity like Udgītha as the source and substance of all Creation (compare Chān. Up. I and II, Bṛ. Up. I. iii). Elsewhere it is the Uktha or the Gāyatrī or the Praṇava. Then we have a series of texts like Bṛ. Up. V. v. 1 (Early Neo-Upan.); Ch. Up. IV (Middle Upaniṣadic); Ch. Up. I. xi. 5, IV. iii. 3, and V. i (being, respectively, Early Brāhmaṇic and Middle Upaniṣadic and Middle Brāhmaṇo-Upaniṣadic); and finally, Tait. Up. II. 7, and Ch. Up. III. 19 (one Late Upaniṣadic, another Late Brāhmaṇo-Upaniṣadic); which set forth the physical or impersonal categories like Water, Air, Breath, and Non-Being as the φύσις or the ἀρχή of the Creation. It is thus clear that all these late and early texts simply reproduce some of the cosmological speculations that were already current during the antecedent Brāhmaṇic period. They cannot have originated in the Upaniṣadic period proper, which of course had already effected the transition from an impersonal to a personal ἀρχή, identifying it with the nebulous and semi-ritualistic figure of Prajāpati, Lord of Creatures, who, being no more than "an apex to the Brāhmaṇic pantheon set up by the priesthood and moving to and fro with each breeze of fantasy and each caprice of the school " * was eventually supplanted by "Brahman," which, originally denoting a "prayer," came in course of time to denote the whole Veda, the *corpus canonicum*, and was later restricted to signify the best and most efficient ritualistic formula, or the entire ritual personified and expressed in a nutshell. Thereafter with the elevation, in the Brāhmaṇic

* Oldenberg, *Die Weltanschauung der Brāhmaṇa-Texte*, Göttingen, 1919, page 32.

texts, of the sacrifice into a cosmological principle, the term Brahman also rose to the position of a veritable ἀρχή, conceived occasionally transcendentally or theistically, but more usually—after its *anupraveśa* or interpenetration into the creation—pantheistically, as in the majority of the Upaniṣadic texts. Later still, with the growing psychological trend of the later cosmological texts, Brahman came to be supplanted by Mind, Reason, Will, and Self or 'Ātman,' by the side of which both Prajāpati and Brahman sank to the position of a mere Demiurge. The identification of this Brahman-Ātman with definitely theistic principles such as Puruṣa or the In-dwelling Lord, and finally with sectarian entities like Rudra-Īśa or Nārāyaṇa, is the last phase in the development of Upaniṣadic cosmology that we have to notice. A second significant trait of the cosmology of the Upaniṣads is (ii) their absolute carelessness and even wilful eccentricity as to the sequential stages of world-creation after the first two, wherein it is not unusual to find physical, psychological, ethical, symbolical, ritualistic, and every other kind of categories huddled up together in a motley mass. The most outrageous example of this kind is Muṇḍaka II. i. 1-9, where we commence with the Immutable (Akṣara), the divine and formless Person (Puruṣa), who creates, first, the Prāṇa, the mind, and the sense-organs; then, the ether, wind, light, water, and earth that are to be the objects of these; then, ritualistic entities like the Ṛk-Sāman-Yajus, Dīkṣā, Sacrifices and Gifts, the Sacrificer, and the Year: next, those Regions where the Moon and the Sun shine, the Gods and the Demigods and men, beasts and birds; then, to conclude the list, Prāṇa and Apāna, rice and barley, Tapas and Faith, truth and abstinence and law:—the seven breaths and the seven worlds and oceans and mountains and rivers and plants and juices bringing in the tail of the process as it were! No wonder then if the Vedāntasūtras had to devote a special section to the *Sṛṣṭi-vākya-samanvaya*, i. e., the effecting of a harmony amongst the Upaniṣadic statements about world-

creation! That there can be a natural or scientific sequence in the process of world-creation, each following stage of it being connected by an inevitable causal nexus with the preceding, is an idea that just emerges in some of the early Brāhmaṇa speculations (e. g. Tait. Br. ii. 2. 9), and then disappears completely, only to reappear in the nascent Sāṁkhya speculations in Ch. Up. vi. 2–6. A third characteristic of the Upaniṣadic cosmology is (iii) its refusal to include the individual soul amongst the created things. The Puruṣa in Ait. Up. i. 3 is of course the body to be subsequently animated by the Ātman; the Kṣetrajña in Mait. v. 2 is the *sāttvika* intelligence in the soul; and the *annamaya* and other Puruṣas in the Tait. Up. I. i. 1 ff. are merely the apparel of the Self: the individual souls being in no single text unmistakably described as *created* objects. At the most they may be described as the *aṁśas* or parts of the Highest Self, as sparks are of the fire —*aṁśas* not greater in magnitude than the hundredth part of the hundredth part of a hair, and yet capable of infinite qualitative as well as quantitative expansion (Śvet. Up. v. 9). Finally, it is worth observing that (iv) there is practically no hint given anywhere in these cosmological texts as to the unreality of the creation, except perhaps towards the very close of our period. Thus, texts of the earliest group (like Bṛ. I. ii. 1, Ait. Up. i. 1, Tait. Up. II. 7, or Ch. Up. III. 19. 1) speak of the world as being "non-existent" prior to creation, and yet, subsequent to creation, it is said to be quite real, and no suspicion of any kind is ever entertained in the matter. Texts of the second group slightly improve the conception, calling the world prior to its creation as not "non-existing," but only "non-manifest" (avyākṛta, Bṛh. I. iv. 7), Śvetāśvatara i. 15f. furnishing the analogy of the oil dormant in the seed. Subsequent texts like Ch. vi. 2 flatly controvert the earlier position as to "existence" coming out of "non-existence"; and this in fact is the final view adopted: only, the world is still not denounced as unreal, but treated, possibly, as the manifestation of the real Will

or Power of the Absolute.* That this power is contingent upon a percipient, and hence no more than merely phenomenal or illusory, is a doctrine adumbrated for the first time only in a very late text like Bṛh IV. v. 15.

Certain corollaries of special significance for the later development of the Vedāntic doctrine follow from all this. The Creator is described by most of our sources as, after the first act of creation, himself entering into the object so created, which thus becomes so-to-say impregnated with the spirit of the Creator, and hence capable of itself independently continuing the succeeding stages of the process of creation. Thus a sort of a Demiurge who becomes the Apara-Brahman of orthodox Vedānta has the path already fore-shadowed for him. Secondly, it is very rarely the case that the Creator feels any drag upon his power of creation by reason of the limitations of the material principle out of which the creation is to be fashioned, because (with the possible exception the primeval Water which in some of the earlier texts is spoken of as existing prior to the Creator) the Creator was believed to fashion, like the spider, the fabric of his creation from out of himself. There is therefore, in the majority of our texts, no acceptance of the dualistic position such as that of the Classical Sāṁkhya. Finally, it is to be noted that the Creator who created the creation is capable of re-absorbing it within himself, and so remains once again in his original state of *advaita*, one without a second. This means that the creation does not affect or colour his real nature. The Creator is not only immanent in his creation but also transcendent, and therefore its Controller or "Niyaṁtṛ." These are some of the main features of Upaniṣadic cosmology brought out by a chronological study of the several texts.

* Compare Bṛ. I. 6. 1–3—" All this is verily three-fold : Name, Form Action.........This three-fold is one and existent (sat) ; the Ātman also is one and existent. So that it is the Immortal covered by the Truth."

With reference to the *Upaniṣadic Psychology* and the Upaniṣadic doctrine of the Soul, on a review of the texts in the order in which they have been tabulated by us above, it becomes evident that in the earliest texts like A.Ā.ii.1–3, Ch. i. 2. Bṛ, i. 3, etc. the inquiry into the cognitive and conative functions of man starts ritualistically, and rather as an offshoot of some specific detail of the sacrifice such as Uktha. The Ātman is spoken of, for instance, as the "pañcavidha" or five-fold Uktha, and the lesser and greater spheres of his manifestation are set forth following the Brāhmaṇic idea of the "fivefold correlates." Compare also the statement in A. Ā. iii. 2. 3, where *four* Puruṣas are spoken of, namely, the man in the body, the man in the metres, the man in the sacrifice, and the Great Man, the last being eventually identified with the Sun as the father of Time, following the Ṛgvedic text (i. 115. 1)—"Sū́rya ātmā́ jágatas tasthúṣaś ca." — In the texts of the middle group the self-same inquiry is pursued mythologically and metaphorically. Thus, for example, we have the half-a-dozen and more texts dealing with "Prāṇa-jyeṣṭhya" or the preëminence of the Vital-breath amongst the organic functions of the body; next the cosmological texts, such as the Ait. Up. detailing the creation of the bodily organs with their corresponding *adhiṣṭhāna* or superintending deities; and finally we come across some of the sustained metaphors such as that of the chariot in the Kaṭha (its still earlier form occurring in the Chāgaleya), or of the "eleven-gated citadel" in the same text, as also the "Kośa-vidyā" from the Tait. Up., and the texts such as Praśna vi, and Ch. Up. vi. 7, which speak of the man and his sixteen digits or *Kalās*. — In the properly Upaniṣadic texts of the third group the method of inquiry is experimental or introspective, especially in passages like Praśna iv, Bṛhad. ii. 1 and iv. 3, Chān. vi. 8, and viii. 7-12,—the last mentioned text furnishing us with the well-known story of Indra and Virocana. This last method of determining the real nature of the Ātman after a critical review of its behaviour in the

three states of waking, dream, and sleep has become quite a favourite one with later Vedāntic texts, and is often used as the proof for establishing the *alipta* or *nirguṇa* (uncontaminated) character of the Soul, who abides as the self-same entity which endures, whereas his states appear and disappear. The whole investigation is categorically summed up in the latest Upaniṣadic text, the Māṇḍūkya, where the waking soul called Vaiśvānara who cognises the outer world and functions through all the bodily organs is distinguished from the dreaming soul called Taijasa who is shut off from the external world, but still performs all the functions inwardly, the sleeping soul called Prājña being differentiated from both these as being freed from all sense-functionings inward as well as outward, and concentered within his own blissful intellective unity, while our text goes even further and posits a fourth indescribable, unknowable, transcendent state of absolute oneness, where the world and its manifoldness find their utter extinction. One or two peculiar positions evolved in the course of this investigation deserve a passing reference. The Soul, for instance, is located in the cavity or the "ākāśa" of the heart and is assigned the size of a thumb. Secondly, we are told that there is a network of thousands of *nāḍīs* (tubes, veins) in the body, and that in the condition of dreamless sleep the Ātman enters a particular *nāḍī* (the Purītat) and so secures escape from the turmoils of the senses, while at death-time, if the Ātman can manage to pass out through the *nāḍī* which terminates at what later came to be known as the *Brahmarandhra* within the skull, he becomes free from transmigration. Otherwise he has to revert to the *saṁsāra*. This occult psychology was in time taken up and specially cultivated in the Yogic schools, as also in some of the later Upaniṣadic tracts.

In relation to the psychological texts from our sources (only a few of which I have above mentioned, and which I have not thought it quite necessary to quote and explain in

detail by reason of the discursive, unmethodical and often inconsistent mode of their treatment, and their failure to distinguish psychology as such from physiology, ritualism, and theology) a point of particular interest is to note the fact that the "spiritual" entity called Ātman, as being the in-dwelling presence within the human body, is not in our texts distinctly conceived as such right from the very start. The two "Udgīthavedha" texts (Ch. i. 2 and Br̥. i. 3) and the several "Prāṇajyesṭhya" texts assign the rôle of preëminence within the body to Prāṇa, the vital breath, who functions continually, sustains the human frame, and is unaffected by evil. It is true that Ait. Ā. II. i. 4, for instance, speaks of the entrance of the Brahman by the toe of the foot within this bodily frame; but this Brahman is not the same as the soul, but is a higher presence by its side. Subsequently, as Prāṇa came to be felt as too physical or physiological an entity, we have passages like Ait. Up. v, where Prajñāna or the intellection is definitely spoken of as the real essence of the Ātman — "*Sarvāṇyevaitāni prajñānasya nāmadheyāni bhavanti*;"—Br̥had. Up. I. 5. 3 further varying the phrase and denominating it as the *manas*, while Praśna iii. 3 speaks of the Prāṇa as having sprung from the Ātman, whereas the Kaus. Up. iii. 2, by way of a compromise, identifies Prāṇa, Prajñā, and Ātman, as when Indra declares—"*Prāṇo 'smi Prajñâtmā.*" In the text last quoted we also reach not only the idealistic position as to the Prajñā being the essential factor in every act of knowledge, but the further somewhat Hegelian position that the sense-data are as much necessary for the evolution of the ideal factors in knowledge as are the latter for the commutation of the sense-data into knowledge: "*Tā vā etā daśaiva bhūtamātrā adhiprajñaṁ, daśa prajñāmātrā adhibhūtam. Yaddhi bhūtamātrā na syur na prajñāmātrās syur, yad vā prajñāmātrā na syur na bhūtamātrās syuḥ.*" The final position arrived at is, that the intellective and the other functions of the Soul are simply the envolutes (kośas) of it and do not constitute its real nature. The Ātman is really an

aṁśa of the Absolute (etasya so 'ṁśo 'yaṁ yaś cetāmātraḥ pratipuruṣaḥ Kṣetrajñaḥ saṁkalpâdhyavasāyâbhimānaliṅgaḥ), very small like the thousandth part of the hair, and attached to a functioning organism later designated as the 'sūkṣma' or the 'liṅga' śarīra (the subtle and transmigratory body), the soul when conditioned by this attachment being designated as the "Bhūtātmā" in Maitrāyaṇī Up. iii. 2. The question as to whether the intellect and the other functions form the necessary attributes, or are merely the accidents of the Ātman—a question raised and discussed in the Brahmasūtras II. iii. 19ff.—is not definitely resolved by any of our texts. The Kena declares this Ātman to be the *agent* of seeing, hearing, etc., but never their *object*. The only mode of obtaining a direct knowledge of the Ātman is by 'pratibodha,' a word differently interpreted but which may for the present be conveniently rendered by 'intuition.' This passage and the well-known solipsistic position reached by Yājñavalkya: *Yenedaṁ sarvaṁ vijānāti taṁ kena vijānīyāt. Sa eṣa neti nety ātmā*, etc. mark the highest point reached by the introspective psychology of the Upaniṣads.*

Let us next briefly review the Upaniṣadic statements as to the *Nature of the Absolute*. There are two definitions of it in vogue. That in the Taittirīya (iii. 1) is cosmological:

* Jacobi argues (Entwicklung der Gottesidee, 1923) that the earliest Upaniṣadic texts (and thereby, following Deussen, he means Early Prose Upaniṣads) have not reached the conception of the soul as immortal consciousness, inasmuch as they do not contain any words like *cit* or *caitanya*. But they contain the word *vijñāna* used in a context (Tait. Up. ii. 6, Bṛ. Up. ii. 4. 12) where its meaning does not really differ from that of *caitanya*. The fact is that while there may have been an actual evolution of the conception of the soul from "Psyche" to "Monad"—to adopt Jacobi's very convenient nomenclature—the evolution should be traced not from the period of "Early Prose" to that of "Early Metrical" Upaniṣads, but rather from our own "Brāhmaṇic" and "Brāhmaṇo-Upaniṣadic" Groups to that of our "Upaniṣadic" Group, as set forth in the Chronological Table on pages 44–45 above. Compare also our remarks towards the end of this Lecture.

"That from which all these beings are born, in which, having been born, they subsist, and into which they are absorbed." That in the Chāndogya (vi. 1. 3) is epistemological: "That by knowing which whatever has not been known becomes something already known." Both presuppose the strictly monistic point of view in intimate association with the realistic view of the world. As a general rule, the Absolute is designated Brahman in the earlier texts and Ātman in the later texts; but there are exceptions to this both ways. The Upaniṣads everywhere tell us that a number of other claimants for the Absolute were put forward by different philosophers, amongst them Indra, Agni, Vāyu-Prāṇa, Ākāśa, Āditya, and others. Compare Yājñavalkya's criticism of the philosophers in Bṛ. Up. iv. 1–2, or (as a better example) the newly edited Ārṣeya Upaniṣad, where five sages, Viśvāmitra, Jamadagni, Bharadvāja, Gautama and Vasiṣṭha discuss the progressively more and more inward and "spiritual" conceptions of the Brahman, that of Vasiṣṭha being accorded the highest rank. There are likewise various stories such as that in the latter part of the Kena, the texts containing the Vaiśvānara-vidyā and the "Bhūman" doctrine, or the dialogue between Gārgya and Ajātaśatru in both the forms, where the point emphasized is that the "true" Absolute is to be sought not in any physical or physiological category, nor in any psycho-physiological function of the Ātman (mind, speech, intelligence, will, etc.), but in the Ātman itself. We need not, however, suppose, as is sometimes done,* that the latter doctrine of the spirit as such came in in violent opposition to the earlier cosmo-physical doctrines. The older Brāhmaṇic notion of psycho-physical correlates, which postulated a man-in-the-eye to correspond to the man-in-the-sun and assigned 'adhiṣṭhānadevatās' or controlling divinities to the functional activities, was always there as a mediating process between the two; and this mediation is not absent

* Cp. Hertel in "*Die Weisheit der Upanischaden*" p. 32ff.

even in the Kena Upaniṣad in spite of its repeated and characteristic refrain—*nedaṁ yad idam upāsate*, on which Hertel (*Weisheit der Upanischaden*, pp. 23, 32 ff.) seems to have laid unnecessary emphasis. He ignores the full significance of the line *Bhūteṣu bhūteṣu vicitya* etc., which implies that the entity inside has its analogues in the world outside. The important point to note is that the Upaniṣads ultimately assume the position that the principle which underlies, and enlivens, and controls the inner life of man is identical in essence with the principle which pervades and dominates every other thing in the universe, and that (as Śāṇḍilya expressly declares, Ch. Up. iii. 14) the individual can, if he were to will it, attain the Absolute.

As to the nature of this Absolute our texts, naturally enough, give us the most enigmatic descriptions: compare Īśa 4-5, Kaṭha I. ii. 14, 20ff., as also the stock description of Yājñavalkya* — *Sa eṣa neti nety Ātmā*, etc. On the other hand we possess many other texts, fairly distributed over all the groups, which give a 'saguṇa' description of the Ātman, speaking of it as Anna-Prāṇa-Mano-Vijñāna-Ānanda-maya, or calling the Vāk-Prāṇa-Cakṣus-Śrotra as its four quarters, or describing it in the stock-phrases '*satyakāmaḥ satyasaṁkalpaḥ*' (whose desires are truth, whose intentions are truth, etc.) of Ch. Up. viii. 1, or finally, in a theistic mood, assigning him omniscience, omnipotence, and the other attributes. These double sets of passages, as is well known, have formed the bone of contention between the later Vedāntic schools. On behalf of Śaṅkarācārya's subordination of the *saguṇa* passages attention may be invited to the distinction between the Parā and the Aparā vidyās, or between the Mūrta and Amūrta forms of the Brahman, as also to texts which speak of the Ātman as being

* "He is that Self cognisable as not-so, not-so. He is incomprehensible, as he cannot be comprehended; indissoluble, as he cannot be dissolved; unattached, in that he attaches himself to nothing; unfettered and neither injured nor destroyed."

originally Avyākṛta or non-manifest and afterwards becoming manifest, or as having created the two kinds of creation—Sat and Tyat—and entered therein. As passages to this purport are to be met with all over the period, it would be safer if we conclude that the Upaniṣads did not wish to preach one exclusive and clear-cut view on the point.

Our Upaniṣadic texts, which afford us more of poetry and of imaginative anticipations of truth than any reasoned argumentations and logical conclusions, do not of course attempt to *logically* prove the existence of the Absolute. Nevertheless the following modes of establishing its existence seem to be implicit in their methods of procedure. There is, to begin with, (i) the ritualistic approach, which was the direct corollary of the Brāhmaṇic elevation of the Sacrifice into a world-principle and the consequent assumption of innate correspondences between things ritual and things secular. The Brāhmaṇic Sacrifice was a very complicated process. Several priests considerably differing in their qualifications and functions ministered at it. There were complex movements and activities to be gone through as well as prescriptions without number to be attended to during their performance; and the theory set forth was that all this congeries of complexities was instrumental in producing one larger *apūrva* or mystic potence, giving rise eventually to one specified fruit, believed to be in the dispensation of the Highest God of the Sacrifice, be He either Viṣṇu or Prajāpati. This hierarchy of the sacrificial *Apūrvas* had its corresponding analogue in the world outside which was accordingly believed to culminate in one Highest entity, the source and goal of the creation. Furthermore, just as the Brāhmaṇic theory did require not only that the lesser Apūrvas of each individual detail should merge into the larger Apūrva of the whole ritual, but also that the specific detail, so long as it was being performed, should have the entire resources of the sacrifice concentered upon it—should in fact be for the time

being the whole sacrifice in a nutshell—even so we find our Upaniṣadic seers ready to put forth (e. g. in the "Saṁvarga" and "Parimara" passages, Ch. iv. 3, A. B. viii. 28, Kauṣ. ii. 12, etc.) not only an all-inclusive entity like Prāṇa-Vāyu or Brahman as the First Principle of Creation, but also, by a sort of symbolism or ritualistic "henotheism," even such a category as Uktha, Udgītha, and latterly and more usually, the Praṇava or the tri-mono-syllable *Om*, as the veritable be-all and end-all of existence. — A second access to the Absolute was opened out by (ii) some of the physical or naturalistic theories of creation. The Upaniṣads are not strong at this, and are often inconsistent. The "scientific" investigation of Nature was not their *forte*. As the very best examples of the kind we have the Ether-Wind-Fire-Water-Earth cosmology in the Tait. Up. ii, or the Light-Water-Food cosmology in Ch. Up. vi. 2 ff. How truly weak the scientific interest in all this was follows from the circumstance that in proof of the proposition that *Tejas* produces Water the argument adduced is, "Hence it is that wherever there is heat a man perspires!" The First Principle reached through such a mode of argumentation—whether it be Āditya or Ākāśa or Sat or pure Being—cannot be said to be inevitable or rationally deduced.

The Upaniṣads achieve a better result along the method of (iii) psychological introspection. That there is something in man that does not perish with the body: that the body grows and changes, that the functions of its several organs begin and endure and cease, that the body passes through utterly divergent stages like waking, dreaming, sleeping, swooning, trance, etc. and yet there persists, as the basis of all these mutations, one identical individuality—call it the Prāṇa or Manas or Prajñāna or Ātman—this central fact was perceived early enough by these thinkers. We have only to mention here the Kaṭha Upaniṣad or the several "Prāṇa-jyeṣṭhya" passages in our support. That the Soul not only

dwells within the body from birth to death, but that the same Soul, after the falling away of one body, takes up another, and yet another, in accordance with its unexpended portion of *Karman*—the so-called theory of Transmigration in association with the doctrine of *Karman*—is however not unmistakably present in the earlier of the Upaniṣadic texts. The famous "Pañcāgni-vidyā" in Chāndogya v. 3–10 and Bṛ. Upan. vi. 2 claims to be its most authoritative expositions. Whether this famous doctrine originated outside the strictly Brāhmaṇic circle—whether, for instance, it was (or was not) borrowed from the animistic notions and practices of some earlier Non-Āryan tribes—is at this date perhaps more curious than profitable to inquire. I incline rather to the view that, whereas the premises for the enunciation of such a doctrine were present in the Ṛgvedic and Early Brāhmaṇic speculations, the actual drawing out of the inference may have been inspired and facilitated by a contact with people exhibiting certain primitive and animistic ideas. Be that as it may, it is worth noting that after having reached a unitary spiritual principle within the human body, the identification of that principle with the Principle believed to be standing at the source of the Universe was probably, in its initial stages, no more than a direct result of the Brāhmaṇic hypothesis of the Ādhibhautika and the Adhyātma correspondence between things. When later the speculation deepened, this position was further buttressed up by two additional philosophical arguments. The most universal category reached in the course of the cosmological inquiry was, as we saw, the concept of Being, which must be, self-subsistent inasmuch as it cannot arise from a Non-being, nor also from a Being as such. Similarly, the Ultimate Reality reached through introspective analysis was the concept of the Self that was most immediately present to our consciousness. Since it was illogical to posit two kinds of ultimate existences as such, the Real within was inevitably identified with the Real without. This we may style as (iv) the ontological argument.

Finally, starting with the idealistic position reached in a text like Ait. Up. v. 3, and getting a further clue from the statement about the all-pervasive and all-interpenetrative nature of the Absolute, our Upaniṣadic philosophers came in due time to assume the position of what Hegel might have designated "Absolute Idealism," and to speak of it as consisting of pure Consciousness or a mass of Caitanya, which, however, differs from ordinary consciousness in its being for ever beyond consciousness, that is to say, in its being always the subject and never the object. "It is the ear of the ear, the mind of the mind, the speech of the speech, the breath of the breath, and the eye of the eye." "One does not think it by thought, but the thought, they say, is itself thought by it: that is the True Brahman."* "When everything here has become the Ātman alone, who can smell what, and by what means; who can see what, and by what means;...........who can know what, and by what means: that by means of which one knows all this, *That* how can one know, and by what means: how forsooth and by what means can one know the Knower?† This may be styled the (v) epistemological argument, and it is tantamount to Reason stultifying itself or returning back upon itself. The Upaniṣads, however, do not like to abandon things in this extremely unsatisfactory predicament. They are loud in proclaiming that the search for the Self or the Reality, with which the Upaniṣadic inquiry commenced is bound to be crowned with success. The highest knowledge is attainable: we in fact do see Yājñavalkya and Janaka and the proud Śvetaketu attaining it before our very eyes; and the same is sure to happen to the pupil who, being sufficiently qualified, has found out the proper sort of teacher to point out to him the way towards self-intuition or god-realiation. This last may be called (vi) the experimental proof of the Absolute.

* Kena Upaniṣad i. 2–5.

† Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad ii. 4. 14 and elsewhere.

While determining the *General Ethical Teaching* of the Upanisads we have to recall that the ethical ideal of the pre-Upanisadic period was formulated upon the basis of two dominating conceptions: the omnipotence and world-significance of the Brāhmaṇic sacrifice, and the necessity of an accurate knowledge of the traditions and prescriptions *à la mode de* Devas as distinguished from those *à la mode de* Asuras. The first inculcated a spirit of faith, obedience, and orderliness, while the last insisted upon a *knowing* performance of one's duty in preference to the mere blind conformity: "*Yad eva vidyayā karoti śraddhayôpaniṣadā tad eva vīryavattaram bhavati*"—Ch. Up. i. 1. 10. As a consequence it was natural that the earliest group of the Upaniṣadic texts, such as Tait. Up. i. 9 or i. 11, should commend moral qualities such as charity and truthfulness and faith, and set up an extraneous authority like the Śāstric injunction or the example of the discerning elders as the ultimate guide to conduct. This of course cannot constitute the characteristically Upanisadic view of Ethics. Nearer to it is the teaching embodied in texts of the next group, such as Īśa and Bṛ. i. 4. 15, or like Muṇḍaka I. ii. 10 and Bṛ. iii. 2. 13, which set forth the winning of the real knowledge of the Ātman as the goal higher than mere conformity to the ritualistic prescriptions from the Śāstras, which indeed are not—at any rate in the middle group of our sources—called into question or declared absolutely antagonistic to Ātmic knowledge, but which are all-the-same definitely recognised as a lower (*apara*) goal serving as the necessary propædeutic to the higher. The result was that, although the majority of the Upaniṣadic teachers, in a spirit of compromise, honestly endeavoured to find in their scheme of things a due place for both *Karman* and *Jñāna*, the former—the Way of the Works—necessarily went to the wall.* Saṁnyāsa or renunciation—the passing

*Thus came in the possimistic attitude of the Upaniṣads as expressed in Muṇḍaka I. ii. 12, which paved the way for the cult of Bhakti and the doctrine of grace, that forms the latest teaching of the Upaniṣads.

from out of the householder's stage into that of the houseless wanderer—came to be increasingly emphasized* as the true ideal for the sage, to the lure of which even the great sage Yājñavalkya—for all his shrewd commonsense—did ultimately succumb. Hence, with this inevitable slackening of the only restriction in the shape of the antecedent conformity to Śāstric prescriptions that had been imposed upon the candidate for Ātmic knowledge with a view to enable him to secure tranquillity and self-control—and with the throwing open of the highway to Self-realisation for men and women, gods and demons, Brahmans and Kṣatriyas, or Śūdras and slaves alike—while there might have grown up a spirit of equality and confidence, the door was at the same time certainly left wide ajar for all kinds of fads, abnormalities and self-impositions, indulged in under the cover of the preliminary preparation for Self-realisation. Furthermore, while expatiating upon the extreme significance and blissfulness of the state of a mystic identification with the Absolute in the experience of the "Jīvanmukta," (i. e., of the soul that has attained his emancipation in this very life), our texts naturally wax highly eloquent, with the result that the man that has "crossed the *Bund*† (setu) of the Ātman" is by them declared to transcend not only old-age, death and sorrow, but also merit and demerit, in such a way, that "not by any action of his whatsoever can the world be injured: not by murdering his mother or his father; not by stealing or by killing the embryo. Nor can anybody observe any pallor or any darkening of his face, even though he were to do what is ordinarily regarded as a grave sin or crime."‡ Such a doctrine, if ever seriously and universally preached, would naturally be subversive not only of the "Way of the Works," but also of all established social and moral and religious institutions whatsoever. This is however only an

* Barring an occasional caveat as in Īśa 2, or Ch. iii. 16–17.

† Ch. viii. 4. ‡ Kauṣ. iii. 1.

extreme and one-sided position reached during the formulation of the Upaniṣadic theory of Ethics, which has unfortunately been eagerly seized upon by certain unsympathetic critics of Indian "Pantheism," with whom we will later find an occasion to break the lance.

An unbiassed view concerning the real ethical teaching of the Upaniṣads would take into account the circumstance that practically all the texts require, in the candidate for salvation through self-realisation, a life of purity, truthfulness, and moral dicipline, in the absence of which the true light of the Ātman can never shine out; and it would be a strange travesty of facts if the aspiring candidate were to abjure morality the moment he reached the goal to which it was the indispensable preliminary. The only difference would probably be that his following moral conduct could no longer be a deliberately willed action, but merely an automatic one like breathing and blood-circulation. Secondly, it would not do to forget that the knowledge of the Ātman was not an intellectual action like the knowledge of a geometrical theorem: it was an intuitve knowlege experienced in a Yogic meditation or ecstatic trance, which could be attained only by the aspirant who had first purged his soul of all passions and had won spiritual peace and tranquillity. No non-moral being can ever hope to secure this. Thirdly, it is worth noting that the "Mumukṣu" or the seeker after salvation, once he had reached the great truth of "*Aham Brahmāsmi,*" (I am Braham) or "*Sarvaṁ khalv idam Brahma* (All this verily is the Brahman)," was sure—so long as he was bound to walk the ordinary walk of life—to act upon the maxim—"Do unto others as you would be done by," and to experience, in the happiness of others, a progressive realisation of his own Self. He could in fact rear up, on the basis of the mystic unity of the Ātman, a perfectly sound autonomous system of ethics in which Modern Philosophy need find little to object to. Finally, we have once more to emphasize

the fact that the "Pantheistic" position of the Upaniṣads did not in all the texts necessarily imply "Acosmism," so that there did remain, according to the majority of the passages, a real scope for morality. And even in the case of the few most advanced Advaitic texts that implied the doctrine of the "Māyic" or the illusory character of the universe, morality was still there, so long as one retained the consciousness of a moral agent. That in the state of the mystic identification with the Absolute, the individual loses or rather merges his individuality within the Infinite, and that he can therefore no longer stand in any relation whatsoever to morality (which belongs to the finite and the particular) is of course a logically valid position, howsoever baffling it may have proved for some of our critics of "Indian Pantheism" to understand and appreciate it. It is in Mysticism, we must repeat, that morality finds its natural culmination, and its annihilation.

As before observed, Indian Philosophy has an intensely practical aim. It is not merely an intellectual attempt to resolve the Riddle of the Universe: but it is an endeavour, after having intellectually grasped it, to attain and to be absorbed into that essence of the Universe—Brahman, Ātman, or by whatever other name we may choose to designate it. Thus we saw (p. 14) that the best proof that the Upaniṣads had to offer to establish the existence of the Absolute was its "realisation." That this realisation is not a goal reached through the ordinary gateways of knowledge has been declared time and again by most of our texts, which prescribe for the purpose the necessity of reverentially sitting at the feet of a qualified teacher, studying the Scriptures, inwardly meditating upon their teaching, breath-control and the other Yogic practices of various sorts designed to effect a Καθάρσις of the body and the mind. This is to be followed by rapt concentrations upon the prescribed *pratīkas* (symbols) of the Absolute, ultimately leading to an ecstatic union with the

Highest, without retaining even the consciousness of that union. It is some sort of a *Pratibodha* or a mystic intuition of the Absolute, the sure approach of which is heralded by the sense of perfect peace and passionlessness and those etherial experiences that have been detailed for the first time in the Śvetāśvatara Up. ii. 11–13. Such an eventual realisation of the Absolute makes the adept's soul aglow as it were with an incomparable and incalculable bliss, which passes our ordinary experience and so transcends the power of adequate description, although we have texts like Tait. Up. ii. 8 or Bṛ. Up. iv. 3. 33 that boldly essay the task of setting up a "calculus" for this beatific bliss, while enigmatic but highly suggestive descriptions of that mystic state are vouchsafed to us by a few texts like Tait. i. 10, Ch. iii. 14 and viii. 4. 2, Bṛ. iv. 3. 21, or Śvet. ii. 14–15. It is a supra-sensuous experience which secures peace and infinite joy and is able to harmonise all contradictions. And for winning that *summum bonum* which rends all the knots of the heart asunder and dispels all doubts and fears and secures absolute emancipation, no preparation is naturally thought to be too great or too arduous; and it is in this connection that truthfulness, penance, charity, celibacy and such other moral virtues are prescribed and insisted upon. Whether however an absolute renunciation of all the actions is enjoined or not may well be debated. There are to be found instances both ways, although the eventual Upaniṣadic leaning seems to be rather towards renunciation.

Our Upanisadic texts are of course generally unanimous and are even rapturously eloquent in their *Description of the State of Self-realisation.* The state was believed to bring about the final absorption of the individual soul as well as of the whole world of phenomena into the Highest Self; and an approximate conception of it could be formed only with the help of well-known *dṛṣṭāntas* such as that of the deep-sleep condition, of the rivers flowing into the ocean, the flowers

mingling their honey into the honey-comb, and the like. The absorption in question is complete and final, and theistic passages like Śvetāśvatara v, Ch. Up. viii. 3, and even the famous Śāṇḍilya-vidyā (Śat. Brāh. X. vi. 3, Ch. Up. iii. 14), which recognise the reality of the distinction between the individual and the supreme soul prior to the absorption, do ultimately speak of that distinction being transcended. But the question of questions is whether this Self-realisation takes place all at once, with the very first flash of the intuitive knowledge (*sadyo-mukti*), or whether contrariwise it takes place by a few graded stages (*krama-mukti*), the latter of the two being not yet absolutely denuded of all sensuous perceptions and delights, and hence forming a feature in the process that may attract and ensnare the commoner, but was sure to repel the heedful. This is a question that has provoked quite a battle royal between the later Vedāntic schools. Here it must be admitted that the majority of our sources (such as, Kauṣ. Up. I, Ch. Up. iv. 15 and v. 3–10, Bṛ. Up. VI. 2, etc.) lean to the former of these views, Kaṭha Up. II. iii. 5—a passage not always properly understood—setting forth the less and less partial views of the Reality vouchsafed unto us in the different worlds, such as that of the Manes, of the Gandharvas, and so forth, through which the soul has to pass in the course of his career of God-realisation, until in the world of Brahmā there is obtained a full-orbed vision of the same. There are, however, some other texts—especially, those proclaimed by that most advanced amongst Vedāntic teachers, the Sage Yājñavalkya—where an immediate and absolute union with the Reality without retaining even the consciousness of that union is said to take place at the very moment of the *Sākṣātkāra* or beatific vision. It is of course true that from this ecstatic state of *advaitic* union it is permitted to the Yogin to come down and to continue to inhabit his old mortal tenament until the Karman which had originally produced its effect in the form of that tenament has completely spent out its force. But in that state of what is

termed the "Jīvanmukti" the soul merely mechanically goes through the wonted bodily movements without ever being under the dominance of the idea that he is their deliberate agent, nor feeling any attachment or aversion for the consequences likely to result from them. The *karman* that may result from these movements is, like the burnt-up seed, powerless to produce fresh *karman*. "He has merely to wait until liberated (from his bodily vesture); but once that happens, there is freedom and the complete attainment of the *Videha-kaivalya*." When both these doctrines are expressly to be found in the Upanisads, it is futile to explain one of these two sets of texts away, as though they did not exist at all. The only reconciliation that is possible in the matter can emerge from the crucible of experience or *anubhava*. The Upaniṣads, in so far as they faithfully recorded traditionally reliable accounts of so many individual intuitions of the Absolute, were naturally and normally not expected to dogmatise and vouch for the exclusive truthfulness of any one set of intuitions alone; and this much we must concede to them in spite of the fact that, on the face of it, the Advaitic intuition of Yājñavalkya may appear to us to include and transcend not only the other non-Advaitic intuitions, but also those concerning the qualified or partial Advaitism. We need not discuss the question further at this stage. It led however to certain important consequences in the Upaniṣadic theory of Ethics, which it ended by making a-moralistic. The position reached was, as we saw, dangerously within sight of downright Materialism, and never at a very great distance from Scepticism and Atheism.

A few words may finally be permitted on the question of the *Beginnings of* some of the later *Philosophical Systems* which it is usual to trace in the Upaniṣads. Now, to speak of a given body of doctrines as forming a *philosophical system* implies, in the first place, that the doctrines are not isolated utterances on single detached problems, but that they, in

their *ensemble*, cover the full (or very nearly full) range of the philosophical issues that one raises for example in Cosmology, Psychology, Ethics, and Metaphysics; and, in the second place, that the solutions so offered are logically consistent, as presupposing throughout one and the same point of view. As a consequence, mere differences in ritualistic practices—as to whether, for instance, in some specific sacrifice, the omentum should be basted first and after that the clotted-ghee, or the clotted-ghee first, and then the omentum—even though consistently maintained and giving rise to two opposing ritualistic schools, namely, that of the Carakas and the Yājñavalkyas,* cannot originate *philosophical* systems, any more than can the divergence of views on isolated topics, as for instance, what god constitutes the deity of the Prastāva or the Udgītha or the Pratihāra,† or to what world the Pārikṣits after death have been assigned (Bṛ. iii. 3) constitute philosophical *systems*, even though these latter questions possess a distinct philosophical import. We can even go further. The Upaniṣadic texts make frequent mention of some individual teachers holding sporadic views on philology, cosmology, eschatology, and the like; but it would be misleading to dub these as definite philosophical theories by giving them names and characterising (on the strength of Greek analogies) one a Water-philosophy, another a Fire-philosophy, and so forth. The fact is that, even where teachers like Aśvapati Kaikeya, Ajātaśatru of Kāśī, or Sage Yājñavalkya are naming and criticising the earlier doctrines as to the nature of the Highest God or the Supreme Self, so little is really known as to the general outlook on life of a personality like Varku-Vārṣṇa or Gardabhīvipīta Bhāradvāja who are mentioned as maintaining, one the Eye and the other the Ear as the Highest Deity, that one should really hesitate to find therein any genuine and systematic philosophy.

* See Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa iii. 6. 3. 24.

† These are the specific divisions of a *Sāma* chant. For the answers see Ch. Up. i. 11.

It is only when we come to deal with texts such as Tait. Up. ii and iii, Kaṭha, Aitareya, Chāndogya vi, or viii, Bṛ. ii, iii, or iv, or Śvetāś. i that we become aware of a philosophical problem *fully worked-out* in all its bearings. And the way to such systematised speculation can properly be said to have been prepared in part by texts like Ch. i. 2ff., Ch. iii. 14, Bṛ. vi. 2 or Praśna i, where there are single philosophical topics dealt with, but in a manner that may serve as the basis for rearing up a philosophical superstructure. It is obviously only in such systematised attempts that we are justified in tracing the roots of the later philosophical Darśanas, and not (as has been too often done) in a few chance expressions here and there.

Now, whenever there is made an attempt at systematic philosophical thinking, a sort of a more or less fixed philosophical terminology is evolved in the process; and this is strikingly illustrated in the case of our Upaniṣads on a comparison of the technical terms of the texts that fall within what we have designated as the third and fourth Groups with those that can be culled from texts belonging to the first two Groups. Professor Jacobi in his *Entwicklung der Gottesidee bei den Indern*, page 20, gives the following select list of such technical terms: *avyakta, ahaṁkāra, karaṇa, kāraṇa, kārya, kriyā, tanu* (= the body), *deha, dehin, dravya, nivṛtti, pariṇāma, prakṛti, pratyaya, pramāda, phala* (= the consequence), *mokṣa, vahni,* śakti, sarvaga, sarvajña, sūkṣma,* and *hetu* (= the ground or cause); also forms and derivatives from the following roots: *ud + bhū, up + labh, cint,* tyaj,* ni + yam, pari + nam, pra + arth,* vi + añj,* and *vi + āp*. As this list is admittedly a selection, I may be permitted to make it more complete by adding the following words: *advaita* (also *dvaita*), *adhiṣṭhāna, adhyātma, amūrta* (also *mūrta*), *avyākṛta, asaṅga* (also *saṅga*), *āvirbhāva, kevala, kṣayiṣṇu, kṣetrajña, guṇa* (also

* I must confess that I really fail to see why Jacobi includes these words in the list.

guṇin, nirguṇa, and others), *tattva, tanmātra, tarka, tryaṇuka, dṛṣṭānta, dhāraṇā, nāstika* (also *nāstikya*), *nididhyāsana, niṣkriya, nairātmya, pratyag-ātman, pradhāna, prapañca, pramā* (also *pramāṇa* and *pramātṛ*), *prasāda, bhoga* (also *bhōktṛ*), *māyā, yoga, lakṣaṇa, vastu, vāsanā, vikāra, vijñāna* (also *saṁjñāna*, etc.), *viśeṣa, viṣaya, saṁyoga, saṁsāra, saṁghāta, sattva* (also *sāttvika*), *saṁnyāsa, samādhi, samudaya, samprasāda, sarga, svabhāva, sāṁkhya, sāmparāya*, etc., together with the several forms and derivatives from the roots *duṣ, pra + mā*, and *vi + kṛ*, other than those that are already listed.* And, if we note down the actual passages wherein these words occur, it is seen that over nine-tenths of them proceed from our third and fourth Groups, including therein texts hailing equally from the portions of Chāndogya and Bṛhadāraṇyaka which Deussen (followed by Jacobi) regards as the earliest, but which we have recognised as constituting the middle and later Upaniṣads, along with the Upaniṣads like Kaṭha, Muṇḍaka, Śvetāśvatara, and Maitrā. Some of the technical terms enumerated in the above list are already in vogue in the Brāhmaṇas. Only a few, but these the most important ones, can be put down as the inventions or the newer adaptations by the Upaniṣads themselves.

* There is room for making even this list a little longer, but not very much. In regard to arguments based upon a critical consideration of such vocabulary, we have to remember that G. A. Jacob, whose *Concordance* has been utilised in this compilation by myself (as well as by Jacobi), has unfortunately not recorded all the "uttara-padas" (he thus omits *sukhaduḥkha-hetu* sub voc. *hetu*). Secondly, he has not given cross-references for cognate words, e. g. to *mukti, mumukṣu, atimukti, atimokṣa, vimokṣa vimucyamāna*, and *vimukti* under the word *mokṣa*, or to *anupalabhya* and *smṛtilambha* under the root *upalabh* (which has led Jacobi to the wrong view that in the earlier Upaniṣads—and by this he means Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya, and Taittirīya—these words are absent, which is *not* the case); and in a few cases at least the index-slips of Jacob seem to have gone astray. We have moreover to allow for the possibility of mere chance, which indeed Jacobi also concedes. It may thus be a pure accident that the word *sāmparāya* occurs only in the Kaṭha, or that the word *ānanda* occurs only twice or thrice in the whole

There are amongst these latter three distinct types of words that easily lend themselves to classification under "Yoga," "Bhakti," and "Sāṁkhya" technicalities. These are the names of the three famous Philosophical Schools, the first beginnings of which are traced to the age of the Upaniṣads; and they seem to have come into existence in the above order. Now, as regards Yoga, its primary connotation is a "constant application" or a ceaseless exercise of the powers of the mind and the body along certain prescribed methods such as regulation of the breath (Prāṇāyāma) with the view to control and perfect the physiological as also the psychological processes and functions of the human body; and the Yajurveda mantras quoted in Śvetāśvatara Up. chapters 2 and 3 emphasize this sense of the term. The practical discipline involved in the "Yoga" was believed to give rise to certain "supernatural" powers and aptitudes in the man; and not a few of them may have been the by-products of the primitive magic-imbued ritual. In a primitive society at any rate the dread wizard or the "medicine-man" is hardly ever distinguishable from the Yogin, who can be understood to be in some sense the magician turned into the metaphysician. In India magic is as old as the Atharva-veda, if not indeed still earlier; and it forms in fact the back-bone of the early Vedic ritual, which may be said to be a blend of certain simpler forms of Nature-worship with certain animistic or totemic ideas probably imported from the cults and practices of some neighbouring "Non-Aryan" peoples. From this point of view, J. W. Hauer (*Die*

Chāndogya, or that so important a word as *jīva*, as a substantive, does not occur in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, nor also the word *sukha*, either as a substance or any derivative from it. And this is likewise true of the opposed word *duḥkha*—except for one solitary passage (iv. 4. 14), which Bṛh. and Śvet. (iii. 10) have in common, and which seems to have been original with the latter. Making allowance for these somewhat disconcerting circumstances which are unavoidable, the evidence of the technical terminology may be said to establish the correctness—not of Deussen's stratification of the Upaniṣads according to their external form—Prose or Verse—but rather of our own chronological grouping.

Anfänge der Yogapraxis, 1922) is not without some justification in holding that several [late] *sūktas* of the Ṛgveda and not a few of the earlier sacrificial prescriptions about fasting and abnegation are swayed by ideas of Yoga and of Sympathetic Magic. Compare, for instance, Ṛv. x. 136,—a sūkta which describes certain "Munis" or sages "girdled with the wind" who wear their soiled and yellow garments, and fly through the regions of the air with long loose locks, deep-drunk and "treading the path of wild beasts, Apsarasas, and Gandharvas," and having their home in both "the Eastern and the Western oceans." This bears witness to a definite *penchant* for the acquisition of occult powers, which, however, need not mean that a fully-worked out metaphysical theory was supplied as the requisite back-ground for the exercises and practices involved.

Such a theory, whenever worked out, would, in the first place, emphasize the "*kratu*," or the thinking-and-willing power of man, so that "to think upon a thing intently was actually to be it;" and then it would set forth the Supreme Self as the goal which it was the duty of the individual to strive to reach through the several Yogic disciplines culminating in the enrapt, one-pointed, and ecstatic meditation upon it. The Upaniṣadic texts (e. g., Kaṭha I. ii. 12) correctly designate this as the "*Adhyātma-Yoga*," so as to distinguish it from the pre-Upaniṣadic Yoga, which had not yet been apparently elevated into a philosophical system. We have however no valid ground to suppose that it is the Upaniṣads themselves that have effected this "systematization." It rather seems to have been achieved more or less independently of them. The Upaniṣadic texts * that contain specific references

* Namely, Kaṭha I. ii. 12, 17, 20, 24, I. iii. 13, II. i. 1, 15, II. ii. 3, II. iii. 9–10, 16 and 18; Chāndogya v. 10. 1, viii. 6, and vii. 6; Muṇḍaka I. ii. 11, 13, II. ii. 3–7, III. i. 5, 8, 10, and III. ii. 1, 6; Śvetāśvatara i, 5. 10, 14, and the whole of Śv. ii; Bṛhad. iii. 3 (or iii. 7), iii. 5, iv. 3. 20, iv. 4. 23 and iv. 5. 6; Praśna i. 10, iii. 6-7 and v. 1; Kauṣītaki iv. 19 and Maitrāyaṇī i. 2, ii. 3 and several other passages from the later parts of the same.

to "Yoga" ideas do come all of them from our Groups Three and Four. They lay down a restrained life, self-subdual, concentration, and penance amongst the preliminaries to Yogic discipline; recommend silence, solitude, temperateness, and habitual introspection as the helps to the Yoga, suggesting certain well-favoured places for meditation. They also prescribe postures and rules for breath-control and concentration, speaking of the *Om* as a suitable object for symbolical meditation. There are also several references to the *Nāḍis*,* descriptions of the sure signs of imminent Yogic perfection, and an expatiation upon the results believed to follow from the mastery and perfection of Yogic concentration, including amongst these, freedom from all the diseases, freshness and purity of mind, and a serene and peaceful disposition. Except the latest passages of the Maitrāyaṇī Up., which introduce most of the technical terms of "Ṣaḍaṅga" Yoga, none of the other texts bring in any really elaborate technical terminology. The general impression gathered from a study of these texts is that the Upaniṣads are, in this behalf, merely alluding to and quoting from certain well-known sources. Compare in particular the Śvetāśvatara Chapter ii, and the several chance allusions to the mystic "Nāḍīs." — Kaṭha II. iii. 10 f. seem to define the Yoga as the process of "the steady holding down of the senses," or of "the causing of an emergence and absorption;" and, philosophically speaking, its necessary postulate is the existence of an entity which is of-one-essence with the individual soul but subtler and more perfect than the latter, and which it should be the individual's sole aspiration in his life to know and attain. This means that Yoga must have all along been theistic †; and seeing that the beginnings of Yoga can be traced back even upto the pre-Upaniṣadic period, we ought no longer to acquiesce

* Viz., Praśna iii. 6 f., Kaṭha II. iii. 16, Ch. viii. 6. 6, Bṛ. iv. 3. 20, Kauṣ. iv. iv. 19, etc.

† Yoga seems to have taken a somewhat different philosophical attitude in Buddhism, although the outward disciplines did not vary.

in the generally accepted opinion that the Yoga represents the atheistic Sāṁkhya turned theistic. We should rather say that Sāṁkhya is the theistic Yoga rendered atheistic. For the peculiar association of the Yoga with Sāṁkhya in the Śvetāśvatara (vi. 13) see pages 79–81 below.

In many ways allied to Yoga is " Bhakti. " The sense of "worshipping" which belongs to the root *bhaj* from which *bhakti* is derived is only secondary, the primary meaning being "to divide or share." This implies in the first place that the *bhakta* or devotee feels a peculiar and exclusive sense of possession or of ownership in the object of his devotion. Secondly, there is the further implication that the *bhakta* so-to-say participates in the life of the object of his worship and thereby recognises his own identity of essence with Him, as constituting an "*aṁśa*" or part of Him. We saw already that the Yoga also requires and postulates a similar identity of essence between the practising Yogin and the object upon which he concentrates his mind. The only real difference between these two attitudes consists in the fact that the Yogin pursues his ideal in an activistic or intellectualistic frame of mind with the help of certain psycho-physiological disciplines, whereas the devotee (*bhakta*) assumes a more or less emotional or ethical attitude towards his "God," whom he seeks to propitiate with certain sectarian and symbolical methods. Hence in the case of the Bhakti also we have to distinguish an exterior and practical part (which concerns itself with the details of the cult—the marks, symbols, place, time, materials, and methods of worship — in the formulation of which not a few primitive animistic and totemistic conceptions can perhaps be easily detected) from its philosophical back-ground, which, as in the case of the Yoga, may be "monistic," but is more usually seen to be "dualistic" or "qualified-monistic." It is also worth noting that the sort of intense personal relationship between the individual and the Deity which Bhakti connotes need not be inconsistent

with Polytheism. Hymns of genuine devotional fervour are not accordingly absent in the polytheistic Ṛgveda, because the consciousness that there may be other "gods" need not come in the way of the particular worshipper surrendering himself whole-heartedly to Varuṇa, Indra, or (coming to more recent times) Viṭhobā, any more than the consciousness that there is "God, the Father" need really qualify the whole-heartedness of the Christian's devotion to Jesus Christ or to the Virgin Mary, just as—to take a secular example—the wife's whole-hearted loyalty and devotion to her own husband is not precluded by her knowledge that there are other devoted wives in the world who owe and ought to owe their allegiance to their own respective consorts. There are some persons however who seem to think that the belief in a multiplicity of gods is irreconcilable with pure devotion and morality.* I really fail to see the reason. Was the devotion of saint Tukārām to Viṭhobā "impure" or "unspiritual" because he has left behind equally sincere *Abhaṅgas* addressed to the other members of the Hindu Pantheon? Armed with the theory of "Avatār," which is the corollary to Pantheism as developed in India, Tukārām could address his prayers to Rāma or to Kṛṣṇa or to Viṭhobā with absolutely the self-same depth and fervour with which the Christian is supposed to turn to Jesus Christ. To him it would be inconceivable to imagine that the "Father in Heaven" incarnated as "God" only once in the whole history of the universe, the countless ages and generations that lived and passed away before the time of that blessed incarnation being condemned to perdition for the "sin" of their being born earlier. In fact, belief in an eternal and infinitely merciful God is irreconcilable with the supposition that God would wait until mankind had reached a particular metaphysical evolution, and learned to clothe their prayer in a grammatically and philosophic-

* As far as concerns "morality" we will take up the question in the next Lecture.

ally accurate form before He actually revealed Himself in answer to the man's fervent and sincere appeals for help and guidance. The true merit of " Bhakti " as a popular, plebian religion, we may say, consists just in this that it demands no metaphysical preparedness of any sort in its adherents. Of course where metaphysics comes to the help of devotion—and it generally does this through "Pantheism" which is no enemy to the cult of devotion, as some people imagine—there ensues *an intellectual satisfaction* in addition to the emotional exaltation. But that is not absolutely essential, because it cannot be always guaranteed that—taking the problem of the evil, for instance—the quality of the "intellectual satisfaction" derived from a *philosophical* solution of the question (whether from the point of view of Pantheism which would regard the evil as the complement of the good, or from the point of view of Christianity with its belief in the existence of the Arch Fiend on whose head, conveniently enough, is to rest the responsibility of whatever you cannot otherwise explain in this fair creation of God, or from any other point of view that one may care to put forward) is not always absolutely impeccable.

Be that as it may, when we are tracing the beginnings of "Bhakti" in the Upaniṣads and in the earlier literature, we have to distinguish between the philosophical justification of the cult of "loving faith" (which seems to have been afforded by the monistic outlook of the Upaniṣads), and the practical illustrations of that " loving faith " as furnished by the (sectarian) worships of Indra, Rudra, Śiva, Viṣṇu, Āditya, and other gods which was current in specific localities, classes, and coteries of the worshippers of these gods even in the Pre-Upaniṣadic period. Compare the Upaniṣadic allusions to these in the Bāṣkalamantropaniṣad for Indra ; Praśna i , and Chān. ii. 9, iii. 1–11, iii. 19 for the Sun ; Īśa 1 and Śvet. Chapters 3–4 and 5–6 for Śiva or Īśa ; Praśna ii and Ch. iv. 3, etc. for Prāṇa-Vāyu ; Kaṭha I. iii. 9 and Maitrā. pp. 383–385

(Ānand. Ed.) for Viṣṇu ; and Ch. iii. 14 and Bṛ. iii. 6–7–8 for the Ātman. In all these texts there is the presence of a theistic attitude towards the Deity that is adored. And inasmuch as this attitude is inspired by the belief in the omnipotence and omnipresence of the Deity, it would be quite legitimate to infer that in the presence of that Deity the individual would feel all the limitations of his own individuality fall away from him so that he has his whole being in God. There are some theistic critics, however, who seem to have persuaded themselves into the belief that the individual would retain the consciousness of his own individuality even in the presence of the Most High. The test of the pudding is in the eating, and it would seem that our critics never have had an opportunity of tasting it. The concensus of Indian testimony in the matter is overwhelming, and the great Mystics of all lands are in this at one with the Indian *Ṛṣis.* "Give up all ye have and follow me" implies that the individual has to empty his life of every finite interest and be prepared to sacrifice even his consciousness of the Self, undeterred by the otiose reflection—" I dare not lose the consciousness of my own individuality, for then I would be lost." When the loving mother rushes into the flames to save her only child, she is not forsooth bothered by the thought of trying to save her own body from the fire so as to be able thereafter to experience the great joy of having saved her child! Such a reflection may well suit the by-standers who watch the heroic act from a safe distance. For the sake of those who are cowed down by the prospect of an absolute and eternal union with the Most High, which is bereft of every finite consciousness as such, we have a few Upaniṣadic texts (e. g. Muṇḍaka III. i. 3) which countenance a lower ideal. The prevailing attitude of the Upaniṣads is correctly typified in the three fundamental passages, viz., the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā (Chān. iii. 14), the Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa (Bṛhad. iii. 7 : cf. also iii. 8) and the two middle adhyāyas of the Śvetāśvatara, in the last of which the Lord is described as—

The all-creating, omni-form guardian of the universe, beyond whom there is nothing higher or subtler; the one immutable and beneficient Puruṣa who dwells within the hearts of all beings and controls their activities, also dispensing unto them rewards and punishments according to their *Karman*; and the unconcerned Seer and Master of the Pradhāna (Nature) and the Kṣetrajña (Individual Soul), who has sent forth the Vedas, being endowed with supreme cosmogenic power, and yet, in reality, actionless and absolute and perfect—His saving grace somehow leading the believing devotee to rectitude, sinlessness, and salvation.

We have already given expression to the view that a few at least of the several forms of the sectarian worship must have been originally current in certain "Non-Aryan," tribes, from which they seem to have been introduced into the Vedic religion; and it is not at all unlikely that some of these cults may have originated in ancestor-worship or in the apotheosis of some successful tribal hero, as for example the Vāsudeva of the Sātvata or the Vṛṣṇi clan,—the worship of the mother Śakti also not being without its own influence in some of the localities.

While both "Yoga" and "Bhakti" originated, in our view, earlier and outside the strictly Upaniṣadic pales, the beginnings of the Philosophy known as the Sāṁkhya are traceable to the Upaniṣads themselves. On this question of the origin of the Sāṁkhya, sharp differences of opinion seem to have prevailed amongst scholars. Garbe, who is the most authoritative writer on Sāṁkhya Philosophy, maintained that Sāṁkhya was a dualistic and atheistic system from the very beginning, it having originated somewhere in the 8th or 7th century B. C., and in the Kṣatriya circles opposed to the Upaniṣadic Brāhmaṇism. The Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad which contains the earliest allusion to the Sāṁkhya Philosophy sets forth before us a theistic form of the Sāṁkhya, which

is a deliberately perverted form, and the "Sāṁkhya" of the Mahābhārata and the Bhagavadgītā constitutes, according to Garbe, a still further perversion of the original. Jacobi, disagreeing with Garbe, believes that there must have once existed an incipient "pre-classical" form of the Sāṁkhya, traces of which he finds in the "Light-Water-Food" cosmology of Ch. Up. vi. 2 ff. This original form, however, was a "Satkāryavāda," dualistic in Metaphysics like the Classical Sāṁkhya of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Kārikās, of which—here agreeing with Garbe—Jacobi regards the "Sāṁkhya" of the Kaṭha and the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣads as the perverted form. Jacobi in effect—going against the dictum, *Entia non sunt multiplicanda*—adds to the classical and the perverted forms a pre-classical form of the Sāṁkhya system, all the three believed to be dating right from the Pre-Buddhistic period. Oldenberg plausibly maintains that the pre-classical form of the Sāṁkhya is just the form in which we meet the system in the Kaṭha and the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣads, i. e. to say, a theistic and idealistic system based upon the famous doctrine of "Triune-unity"—

> The Mutable (Kṣara) is the matter (Pradhāna), the Immortal and Immutable is the soul (Hara), while there is the one God who lords over the Mutable and the Self.........Thus there exists the Enjoyer (Subject), the Enjoyable (Object), and the Controller, who together constitute the Triune Brahma.

And as this form of the Sāṁkhya is also the form preserved in the Bhagavadgītā and in the Mahābhārata as a whole, Oldenberg is logical enough in affording a less condemnatory appraisal of the Epic philosophy than is usually done by most writers of the "analytical" school. The view of Dahlmann does not essentially differ from that of Oldenberg except for the fact that he claims for the Mahābhārata *just in its present form* an absolutely unitary and consistent character, which few critical scholars would care to assign to it. My own view on the question is a compromise between the views of

Dahlmann and Oldenberg. I accordingly believe that Kaṭha I. iii. 10–11, II. iii. 7–8; Śvetāśvatara i. 8, 10, iii. 12, iv. 5, 10, v. 2, 7, 8, vi. 10, 13, 16; Praśna iv. 8; and Maitrāyaṇī ii. 5, iii. 2–5, etc. give us the earliest form of the Sāṁkhya, which is theistic, as holding the Matter and the Soul as two parallel manifestations proceeding alike from the Lord. It seems also to have been an idealistic system,* there being assumed to exist a distinctive phenomenal world for each individual soul, the general agreement of the idealistic creations of them all being guaranteed by the circumstance that there is a Lord creating and controlling them all. The Bhagavadgītā simply inherits and develops this same original form of the Sāṁkhya bringing it into alliance with the Yoga, which was likewise theistic from the very start. Subsequently, through the inward logical development of thought (the details of which we need not pursue in this place) there were evolved forth in more or less parallel and simultaneous manifestations (i) the Classical Sāṁkhya which denied the Lord and became realistic and rational by assuming a multiplicity of Souls in eternal opposition to the Matter; (ii) the Advaita Vedānta which reduced both the World as well as the Individual to sheer illusion, and sought such salvation as was possible under a system of rigorous and uncompromising Monism; and (iii) the Śūnyavāda of Buddhism which negatived both the World and the Individual—and *ipso facto* the Lord—and so landed speculation into the bottomless abyss of the "Eight Noes."

Besides the three systems of philosophy—Yoga, Bhakti, and Sāṁkhya—the beginnings of which are traced to the Upaniṣads, there are in evidence in these texts certain other speculative tendencies, as for example that towards Materialism

* This circumstance alone explains how in the Sāṁkhya cosmology such psychic entities as Buddhi and Ahaṁkāra find a place.—There are a couple of attempts made in more recent times to give a fresher interpretation of the genesis and evolution of the Sāṁkhya philosophy, which I do not regard as very successful.

(Ch. vi. 2. 1), Hedonism (Ch. viii. 8. 4), Determinism (Bṛhad. iii. 13), and so forth, which may be taken to mark the beginning of a new phase of thought-activity which can be designated as "Post-Upaniṣadic thought-ferment" and which eventually paved the way for Buddhism. The existence of a sense of speculative restlessness in the age is evidenced by the prevailing thirst for knowledge, which actuated men and women, young and old alike, to undergo distant travels and humiliating privations, if thereby they could succeed in increasing their stock of knowledge by howsoever small a measure. Itinerant asceticism appears to have been quite a recognised feature of the Upaniṣadic society, which exerted its greatest influence on Jainism, Buddhism, and the other philosophies that encouraged Monasticism. And that the philosophical theories cultivated in these different Schools and Saṁghas and Āśramas were, not a few of them, radical in the extreme is borne out not only by certain well-known and oft-cited references in the Jain and Buddhistic Scriptures, but also in the succinct enumeration of the current cosmological doctrines in the first two stanzas of the first Chapter of the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad:

> What is the Cause, the Brahman [so-called]? Whence have we sprung forth?
> Whereby do we subsist? And whither are we ultimately (*sam*) bound?
> Supported by what, through the pleasures and their opposites,
> Do we, O Brahman-knowers, live out what is ordained?
> Is it Time? — Nature? — Destiny? — Chance?
> That it be the Elements, the Uterus, and the Puruṣa can be debated:
> For, their conjunction happens not of its own accord;
> And as to the Self [as possible conjunction-maker], he has no command over causes of joy and grief.

But herein we are stepping beyond the thought-world of the Upaniṣads as such.

Our treatment of Upaniṣadic Vedānta commenced with a closer determination of both the connotation as well as the denotation of the term Upaniṣad, alluding in particular to the composite nature of even the very oldest of these texts, and consequently to their extremely unsettled chronology, both with reference to each other, and in relation to the Vedic Saṁhitās and their exegeses—the Brāhmaṇas—of which the Upaniṣads mark the culmination. We next put forward one or two hypotheses to explain the relation of the Ṛgveda to the Atharvaveda, and the *raison d'être* for the peculiar *Weltanschauung* of the Brāhmaṇic texts, which we set forth with some details as explaining the characteristic tone and tendencies of the Upaniṣads themselves. Then we took up the question as to whether the Upaniṣads in their present form constituted a revolt of the Kṣatriyas against Brāhmaṇic sacerdotalism; and in answering it in the negative we tried to explain the cultural back-ground of the Upaniṣads with a special reference to the contact and fusion of divergent cultures which, there is reason to suppose, must have taken place during the age of the Upaniṣads. This was followed by an attempt at a chronological stratification of the principal Upaniṣadic texts by way of a preliminary to the exposition and evaluation of their philosophy under the headings of (i) Methodology, (ii) Cosmology, (iii) Psychology, (iv) Conception of the Absolute, and Approaches towards the same, (v) Ethics, (vi) Mysticism or the Self-realisation, and (vii) Roots of Later Philosophies—especially of the Yoga, Bhakti, and Sāṁkhya—winding up the whole review with a brief indication of the advent of a period of thought-ferment that is to occupy us more fully in the earlier part of the next Lecture, which we propose to devote to the Bhagavadgītā, the second of the three Vedāntic "Prasthānas."

LECTURE III

VEDĀNTA IN THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ

IN my last evening's Lecture I tried to put forth the view that the Upanisads in their present form represent an alliance, based upon the theory of the Āśramas (life-stages), between Brāhmaṇic ritualism and some of the less radical out of those forces of disruption that threatened to overwhelm Vedic sacerdotalism as re-instated upon the basis of the "Bandhutā" philosophy of the Brāhmaṇas. But this was admittedly a compromise for mutual benefit, effected in the face of a common danger that appeared to shake the very foundations of the society; and it went the way all patchwork compacts are ever known to go in every walk of life. What now was this common danger? Fortunately we have for the period under discussion four or five independent testimonia converging to pretty nearly the same conclusion. These testimonia were for the first time critically set forth by Dr. F. Otto Schrader in his learned Doctorate dissertation entitled "*Ueber den Stand der indischen Philosophie zur Zeit Mahāvīras and Buddhas,*" 1902, and then in a more elaborate form in one of the publications of the Calcutta University.* It is not therefore necessary for me to go into any very great details. As the data recorded in the Buddhistic texts like the "Brahmajālasūtra," and in the different Jain Suttas mutually support and supplement one another, and are both in part confirmed by various statements in the Mahābhārata, in the Ṣaṣṭitantra as preserved in a synopsis of it in the 12th Chapter of the Ahirbudhnyasaṁhitā (a Pāñcarātra Āgama edited by Dr. F. O. Schrader some few years ago), as well as in some of the late Upaniṣadic texts

* Barua, *Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, 1921.

like the Śvetāśvatara or the Maitrāyaṇī (Ānand. Ed., p. 465), it is reasonably probable that the accounts refer to an identical philosophical period, which we will have to place between the last stage of the Upaniṣads and the century or so preceding the rise of Mahāvīra and of Gautama the Buddha. The texts mention certain philosophical views in general (such as the Kāla-vāda, Svabhāva-vāda, Niyati-vāda, Akriyā-vāda, Ajñāna-vāda, Aśāśvata-vāda, Uccheda-vāda and so on), and name certain "heretical" teachers, some of whose views and recorded utterances they expound in suggestive details. And as a few of these teachers are said to be contemporaries of Mahāvīra and Gautama Buddha, it is evident that they represent a much later phase of this period of "thought-ferment" as I have named it. But the views of these contemporaries of the Buddha are so bold and subtle and extreme, that the ground must have taken a century at least to get ready for them. I shall here quote, by way of a sample and in order to show the reality of the danger that menaced not only the Śrauta religion but all institutions and all established faiths, a few of these views as attributed to the leading "heretics" of the day.

In the *Sāmaññaphalasutta* the following view is attributed to Pūraṇa Kassapa —

> To him who acts or causes another to act, to him who mutilates or causes another to mutilate......to him who causes grief or torment......to him who kills a living creature......breaks into houses......speaks lies: to him thus acting there is no guilt. If with a discus with an edge sharp as a razor he should make all the living creatures on the earth one heap, one mass of flesh, there would be no guilt thence resulting, no increase of guilt would ensue. Were he to go along the south bank of the Ganges striking and slaying, mutilating and having men mutilated.........there would be no guilt thence resulting, no increase of guilt would ensue.

> Were he to go along the north bank of the Ganges giving alms and ordering gifts to be given, offering sacrifices or causing them to be offered, there would be no merit thence resulting, no increase of merit would ensue. In generosity, in self-mastery, in control of the senses, in speaking truth, there is neither merit nor increase of merit.

It will be seen that this is the Sāṁkhya-Vedānta doctrine of the soul being "*akartṛ*" carried to its logical extreme, and reminiscent of some of the Upaniṣadic texts cited on p. 63, which speak of the absence of any moral obligation to the man who has acquired true knowledge of the Absolute.

Here is a violent attack on the Brāhmaṇic doctrine of the sacrifice by a philosopher called Ajita Keśakambalin—

> There is no such thing as alms or sacrifice or offering. There is neither result nor fruit of good or evil deeds. There is no such thing as this world or the next. There is neither father, nor mother, nor beings springing into life without them. There are in this world no recluses or Brāhmans who have reached the highest goal, who walk perfectly, and who, having understood and realised, by themselves alone, both this world and the next, make their wisdom known to others. A human being is built of the four elements. When he dies, the earthy in him returns and relapses to the earth, the fluid to the water, the heat to the fire, the windy to the air, and the *indriyas* or faculties pass into space. The four bearers—he on the bier as the fifth—take his body away; till they reach the burning ground men utter forth eulogies; but *there* his bones are bleached, and his offerings end in ashes! It is a doctrine of fools, this talk of gifts. It is an empty lie, mere idle talk, when men say there is profit therein. Fools and wise alike, on the dissolution of the body, are cut off, annihilated, and after death they are not.

Some of the more familiar arguments of Cārvaka about incurring debts to eat ghee, or about the sacrificer killing his own father in the sacrifice as a sure way to send him to heaven, are more trenchant perhaps as arguments, but are couched in practically the same spirit.

An example of the extreme subtlety which the dialectics of the day had reached is afforded by the following put into the mouth of Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta—

> If you ask me whether there is another world: well, if I thought there were, I would say so; but I do *not* say so; and I do *not* think that it is 'thus' or 'thus;' and I do *not* deny it; and I do *not* say "there neither is nor is not another world." And if you were to ask me about the beings produced by chance; or whether there is any fruit, any result of good or bad actions; or whether a man who has won the truth continues or does not continue after death—to each or to any of these questions do I give the same reply.

It is evident that a period where free thinking was pursued to such extreme lengths could not have been an average period in the nation's history. Its best analogue is the age of the "Sophists" in Greece. The nature of the views propounded presupposes long training in philosophical argumentation; and the views themselves could have sprung only from the débris of some subtle and over-wrought systems of thought and thread-bare remains of metaphysical problems with a long anterior history. Here then we have a formidable attack levelled, not merely against a few detailed prescriptions and practices, but against the entire social order and civil and religious institutions. Nothing was sacred to this New Philosophy, and its power of persuasion and insinuation, and of consequent demolition of the faiths of men, was simply incalculable. The question to ask is, what did Brāhmaṇism which had, as we saw, successfully weathered through so many storms hitherto, do on this occasion to

save itself from utter annihilation? The usually current view in this matter is that after the period of the Upaniṣads there came in the "heresy" of Buddhism, which attacked both the Brāhmaṇic theory of the sacrifice and the Upaniṣadic doctrine of the Ātman. But it will now be seen that Buddhism is really milk-and-water as compared with some of the violent denunciations which we have cited above. Seeing that some of the extreme views propounded were such as would cause the healthy commonsense of the majority to turn away from them in disgust, and seeing further that the average man is generally on the side of established institutions, and conforms to their forms and requirements long after the spirit has fled away from them, would it not have seemed to the Brāhmans worth their while to make an attempt to gather all such people under one banner? Further inasmuch as the success of a religion or philosophy depends at least as much on what it has to offer to its *élite* followers, as on what it does for the average man, the attempt in question, if made, would have a chance of success only if it placed no bar of any kind to the god-ward aspirations of the average man, but opened out even for the humblest of them a way to reach the highest goal and be one with the Absolute. This naturally can nowise take place along the path of Jñāna or knowledge (as set forth in the older Upaniṣads), the highest reaches of which must always remain beyond the scope of the average man. Moreover the strange corollaries which some of the "heretic" philosophers deduced, as we saw, from the Upaniṣadic premises themselves, must have deterred the reformers and taught them a lesson. It would not have served any useful purpose now to make a *fetish* of jñāna or knowledge, and assume the attitude of an extreme rationalism. It was desirable and necessary to temper it with an element of emotion such as was afforded by the current (and at the time, certainly, the vigorous) doctrine of the Bhakti. If to all this we add the usual veneer of an up-to-date knowledge of cosmology and psychology and eschatology, care being

taken to insist upon a life of conformity to accepted moral principles and established institutions before, no less than after, the acquisition of the highest knowledge and the realisation of the Absolute, there was sure to be brought into being here a new system of thought which was bound to enlist under the banner of the "orthodoxy" all those whom it was worth any body's while to keep in. I believe that just such an attempt was made by Brāhmaṇism prior to Buddhism; and the best representative of this attempt is no other than the Bhagavadgītā, our second Vedāntic Prasthāna.

The mention of the Bhagavadgītā naturally brings to the fore a number of interesting problems connected with this philosophical poem; and the solutions of them usually in vogue would seem to militate against the chronological position which I propose to assign to the poem. I cannot therefore proceed without giving at least a brief discussion of these problems from my own point of view, seeing that it is, to my mind, absolutely futile to attempt to evaluate the philosophy of the Bhagavadgītā before first determining a primary fact such as whether the poem, in its present form, comes before Buddhism or after it. The question has been much debated of late, not only in India itself where a powerful impetus was afforded by the publication of B. G. Tilak's *Gītārahasya* in Marathi (1915) and its translations in several of the Indian Vernaculars, but also in Europe and America, where the appearance of the second edition of Garbe's *Die Sāṁkhya Philosophie* (1917) and of the *Bhagavadgītā* (1921) resuscitated the old controversy as to the original form and teaching of the "Song Celestial," wherein, through the pages of the NGGW, 1919, the *Deutsche Literaturzeitung* (24 December 1921, 11 February 1922, 8 April 1922, and 15 July 1922), and other less accessible media, a long controversy was carried on in which Garbe, Oldenberg, Jacobi and other scholars participated. There also appeared, as important contribution to the problem at issue, Senart's French render-

ing in 1922 and Michalski-Iwienski's edition in the same year, and his Polish version in 1927, besides Edgerton's Interpretation of the Bhagavadgītā, 1925. Where so many tried hands have been at work it might appear presumptuous of me to go to the problem *ab ovo.* But I have taught the poem critically these more than half-a-dozen years to advanced students in my University, and have formed my own views about it which, unfortunately, differ from those of most of my predecessors. It is primarily a question of methodology, and secondarily that of a literal textual understanding of the poem. It would on the one hand be as great a methodological error to select convenient passages from the poem and set forth their teaching as its real teaching, and dub the inconvenient and conflicting passages as interpolations, as it would on the other hand be to first settle, on *a priori* and logical grounds, what the philosophically consistent teaching of the poem ought to be, and then to merely ignore passages that cannot be brought into conformity with such a preconceived idea of the ultimate purport of the poem, as though they did not exist. If all attempts to unify the teaching of the poem must necessarily land one into one or the other of the above-mentioned mistakes, it would be honester to confess (and to prove) that the poem is just a philosophical hotchpotch, with no settled philosophical terminology, no definite metaphysical or ethical teaching, and not even a creditably consistent rhetorical outlook, or grammatical diction! This in fact has been averred in so many words in India as well as outside of it. And yet from the time of the great Śaṅkarācārya and the other Bhāṣyakāras right down to the present day this "Divine Lay" has lured the greatest talents to an attempt to afford a synthetic and philosophically consistent interpretation of the "Lords' Song." Is the attempt to do this, without sacrificing the plain intention of even a single one of the seven hundred stanzas of the Poem, merely a fool's chase, never destined to succeed? I am convinced that it is not so; and every time that I have an opportunity

to read the poem thoroughly with my students I find my conviction getting additional confirmation. I propose therefore, in what follows, to give my own interpretation of the poem, furnishing, by way of an appendix to this Lecture, a summary of the poem chapter by chapter, which I have used for my lectures to the class and revised more than once.

Before however I can tackle the question of the interpretation of the Bhagavadgītā in its present form, I must dispose of the issue raised and established *on independent philological grounds* by Garbe regarding the composite nature of the present text of the Gītā, which, if proved, foredooms to failure every attempt at a synthetic interpretation of the poem taken as whole. The Mahābhārata (of which our Poem forms a more or less loosely connected part) is now generally believed to have passed through at least two if not more successive elaborations. Indian tradition itself, which speaks of these forms of the Epic as Jaya, Bhārata and Mahābhārata, lends strength to this belief; and *prima facie* the same should hold true of the Bhagavadgītā. The problem therefore reduces itself to a determination of the nature, extent, and general character of the contents of the earliest recension of the Poem, or at least of its second or penultimate recension, in case the Poem is taken to have undergone more than one revision. Now we need not complicate the issue by postulating three forms of the Gītā. Even if there be the three forms, it is evident that we cannot undertake to determine the earliest until we fix upon the form from which our present text has been elaborated. On this question, as is well known, there is the view of Holtzmann who thought that the original Gītā was "Vedāntic" in character, the originally "unorthodox" doctrine of Bhakti being subsequently grafted on to it. Then there is the view of Garbe who regarded the genuine Gītā as being a devotional and sectarian tract to which the Vedāntic portions were tacked on under the influence of Brāhmaṇism. Hopkins' formula is more compli-

cated. He declares that the *Song of the Blessed One* is "at present a Kṛṣṇaite version of an older Viṣṇuite poem, and this in turn was at first an unsectarian work, perhaps a late Upaniṣad." The first and the last of these views are based mainly upon *a priori* considerations. The great merit of Garbe's theory (which is now generally accepted in Europe) consists in the fact that he actually essayed the task of separating the genuine part of the original "devotional" poem from the later "Vedāntic" interpolations. And this was not the result of a mere application of the scissors-and-paste method; for, if that were all, one could much more readily harmonise the teaching of the Poem by cutting out all the Bhakti passages, or all the Sāṁkhya passages, or all the Yoga passages, at will. The outstanding merit of Garbe's theory, however, lay in his having attempted to furnish a proof of the presumed interpolations on some *independent philological grounds.* So long as these grounds remained unshaken, no amount of extraneous logic could dislodge Garbe from his position. Garbe was prepared to admit that—on grounds similar to those that he had put forth—a much larger number of passages would have to be put down as later interpolations than the about 170 stanzas already singled out by him. And to retort that the Gītā can be made to yield any wished-for consistent teaching if we just omit the inconvenient passages under the pretext of their being interpolated is *ignoratio elenchi,* because Garbe wanted to reject a passage as spurious *not* because it was Vedāntic, but *because* there were independent philological grounds for its rejection, and it so *happened* that all such passages rejected on these grounds were "Vedāntic" in tone. Nor will it do to argue that the Gītā bears a close resemblance in character and contents to the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, which exhibits the same admixture of Bhakti and Vedānta and Sāṁkhya-Yoga that we meet in the Bhagavadgītā; and that therefore, if we dissect the Poem into an original and an interpolated portion, we will have to do the same in the case of this Upaniṣad.

Yes, why not do it, would probably have been Garbe's reply; and whatever the conclusion reached, the problem of the Gītā must remain unaffected by it.* The only method of dislodging Garbe from his position is first to prove that his philological grounds are untenable, and, secondly, to show that the poem in its present form—even though admittedly a composite one—can be made to yield a consistent philosophical teaching, representing a harmonious synthesis of Vedānta, Sāṁkhya-Yoga, Mīmāṅsā, and Bhakti all in one. I believe that both the methods are possible.

To turn to the first, it will clarify issues if we admit at the outset that the poem may have undergone elaborations in part. Thus the first 19 verses of introduction, or the last 5 verses of the conclusion, or the second at least of the two "vibhūtivarṇanas" viz., in stanzas VII. 8-11 and again more elaborately in the last 30 verses or so of Chapter X, or the doctrine of the Devayāna and Pitṛyāṇa paths in VIII. 23-27, or the symbolical application of the "Sattva-Rajas-Tamas" division to the formula *Oṁ tat sat* in the last six verses of Chapter XVII, and even a large number other "Paurāṇic" passages from the peom *may* have been subsequently inserted into it; but that will not prove or disprove Garbe's position. It is where these interpolated passages—established as such on independent grounds—turn out to be all Vedāntic that Garbe's position becomes really unassailable. At the risk of introducing too much of philology into the Lecture, which however must always form the basis of every philosophical superstructure, I propose to take up the several "Vedāntic" interpolations seriatum.

* The problem of the Svetāśvatara I have dealt with in a paper contributed to the "Vasant-Rajatamahotsava" Volume of Essays in honour of A. B. Dhruva, 1927, where I have shown that Chapters 2-6 of the Upaniṣad merely elaborate the idea of Chapter 1, which already presents the theistic doctrine of triune-unity.

Garbe's first strong case is Gītā II. 17. The stanza refers here to the immortal and pantheistic Absolute in the neuter gender, while in the earlier and the later stanzas it is the masculine Ātman, the embodied Self, who is the topic of discussion. The argument does make a strong appeal at first sight. But upon reflection one has to ask whether the words *asataḥ* and *sataḥ* in stanza 16 cannot be equally in the neuter gender. If so, stanza II. 16 ought to have been likewise pronounced as an interpolation, because stanza II. 17 is a legitimate corollary from II. 16. Of a fact, however, stanza II. 13 topically attaches itself to stanza II. 18, and all the intervening four stanzas might have been much more cogently regarded as an interpolation. But in case we do not wish to go to this length, we might make a consistent and harmonious argument of the whole passage as it is. Thus stanzas II. 11–13 declare that birth, death, disease, etc. are mere accidents in the eternal life of the Ātman. Stanzas II. 14–15 urge Arjuna not to mind all these accidents; because, the next two stanzas argue, these accidents have no substantial existence. They are fictions of imgination, are *asat*, the only reality being the Ātman. The "pantheistic" *yena sarvam idaṁ tatam* in stanza 17 need cause no more stumbling than *sarvagataḥ* in stanza II. 24, which Garbe retains.

The next important case taken up by Garbe is stanzas III. 9–18, which from according to him an interpolation from the Mīmāṅsā point of view designed to recommend ritualism. I am going to argue hearafter that the Gītā, in its ultimate philosophical synthesis, has *not* ousted ritualism altogether; but looking to the philological reasons urged by Garbe, he is not right in saying that stanza III. 19 directly continues the topic of stanza III. 8. Stanza III. 19 beginning with "*Tasmād asaktaḥ*" presupposes that in what has gone before reasons have been assigned for *asakti* or absence of attachment. But these are only to be found in the stanzas which Garbe rejects, where it is brought out how, doing actions without attachment, carries the man to the highest goal.

Secondly, Garbe objects to the extension of the meaning of *karman* which meant in III. 8 the duty of a Kṣatriya, while in the interpolated stanzas it signifies ritualistic *karman.* But the word is used in a far more extended sense already in stanza III. 5; and besides, it is one of the lessons which the Gītā teaches to look upon all *karmans* as a sort of a *yajña* (sacrifice): compare stanza IV. 32; and if Garbe rejects this last as interpolated by reason of the presence in it of the word "Brahman," we would ask the reader to compare the trend of stanzas IV. 25–30, where the meaning of *yajña* is extended to include almost every action where a lower end is deliberately sacrificed for a higher future end. Lastly, Garbe draws attention to the evidently apparent contradiction between "*tasya kāryaṁ na vidyate*" of stanza III. 17 and "*kāryaṁ karma samācara*" of stanza III. 19. But, as follows from stanza III. 18 which further expounds the argument of stanza III. 17, "*tasya kāryaṁ na vidyate*" means "*tasya karmaṇi kāryatva-buddhir nāsti,*" i. e., he does not feel it as a task imposed from without, not to accomplish which would lead to disagreeable consequences. The lesson sought to be inculcated here is in fact the same as in "*Sukhaduḥkhe same kṛtvā*" of stanza II. 38, and the emphasis of stanza III. 19 is not upon *kāryam* karma, but upon doing it in an *asakta* mood. So there does not exist, as far as I can see, any palpable contradiction between stanzas III. 17–18 and III. 19.

As regards the identical half-stanza in III. 23 and IV. 11 Garbe triumphantly points out that inasmuch as the present tense *anuvartante* is quite in place in the latter stanza, and not so in the former, the earlier adhyāya must have borrowed the stanza from the later adhyāya and used it with a change of meaning. The case does not possess any vital bearing upon the question of the *Vedāntic* elaboration, and we may ignore it with the remark that the Epic is not over particular about the concord of verbs, and that instances of identical stanzas and half-stanzas with a change of meaning are not far to seek elsewhere also in the Epic.

The case of IV. 34 can in the same way be paralleled by other instances in the Epic and elsewhere where a stanza enumerating an important truth or dogma (in the present case the methods whereby a disciple can get the teacher to teach him), and originally belonging to a different context is bodily taken over in a context where it does not quite fit in. Compare the gnomic verses in the Śunaḥśepa story, esp. Nārada's stanza 7 (A. B. vii. 13).

The next case where Garbe gives a philological reason for regarding certain stanzas as interpolated is Gītā VI. 27-32. Garbe says that stanza VI. 33 continues the thought of stanza VI. 26, the intervening six stanzas being out of the context. But is that really so? Stanza VI. 33 speaks of "yogaḥ *sāmyena* proktaḥ"; but the "sāmya" or even-mindedness is enjoined in this particular context only in stanzas VI. 29 and 32, which Garbe rejects.

As to stanzas VII. 25–26, the real reason why Garbe is led to reject these, as also VII. 14–15, is the presence therein of the Vedāntic conception of "Māyā," although by way of an independent philological reason he draws attention to the contradiction between *the fools* not knowing Śrīkṛṣṇa (stanza VII. 24) and *nobody* knowing him (stanza VII. 26). But surely, in the light of VII. 25, the word "*kaścana*," can only mean "*mūḍhe asmin loke kaścana*," even if we observe just the commonsense rules of interpretation, and not the Mīmāṅsā canons of exegesis, for which one may conceivably have a distaste. Śrīkṛṣṇa is here saying little more than what he had already said in adhyāya IV, stanzas 5–6.

It is not clear why Garbe rejects the first six stanzas of Chapter IX. Stanza IX. 4 need not have been amongst his "suspects" because its idea is the same as that of stanza VII. 12, which Garbe regards as genuine. Furthermore, stanza IX. 7 continues the thought as much of stanza IX. 6 as of stanzas VIII. 18–19 as Garbe suggests.

The next passage rejected by Garbe is IX. 16–19, which he characterises as a pantheistic interpolation shoved in in

the midst of a description of the different kinds of devotees of the God. Garbe seems to have ignored the fact that the stanza immediately preceding his "interpolation" speaks of people that worship Śrīkṛṣṇa—who manifests himself in a variety of forms (*viśvatomukha*)—by the *jñāna-yajña*, considering him in his monistic aspect (*ekatvena*), or in his aspect of manifoldness (*pṛthaktvena*). The "interpolated" passage merely expands these *jñāna-yajña* methods of perceiving Śrīkṛṣṇa.

Much capital is made out of the contradiction that is apparent between the statements of Śrikṛṣṇa as when he tells us that he most dearly loves the man with knowledge (VII. 17), that he is attached to his devotee (XII. 14 ff.), the dearest friend of Arjuna (XVIII. 64), most fond of the man who would propagate his Bhakti amongst the people (XVIII. 69), and also that he severely punishes the wicked (XVI. 19f.), or censures those that do not recognise him (IX. 11 f.); and when, in the same breath, he styles himself as the friend of *all* beings (V. 29), and as having none more dear or more hated unto him than another (XI. 29). The earlier sets of passages, which are not "coloured by Vedāntism," are, according to Garbe, genuine; but the latter passages are interpolated. It is worth noting in passing that, perhaps by an oversight, Garbe does not suspect V. 29, and thereby practically gives up his case. But apart from that, the passages can certainly be easily harmonized by supposing that Śrīkṛṣṇa is here—to adopt a phrase from current politics—practising "responsive co-operation" with the people. He is "karmāpekṣa" as the Brahmsūtras would say. He is to be viewed as the Rain. "For, as Rain is the common cause of the production of rice, barley, and other plants, while the difference between the various species is due to the various potentialities lying hidden in the respective seeds, so the Lord,....who cannot be reproached with inequality of dispensation and cruelty (Śaṅkara on B. S. II. i. 34)." And one surely has not to be a confirmed Vedāntist to reach this position

which is the common property of most theistic schools. Look at the way in which Christianity for instance would justify the sufferings of Job. I wish in this connection that Garbe had shown for such "contradictions" the same considerate treatment that he has shown for the first stanza of XI, which he retains. After all, the Epic is not a rigorous manual of logic, and the dialogue-form into which the Bhagavadgītā is thrown should allow some "loose thinking" —if no more serious than the above—to pass muster; but only *some.*

Next, as regards the "Viśvarūpa-darśana" episode in Chapter XI, quite remarkable indeed is the facility with which Garbe picks up certain stanzas from it and lables them as "pantheistic interpolations." It seems to me that stanzas XI. 7 and 13 (which Garbe rejects) do not very much differ in their ultimate intention from stanza IX. 15 which he retains. It is in vain to demand a pictorial consistency in what is evidently meant to be a poetic attempt to portray the unportrayable. For, even limiting ourselves just to the stanzas which Garbe retains as genuine, we could just as well ask, whether Kṛṣṇa fills the *entire* interspace between the earth and the heaven (st. XI. 20); or, if the gods, sages, etc. are entering the mouth of Kṛṣṇa (XI, st. 21–27), where could they be before the entrance, if not in the cosmic body of Śrīkṛṣṇa himself; or, what is more to the purpose to ask, what room was left for Arjuna to stand upon and speak? I hope that Garbe will admit * that his attempt to insist upon a rationalistic topography in the whole description is a bit hypercritical.

To stanza XIII. 2 Garbe objects on the ground that if Kṛṣṇa had already declared himself as Kṣetrajña why should he in the stanza say to Arjuna, Now listen as I am going to tell you who the Kṣetrajña is? But we may retort by asking, if

* I retain the language of the original Lectures. It was expected then that Garbe would see these lines in print, but now, unhappily, that chance is cut off.

similarly Kṛṣṇa had, in stanza XIII. 1, declared the body to be the Kṣetra, why should he have also said, Now let me tell you what the Kṣetra is (*yac ca*), when really it was *yādṛk* and *yadvikāri* which was to form the gist of Kṛṣṇa's subsequent teaching about the Kṣetra? If no objection is taken to this repetition, we can equally cogently maintain that the alleged repetition in XIII. 2 should pass muster although it was *yatprabhāva* which was to form the centre of Śrīkṛṣṇa's subsequent teaching about the Kṣetrajña.

As to the famous reference to the "Brahmasūtra-pada" in the Gītā, XIII. 4, which is rejected by Garbe because, whichever *Vedāntic* text we take that puzzling expression to refer to, the description that is actually given in the subsequent part of the adhyāya follows not the "Vedāntic" but the "Sāṁkhya-Yoga" teaching. This would have been a valid objection if, *according to the Gītā*, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga teaching had been a direct antithesis of the Vedānta. On the other hand, the main purpose of the Gītā is just to philosophically harmonize these teachings, as we shall attempt to set forth in the sequel. I shall in the next Lecture try to show that the reference here is to an earlier form of the present Brahmasūtras, and I have already expressed the view, page 80f., that the original Sāṁkhya-Yoga was theistic, thus approaching the metaphysical position of the Rāmānujīya-Vedānta.

Proceeding further, Garbe rejects the description of the "jñeya" in stanzas XIII. 12-18, reminiscent as it is of several Upaniṣadic texts, as a "Vedāntic interpolation," but without assigning any reason. I wonder why he has retained stanzas XIII. 7–11, which describe the "jñāna" and which are not required by the context or the *pratijñā* in XIII. 3.

Stanza XIII. 27 Garbe rejects on the flimsy ground that the expression *yaḥ paśyati sa paśyati* may have been modelled upon the same phrase in stanza XIII. 29; but the phrase occurs at least once more in the Gītā, V. 5, and is quite common in the Epic as a whole.

I fail to see much difference between the idea in the latter half of stanza IX. 15 which Garbe retains, and stanza XIII. 30 which he rejects.

Garbe hesitates as to XIII. 31. For a possible chance of its being genuine, Garbe cites the authority of VI. 7 (which is not decisive, because there we could understand *param* as a separate word), and of XVIII. 22. He may have also added a reference to stanza XV. 8.

Garbe regards the stanzas XV. 12–15 as disturbing the context; but as a matter of fact stanza XV. 12 at least is no more than a converse proposition of XV. 6, and the stanzas that follow come in as a further elaboration of XV. 12.

As to the stanzas XVIII. 45–46, we have already commented upon the injustice of taking objection to a phrase like *yena sarvam idaṁ tatam*, when no objection was taken to epithets like *sarvagataḥ*.

The last case we consider is stanzas XVIII. 50–54, with reference to which Garbe asks, "if the man has already become one with Brahman, why should he any more care for Kṛṣṇabhakti?" But the words of the texts are "Brahmabhūyāya *kalpate*," which can only mean that he becomes now *a fit recepient for the sākṣātkāra* or intuitive knowledge of God. According to the ultimate teaching of the Gītā the Absolute is to be realised through Bhakti and not independently. Hence, to realise the Brahman is to be one with Śrīkṛṣṇa in a devotional ecstasy. If this fact is kept well in mind the apparent contradiction that Garbe sees here will altogether disappear.

I have thought it worth while, at perhaps a somewhat tedious length, to criticize most of the independent philological proofs that Garbe has advanced for regarding certain passages in the present text of the Gītā as interpolations. The passages that I have not considered are those for which Garbe has given no independent philological proofs; and they include practically all the passages where the Vedāntic

terms "Brahman" and "Māyā" are used. I believe there are over 50 passages where the word "Brahman"—alone or compounded—occurs; and it throws a flood-light upon Garbe's method when it is told that of these fifty and odd passages Garbe rejects as many as 42. Those that he has kindly retained make *Brahman* mean holiness or holy-knowledge (VI. 38, VI. 52), or Brahmadeva (VIII. 16, 17), or Prakṛti (XIV. 3, 4), or the symbol *Om* (VIII. 13), or the Brāhman caste (XVIII. 42), or Vedic study (VI. 14, XVII. 14), but never the Vedāntic Brahman! Of course when one is bent on achieving such a result, there are glossaries and concordances willing to help him to do so. The same holds true of the six passages containing the word "Māyā." Four of them, namely, VII. 14 (*bis*), VII. 15, and VII. 25, smell of Vedāntism and they are rejected. The two retained, namely, IV. 6 and XVIII. 61, in the view of Garbe, employ the word *Māyā* in the primitive Vedic meaning of "wonderful power." But Garbe ought really to have applied the same method to yet another Vedāntically "suspect" word, *Akṣara*. This word, I believe, occurs some 13 times in the Gītā, 4 times in the sense of "letter," 6 times in the sense of the "Absolute," and 3 times in the sense of an "aspect of the Absolute." Garbe rejects 5, and regards 8 of these texts as genuine; but if he had been sufficiently careful he should have rejected two more passages, namely XII. 1 and 3. The latter passage declares—"Those however who meditate upon the imperishable, indescribable, non-manifest, omnipresent, unthinkable, immutable, unchanging, and constant [Brahman]………they also come to me." The passage is of course highly complimentary to the Bhakti philosophy. But to retain this passage, as Garbe was naturally tempted to, and yet to say that the "original" Gītā does not know Vedānta is certainly inconsistent. The passage in question is decidedly one that would lend colour to the view that the Gītā engrafts the Bhakti doctrine upon the earlier Vedānta by proclaiming that even the "Vedāntins" have no option but to come to "Me."

Thus far we have considered Garbe's "independent philolōgical grounds" for putting down certain passages in the present text of the Gītā as interpolations. If we have succeeded in making it appear that these grounds are not compelling or convincing, that would place Garbe's theory as to the genesis of the poem and its subsequent elaboration on a par with other *a priori* theories such as that of Holtzmann or of Hopkins, the correctness of which would depend upon whether any one of them affords, in view of the age and the social and religious environments under which the Poem was presumably composed, a convincing *raison d'être* for it, and also succeeds in putting forward a harmonious interpretation of the entire Gītā text, affording the least possible violation to its literal sense and the prevailing context. There is of course the view of Barnett and others that, looking to the "composite" nature of the Poem, a synthetic and consistent explanation of the whole is not possible. But as against this there is the concurrent testimony of dozens and scores of Bhāṣyakāras and Commentators in India—several of them subtle thinkers and great logicians—who, however divergent their actual interpretations, agreed at any rate in maintaining that a unitary and self-consistent teaching could be extracted from the Poem. It need not be denied that small additions here and there (like those enumerated on page 93, above) may have been made to the Poem; but it can be plausibly maintained that they are none of them of a kind to bring about a fundamental change in the philosophical view-point of the whole, such as European critics seem to contemplate.* The philo-

* Philology apart, does not Garbe's view of the "Pantheistic working-over" of the Poem strike one as intrinsically improbable? The meticulous care with which Garbe makes the "interpolator" insert a single verse here and a couple of verses there, as though he enjoyed the fun of throwing all his would-be critics off the scent, is not the usual psychology of the interpolator, especially in a work like the Mahābhārata.

sophical character of the Gītā was, in our view, formulated once for all in the Pre-Buddhistic period to which I propose to assign the Poem. Thereafter, upto the age of its earliest extant Bhāṣya (that of Śaṅkara), the Poem may have suffered only small and insignificant additions, if any. From the age of Śaṅkara the work, with its seven hundred stanzas expressly mentioned by him, has come down intact to our own days. Lastly, as to the question whether there existed, during the period anterior to the Pre-Buddhistic compilation of the Gītā, a shorter and a still earlier form of it—whether of two chapters, or of eleven, or more or less—we must admit that we have no valid data whatsoever to go into it at all.

The task before the interpreter of the Gītā, therefore, is to determine what kind of a synthetic and self-consistent philosophical teaching can underlie the whole Poem in its present existing form. The task is difficult, but not impossible, especially if we bear in mind the peculiar social and religious atmosphere under which, according to my view, the compilation was made by Brāhmaṇic orthodoxy in its attempt to broaden its basis and enlist on its own side as many of the newer forces as can be induced to compromise and co-operate in the struggle that had to be waged against the radical and disruptive forces, whose ranks were being augmented almost every day. It was a critical period: an age seething with New Thought, not inaptly comparable to the Modern Times in India, where an analogous battle is being fought before our own eyes. A study of the Poem from this point of view cannot accordingly fail to be of supreme interest. The central part of the Poem could not have been written in the Post-Buddhistic period, since it contains absolutely no reference to Buddhism.* We naturally do not

* The "heretics" of Chapter XVI are evidently the Materialists. Holtzmann's evidence for the post-Buddhistic character of the Poem as gathered from the (according to him, characteristically Buddhistic) red

expect this silence from a philosophical poem such as the Bhagavadgītā. The Paurāṇic character of some parts of the poem—even assuming that they form an integral portion of the original compilation—need not rule out the possibility of the Poem being composed at an early age, because the beginnings of the so-called "Paurāṇic" style go back to a time much earlier than what is commonly assigned to it. The Bṛhaddevatā which, according to Macdonell, cannot be placed later than 400 B. C. shows a style not less "modern" than that of the Bhagavadgītā. This argument from style comes in fact as a legacy from the controversy as to the Christian *origin* of the cult of Bhakti, which R. G. Bhandarkar effectively answered years ago by adducing evidence from Pāṇini (IV. iii. 98) and Patañjali (Volume II, page 314). And R. G. Bhandarkar's view that the Christian influence on the *development* of the Bhakti cult in India (especially in the matter of the adoration of the Child-God) came through the Ābhīra immigrants is also rendered improbable by the occurrence of the word Ābhīra in Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya itself, Vol. I, page 252. Amongst the other arguments brought forward in recent times in support of an earlier date for Gītā, reference may well be made to Baudhāyana-Gṛhyaśeṣasūtra II. 22. 9, which quotes the Gītā stanza IX. 26, as also to Tārānātha's rather vague statement that the Buddhistic Mahāyāna, in its development of "Bhakti" and "lokasaṁgraha" was influenced by the teaching of Kṛṣṇa. In view of all these facts the burden of proof should naturally rest upon those who maintain that the Gītā could not have been produced in the Pre-Buddhistic period when, as we have seen, a perfectly adequate *raison d'être* for the poem can be found only in that period. It is not every philosophical poem that is capable of winning the honoured place that the Bhagavadgītā occupies

colour of Duryodhana's horses, or from the doctrine of "the mean" as taught by Chapter VI. 16 f., or his idea that the banished and degraded Aśvatthāman typifies the fate of Buddhism in India, is too flimsy to be seriously considered.

by the concurrent testimony of all the Indian philosophical schools and systems. Its achievement must have originally been commensurate with the respect and allegiance that it even now continues to hold. The position and purpose that I assign to the Gītā should fully justify this.

What is it then that the Gītā seeks philosophically to accomplish? The general social and religious situation at the age of the Bhagavadgītā seems to be something like this. On the one side there was the great mass of the people who possessed a blind and superstitious faith in the efficacy of the ritual and in the course of conduct as laid down by the Śāstras. They never cared to think out the question of a man's duty in life for themselves independently; they were accordingly a great bulwark for orthodoxy and the established institutions. But just because theirs was merely a blind, unthinking conformity, the danger was imminent of their falling an easy prey to the insinuating logic such as that of Ajita Keśakambalin. The same would also be the case with the priests, who had only parrot-like learnt the Veda by heart without understanding their meaning, and who went through a mechanical routine of ritualistic activities without comprehending their true inner significance, in the belief that that sacerdotal gymnastics would take those for whom they ministered as also the ministrants themselves to Heaven. The Gītā refers to these ritualists and their doctrines at II. 42–46, at III. 9–16 and 25–26, at IV. 23–33, at IX. 20–21, at XVI. 23–24, at XVII. 11–13 and 23–28, and at XVIII. 5–7, 23–25 and 41–46. These passages which are scattered here and there throughout the course of the oral instruction according to the exigencies of the argumentation will have to be interpreted, one in the light of the other; and their combined teaching is altogether self-consistent. We are here told that the Vedic sacrifices subserve a cosmic purpose and are hence binding upon the qualified; only they ought not to be performed for the mere desire of winning

Heaven and other fruits. These fruits come to an end after a time, and there is no permanent release from *saṁsāra* and the cycle of births and deaths secured thereby. Secondly, it is stated that *yajña* or sacrifice can be understood in a much wider sense than that of the mere Vedic ritual. Every action wherein a lower good is sacrificed for the sake of the higher is a species of *yajña*. Thus the student who renounces the immediate pleasure of the sport and spends time at his desk with a view to be, in later life, in a position to win his bread and enjoy the pleasures of sport in a legitimate manner, is performing what the Gītā designates a "svādhyāya-yajña." From this larger point of view all deeds of charity, all *tapas*, and even the daily performance by the different *varṇas* (castes) and *āśramas* (stages) of the duties that are assigned to them by the Śāstras—for, Śāstras are the ultimate authority on the point—constitute a species of *yajña*, which becomes *sāttvika* if performed without egoism and a hankering after the fruit, *rājasa* if performed with egoism and a desire for fruit, and *tāmasa* if performed through ignorance, with sinful purpose, or through hypocrisy. *Sāttvika* action is enjoined, and is for ever binding upon the individual, and he ought to loyally perform it all through his life, seeing that even though the performer may not care for the reward promised by it, it at least sets an example to the average man who cannot rise to the same philosophical view-point, but who is quite content to conform to the Śāstras and follow the lead of the wise. In this way it will be seen that the Gītā places the Brāhmaṇic ritualism, which was already getting effete and out-of-date, upon an improved philosophical basis. *

*It is a charge sometimes laid at the door of the Gītā that while it enjoins upon us the supreme need of following the prescribed duties of the several Varṇas (castes) and the Āśramas (life-stages) in strict adherence to the Śāstras, it never occurs to it to investigate the foundations of the Śāstric injunctions themselves. But, in the first place, it must be remembered that the authoritativeness of the Śāstras was not held to be contingent upon any grounds of reason or logic. Secondly,

Secondly, it hardly admits of any doubt that the Gītā in its present form—and even in the form which Garbe regards as its original form—shows a full knowledge of the Vedānta of the Upaniṣads. How then does the Gītā represent that teaching? It tells us, says the Gītā, that the Ātman is the true reality. Birth, disease, death, etc. are merely the accidents in the eternal life of the Ātman (II. 12 ff.), that deserve to be ignored as having no reality underlying them. The Ātman is unborn and eternal and does not die with the death or suffer with the sufferings of the body. This Ātman is in fact quite incapable of doing any action: the action, which really belongs to the *guṇas*, is falsely ascribed to him (III. 27–29, XIII. 29, and XIV. 19). In fact the Gītā goes to the length of saying (XVIII. 17)—"Even if the man with the true knowledge were to kill these worlds, he really does not kill them, and is not responsible for the same." Compare the words of Pūraṇa Kassapa quoted at the beginning of this Lecture (pp. 85 f.). Next, this Ātman is said to be omnipresent or immanent in everything (VI. 30, VII. 7, and IX. 4–6), filling the three worlds (XV. 17), and the centre of all beings, inside and outside, organic as also non-organic (XIII. 12 ff.). The Ātman, it is further stated, can only be realised through knowledge (IV. 33–42), which makes the mind serene and tranquil, unmoved by the happenings of the world, and prone to a life of retirement and meditation (XIII. 7–11). There are Yogic methods of Self-realisation which are given in detail, after the fashion of the Upaniṣads, in VI. 10–32, VIII. 12–16, and XVIII. 50–56; and room is also

although the first standard of revolt against the system of castes was probably already raised, the system does not yet seem to have degenerated beyond all hope of improvement. The work of improving it to the extent absolutely necessary was undertaken by the various Śrauta and Gṛhya Compendia that were being written at this period. The Gītā could therefore afferd not to raise the issue, but to merely rest content with the general recommendation (XVI. 24) to follow the Śāstra in al matters of doubt.

found in the Bhagavadgītā for the Upaniṣadic doctrine of the Devayāna and the Pitṛyāṇa Paths (VIII. 13–17), and other minor technicalities. All this is not an unfair representation of the teaching of the Upaniṣads; but it is worth noting that the Gītā calls this the "Sāṁkhya" teaching; and as far as the eternal and non-active nature of the Ātman is concerned it does resemble even the Sāṁkhya of the later system.

Now the main criticism levelled against this view and the main improvement suggested therein is as regards the Ātman's actionlessness. The Ātman may in reality be quite incapable of action; but that does not mean that he should, from the phenomenal point of view, give up ordinary action and take to *saṁnyāsa*, any more than that the man pursued by an elephant should calmly allow himself to be trampled by it because from the absolute *Advaitic* point of view the elephant is a mere "māyā (phantom)." This criticism or improvement is fully brought out in the Gītā passage ending with II. 39—*Eṣā te 'bhihitā Sāṁkhye buddhiḥ* " Now here the demonstrative " Eṣā " must refer not only to the teaching of Ātman's eternality and immutability as detailed in II. 11–30, but also to the passage beginning with "*Svadharmam api câvekṣya*" etc. (II. 31–38). This is not generally conceded, and these eight stanzas immediately preceding the word " *Eṣā* " are taken to be just a supplementary argument not vitally connected with the main argument. This, I believe, is not grammatically permissible, inasmuch as the demonstrative *Eṣā* must refer to what is *avyavahitapūrva*, or just immediately before it, unless we suppose that stanzas II. 31–38 are an interpolation, which nobody has so far proposed. I propose therefore to understand the whole " Sāṁkhya " argument thus: After listening to the argument about Ātman's eternality and so forth, Arjuna could well have said—" It may be that death is a normal accident, or that no one can really kill another; but would it not be unnatural for one Ātman to go out of one's way and actually compel the other Ātman to " *change*

his apparel — as the phrase goes — before the proper time ?" Śrīkṛṣṇa's reply to this very natural and reasonable question of Arjuna is as follows: "You are here shifting your grounds, Arjuna. You are not now afraid of death or killing as you were to start with, but—whatever death may really mean— you now want to know why *you* should be instrumental in effecting that " change of apparel " rather than disease, age, and the like. But you forget that you are a Kṣatriya, born to certain duties, just as poison is born with certain innate properties. As poison must under all circumstances kill, so ought a Kṣatriya under all circumstances to follow his martial code with the same unconcern for consequences as the poison exhibits." And then Śrīkṛṣṇa explains what the proper code for a Kṣatriya is. Thus the Sāṁkhya, i. e. to say, the Upaniṣadic doctrine of Ātman's *akartṛtva*, the Gītā modifies a bit so as not to exclude the activity from the Ātman absolutely. Indeed, the Gītā goes on to put forth a special pleading on behalf of "activism" in III. 4–8 and 17–26, IV. 16–23, V. 3–10, and XVIII. 5–7 by urging the impossibility of any individual remaining, even for a single moment, without an activity of some sort, and by adducing the examples of Janaka and others who performed actions and yet—because they did not possess *kartṛtva-abhimāna* (egoistic consciousness of the agent) and *phalāśā* (desire for fruit)—they were free from the bondage of actions. This *kartṛtva* even the person who has realised the Absolute can—and hence it is desirable (according to the Gītā) that he should—continue with the same mood of detachment and unconcern. In insisting upon this, the Gītā was no doubt trying to put down the extreme free-thinking of the day, as also the tendency for an irresponsible and immature renunciation of all actions and all bonds of society with the declared purpose of retiring to solitudes and there meditating upon the Absolute Ātman, with consequences detrimental, as we have seen (pages 40 f.), to the peace and safety of all the established institutions.

We may indeed say that Arjuna himself, worried by the trials and the temptations of the *saṁsāra* and anxious to repudiate all his duties and obligations, typifies the spirit of apathy or inertia, and the general mood of despondency that came upon the age by way of a secondary consequence of the misdirected development of the Upaniṣadic philosophy of the Ātman conjoined with the practical disciplines of the Yoga. And as Arjuna was admonished and eventually brought round to perform his appointed duties in a mood of equanimity, and with no anxious or morose brooding over the consequences thereof, even so the Gītā wanted all the people to carry out punctiliously their appointed duties in life,—be they small or be they great, be they agreeable or be they painful—in faith and without fretting. But the activism which the Gītā thus preaches is not of the nature of a blind conformity to a prescribed code, as was the case with the Mīmāṅsā, or Vedic sacerdotalism. The activism of the Gītā was meant to be not only, as we just said, free from egoism and purposiveness, but was to be attended with a thorough knowledge of the nature of the action, of the situation that evoked it, of the consequences direct and indirect, expected and unexpected,* which might result from it, and of the circumstances that would justify persistence either in the course of action chosen, or in a modification of that course, if demanded by the exigencies of the case and determined by the free will † of the agent when "attuned with the Infinite." As the Chāndogya (I. i. 10) already declares: "Thus there are two that do it: he who knows it, and he who does not know it. Diverse are (the ways of) knowledge and (of) ignorance. Whatever a man achieves knowingly, in faith, and with a knowledge of all its ins and outs, that alone becomes more efficacious." This means that the man of action must have a view of life: must be a philosopher;

* Compare Chapter XVIII, stanzas 13 ff.

† The "*vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ*" of II. 41, and 51 ff.

and this fact fully accounts for the various metaphysical and cosmological discussions in the Gītā, the necessity of which will become further obvious if we remember that several philosophers had sprung up at the time who denied the permanence (śāśvatatā) of anything, and who preached a soul-less and God-less nihilism, and the other radical views already mentioned by us.

The metaphysical view-point of the Bhagavadgītā is expressed in the several cosmological passages such as VII. 4–7 and 14–15, VIII. 3–4, XIV. 3–4, and XV. 16–18, and it coincides in a very remarkable manner with that "inchoate" Sāṁkhya of the first Chapter of the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad which is both theistic and monistic : a sort of a triune-unity which recognises the souls and the matter as two parallel manifestations (and is in this sense realistic), but manifestations springing from out of a unitary source, and capable of being completely merged back into it—like rivers into the ocean — without retaining any consciousness of difference. And from this latter point of view the system is not merely idealistic and pantheistic, but even—on ultimate analysis—a transcendentalism; so that from that supremely Advaitic position — but only from such a position — the individual souls and the world of phenomena become reduced to a mere "Māyā." And the logical contradiction between pantheism and transcendentalism is finally harmonized in the *solvitur ambulando* of mysticism, fleeting intimations of which are not altogether denied to us even on the ordinary perceptual levels of consciousness, as I tried to show (page 19 f.) in my introductory Lecture. The metaphysical position of the Gītā need not therefore be inconsistent with activism, and consequently with morality. It is true, that there was a "static" or *Akriyāvāda* interpretation of Upaniṣadic Monism which tended that way, but it was the main mission of the Bhagavadgītā to contradict and rectify any such one-sided interpretation.

It forms an illuminating commentary on the general attitude of tolerance and compromise which characterizes the Poem that the Bhagavadgītā does nowhere say that the "static" mode of realising the Absolute through renunciation (*saṁnyāsa*) is impossible. Such an assertion could not well lie in the mouth of the Bhagavadgītā coming as it did so soon after the great age of Upaniṣadic Advaitism. What the Bhagavadgītā is most anxious to effect here is to win recognition, and therefore parallel status, to the "dynamic" or activistic method of winning the *summum bonum*. Cp. III. 3—

Loke 'smin dvividhā niṣṭhā purā proktā mayā 'nagha ।
Jñāna-yogena Sāṁkhyānāṁ karma-yogena Yoginām ॥

And there follows here a good deal of "special pleading" in behalf of the "Karmayoga." What the Gītā wants to assert comes in effect to this. The Karmayoga requires a metaphysical foundation in knowledge just as much as does the Jñānayoga. Again, to secure the mood of detachment and equipoise (*samatva*) there is the same necessity of meditative discipline (*dhyāna-yoga*) in the one case as there is in the other. The Jñānayogin, in the "Jīvanmukta" condition subsequent to the Realisation of the Brahman, is seen to go through the ordinary *vyavahāra* or routine of life, performing mechanically the various activities connected with the discharge of his bodily functions, which have no power to bind him because he has given up all concern for the consequences of the action, and all egoistic consciousness as the author of those actions. Action ceases to be a "binding" action (which alone can be strictly called *karman*) wherein these latter conditions are satisfied. The Upaniṣadic Jñānayogin, just because he has, by way of an *antecedent* preparation, renounced the householder's life and assumed "Saṁnyāsa," naturally takes to a mere mechanical performance of just the organic functions of the body. It is exactly like the potter's wheel continuing to revolve in the direction of its unspent momentum after the rotating rod is removed from it—with this difference that the wheel does not know what

it is doing and can give no explanation of it, which can be done by the Jīvanmukta in his "vyutthita" condition, or during those brief intervals when, no longer united with the Absolute in an ecstatic trance, he seems to walk through the ordinary walk of life. The Upaniṣadic Advaitism did contemplate, nevertheless, the possibility—only by way of a rare exception it is true—of a Jīvanmukta like Janaka, if he has not assumed the robes of the Saṁnyāsin prior to the realisation, performing in the post-realisation stage all the ordinary or *vyāvahārika* actions (and not the mere organic activities of the body), which—being performed in the same mood of self-effacement and detachment—cannot have any power to bind him. Compare III. 20, and the unambiguous admission of the point in Śaṅkarācārya's Bhāṣya on the same, and especially on IV. 20. What Śrīkṛṣṇa in the Gītā desires is that what is here admitted as a rare and possible exception should be the prevailing rule. This cannot of course be achieved by compelling the Jñānin, in the post-realisation stage, to follow any prescription to do this or not to do that; because, as one who has actually realised the Absolute, he is naturally beyond the reach of any "ought" or "ought-not" (*vidhiniṣedhâtīta*); but somewhat tactfully: by dispensing with the assumption of the robes of the recluse as a necessary propædeutic to salvation, in the expectation* that the wheel, having acquired a bias in favour of the "*vyavahāra*," will continue, after the removal of the rod, to rotate in the same direction, and thereby achieve what Śrīkṛṣṇa calls "lokasaṁgraha" by setting before the world (which the Gītā wanted to bring round to the path of "activism") the highest example—that of the Jñānin—in favour of a punctilious discharge of the prescribed duties.

* If, by way of an exception, this expectation is not realised, that must be because the Jñānin who, as a free agent, has all his actions determined from within, follows the impulse of his self-intuition (*vyavasāyātmikā buddhi*), his Self being now rendered absolutely free from all

The outstanding achievement of the Bhagavadgītā was however the alliance which it sought to establish between Advaitism and Bhakti, between Knowledge and Faith—an alliance which has persisted in one form or another down to the present times. The Sāṁkhya-Vedānta view of the Upaniṣads had preached that knowledge was the only way to salvation. This "knowledge" was in every way higher than ordinary sense-perception: it was intuitive and was to be had by introspection: a turning of the senses *inward* and away from the world of sense. And for the attainment of it the Upaniṣads had prescribed certain "symbolic meditations" such as that upon the *Om*. Further, working out the logical implications of the "Bandhutā" philosophy in the Brāhmaṇas (page 34f.) speculation reached a stage when not only could it be maintained that "All this is Brahman," but that the Brahman-Ātman was within the hearts of us all as the Inward-Controller; and when not only was the aspirant free to reach a platform from which he could declare, "I am the Brahman," but also when an eminent sage like Vāmadeva (Ait. Up. iv. 5) or an eminent godhead like Indra (Kauṣ. Up. iii. 2, also Bāṣkala 8–20, 23–24) could declare—as does Śrīkṛṣṇa in the Gītā IV. 5ff., or VII. 6ff., or IX. 4ff., or X. 19ff., or XVIII. 64ff.—that he is the be-all and the end-all of existence. The first two of these positions are intellectualistic, and are attainable through what was called the "Avyakta-upāsanā" or meditation upon the Non-manifest. The last two figure forth the Absolute as a concrete personality, and so constitute the "Vyakta-upāsanā" or meditation upon the Manifest, which naturally gave scope for a sort of a *personal* relation between the aspiring devotee and the object of his "loving faith." The ground having been thus already prepared, it required little *philosophical* persuation for the Bhagavadgītā to get people to equate Śrīkṛṣṇa with the Highest Lord or the

taints of *rajas* or *tamas*, which may have partially clouded his vision in the pre-realisation stage.

Absolute. In meditations it is always easier to concentrate the mind upon some definite concrete object like Śrīkṛṣṇa rather than upon the subtle and infinite Absolute. Compare XII. 5. But there was another advantage also. Meditation upon the Brahman in its Avyakta form—coming as it did at the end of a long process of religious discipline according to the Vedic prescriptions—was naturally the preserve of the three upper classes; whereas the cult of the loving faith (Bhakti or Vyakta-upāsanā) in Śrīkṛṣṇa was *open to all*: women, Śūdras, and even pariahs, besides being easier. At a time when people had begun to look askance towards the Brāhmaṇic institution of castes, this "democratisation" was naturally a great element of strength. The metaphysical position of "triune-unity" which the Gītā assumed was not inconsistent with a theistic attitude towards the Absolute. The Gītā accordingly tells us that Śrīkṛṣṇa is no other than the Brahman or the Paramātman of the Upaniṣads that had incarnated as a human being out of His infinite kindness for the world which He is most anxious to save (compare IV.6–8, VII. 4–7 and 13–14, IX. 4–10 and 17 ff, X. 2–8, XIV. 7 and 12–15, XVIII. 61, etc.). The method of reaching this God and of merging one's individuality in His cosmic life is through one-pointed devotion, always thinking of Him, worshipping Him, not with pomp but with humility, renouncing everything else to follow Him, dedicating all actions to Him, and, having retired from the bustle of life, meditating upon Him until His presence is felt to be everywhere, and the mind attains to serenity and equipoise and peace (Cp. III. 30–31, VI. 30–32, IX. 26–28 and 34, XI. 53–55, XII. 6–8, XIII. 10, XVIII. 65–66, etc.). Śrīkṛṣṇa declares that devotion to him and even remembering him at death-time is the only unfailing method of being free from the unending cycle of birth and death, since, having once reached him, there can be no more any return (VIII. 5–7). Even sinners and persons whom Brāhmaṇic ritualism had declared incapable of salvation —women and Śūdras—can be saved through Kṛṣṇa-bhakti

alone (IX. 30–32). Those who worship any other gods indirectly worship Śrīkṛṣṇa without knowing it, and it is Śrīkṛṣṇa who gives unto these worshippers rewards according to their deserts and desires (VII. 20–23, IX. 23–25). People worship Śrīkṛṣṇa from various motives, but the knowing and selfless worship of Him is the highest of all (VII. 16–18). It may not be possible to every one to acquire such highest devotion in one life; but that should not matter; for, in the next life he can continue the process from where he left, and so there is no wastage of efforts (VI. 40 ff., VII. 3, 19). The Gītā does allow—as indeed it could not afford to deny—that the persons who duly follow the Upaniṣadic method of *Brahmajñāna* through the "Avyakta-upāsanā" can attain to final emancipation without any devotion to a personal God; but that way is more difficult and leads eventually to a goal not at all higher than what the Bhaktimārga or the "Vyakta-upāsanā" affords (XII. 2–8). Why should we not then follow the easier method? The descriptions of the ideal man given by the Gītā in over half-a-dozen places (*sthitaprajña* in II. 56–72, *bhakta* in XII. 13–20, *yogārūḍha* in VI. 4–32, *jñānin* in XIII. 7–11, *guṇātīta* in XIV. 21–25, *the man with the daivī-sampad* in XVI. 1–3, and the *brahma-bhūta* in XVIII. 50–56) are in effect applicable to one and same man, being only several ways of looking at him. Thus the Gītā has brought about a synthesis between the Vedānta of the Upaniṣads and the new cult of Bhakti, thereby securing a tempering of the extreme rationalism of the former, and affording an equality of opportunity for salvation to all irrespective of caste and sex, and—what is equally important—an avoiding of the dangers of blind sectarianism by declaring preference for the "jñāni-bhakta," who may be presumed to know that the different sectarian gods are really aspects of the same Absolute Principle, and so, rising above mere blind sectarian prejudice, to inculcate a lesson of tolerance for all modes and forms of divine worship. The Gītā mentions different kinds and grades of devotees (VII. 16–18, XII. 9–12), and is

creditably anxious to take *all* with it, not barring the way even to the ignoramus who blindly conforms to the Śāstras and cares for nothing higher (III. 25-26)—except of course to the scoffers, and sceptics, and materialists against whom it utters its anathema in no mitigated language (XVI. 19f.).

But whether it was the Avyakta-upāsanā or the Vyakta-upāsanā, there would always remain the danger of the "man of knowledge" or the "man of devotion" proving himself—through an extreme and one-sided development of his own chosen mode of life—useless for the practical work of life. He may renounce life and repair unto forests and mountain-recesses, or he may spend all his days and hours in the details of temple-worship and the like. This would militate against the central purpose of the Bhagavadgītā, which was to make Arjuna—and therefore the whole world—fight the battle of life as its earnest and unflinching soldiers. Accordingly, the Gītā—as it can quite legitimately do—proposes to consider the meditative life or "Dhyāna-yoga" (which forms an essential condition of both the *Jñāna-yoga* and of the *Bhakti-yoga*) as equally the means for achieving that mood of equanimity (*samatva*) which is the foundation of the *Karma-yoga* as preached by the Gītā. And as this "Dhyāna-yoga" presupposed in the disciple a regulated and restrained life, a place was herein afforded to those details of sacerdotal prescriptions, which, whatever one may have to say against them, were at any rate able—if performed without self-seeking and in a mood of detachment—to achieve a purification of the mind (citta-saṃśuddhi) and so render the candidate for salvation a fit recepient for the illumination of knowledge. And we have already pointed out how the Gītā artfully—but *not* illogically—contrives to keep the door open for the "activism" of the candidate even in the post-realisation or "Jīvanmukta" condition. We can now well understand why it was that the predecessors of Śaṅkarācārya interpreted the Bhagavadgītā as preaching the so-called "Jñāna-karma-samuccaya" theory.

We may accordingly sum up our remarks by stating that the peculiar achievement of the Bhagavadgītā as a philosophical poem consisted just in its having successfully gathered together under one banner the Brāhmaṇic ritualists and the Upaniṣadic Vedāntists, the Śāṁkhya pacifists and the Yoga activists, the devotees of Kṛṣṇa and the free-thinking recluses, as also the average majority of the adherents of established institutions—not excluding women and the depressed classes whom Brāhmaṇism had denied the right of Vedic sacraments—requiring each of its constituents to give up or modify a part of his dogma in the interest of a compromise on a common platform with the other constituents. The ultimate position reached was philosophically quite self-consistent, special efforts being made to modulate the current opposition between Jñāna and Bhakti, between Karman and Saṁnyāsa, and between Ritualism and the Ātmanism. These different roads, it was asserted, ultimately merged into one another and led to a common goal; and of those that walked them it was expected that they would, in secular matters, follow the Śāstric prescriptions as to the duties of the different castes and stages of life (XVIII. 41-45, XVI. 23-24), of course trying to give up *kartṛtva-abhimāna* and *phalāśā* as far as practicable, and practising meditations, etc. in order to reach that mood of detached equipoise; and that, even after receiving the "illumination" through either knowledge or devotion, they would not discontinue their daily routine of appointed duties, which would not be quite an imposition upon the Jñānin—for, nothing could be imposed upon him—but which would be, as already pointed out, like the wheel's spinning out its momentum after the rotating rod had ceased to be active. The only defect of the philosophical synthesis which the Gitā, in its laudable endeavour to summon up all available forces on the side of "Orthodoxy," brought about was that it blindly accepted the current Śāstric injunctions in the matter of the social and civic duties of the individual, and did not perceive that very serious anomalies and even

grave injustice might have been harboured in it. As a matter of fact the Śrauta religion of the Sacrifice and the several institutions ministering to the same had well-nigh outgrown their utility, and they needed to be radically modified if a serious social upheaval was at all to be averted. This neither the Bhagavadgītā nor the Mahābhārata in general was able to perceive. To the Epic the ideal of the pious king was still the liberal "Yajamāna" who performed the Aśvamedha and other sacrifices, bestowed ample largesses upon the priests, and otherwise punctiliously maintained the *varṇāśramadharmas* in all their Śāstric purity. Buddhism and the other "heresies" came in as a serious disillusionment of this self-complacent optimistic philosophy; but that need scarcely detract from the credit due to Brāhmaṇic orthodoxy for this its last attempt to husband up all its resources for a tooth-and-nail fight against the diverse disruptive forces of the day—forces which eventually proved too strong for the syncretic compromise, thereby turning the "Song Celestial" into the "Swan-song" of the centuries-old Śrauta Religion.

SUMMARY OF THE GĪTĀ

It only remains now to afford a running summary of the Bhagavadgītā with a view to show that the philosophical synthesis set forth above is actually warranted by the text of the Poem as we have it. In a brief summary it is not of course possible to explain every difficult passage. I can only assure the reader that no passage has presented me with any insurmountable difficulty. Where the Poem is designedly syncretic, some inconsistency in the use of technical terms was of course inevitable. The dialogue-form of the Poem also makes it necessary that partial statements of an argument in one place be duly supplemented by fuller statements of it in another place, where that particular topic constitutes the main theme under discussion. With these reservations the following Summary can be allowed to speak for itself.

CHAPTER I

Stanzas 1–27—Prologue.

Stanzas 28–37—Victory is uncertain, and is in any case not an unmixed good.

Stanzas 38–47—Nay: victory can be a positive curse, as involving annihilation of the whole household and of the traditional culture and religion. Better not to fight.

CHAPTER II

Stanzas 1–3—These scruples are unmanly.

Stanzas 4–9—Manly or unmanly, I can't banish them. I can under no circumstances kill my *Gurus.* I will not fight.

Stanzas 10–13—But death is inevitable to all. If you would not kill the *Gurus*, they are going to die all the same. [If death is natural, are not my tears and my scruples equally natural?]

Stanzas 14–15—But then, where is the difference between the wise man and the fool, if both alike weep?

Stanzas 16–25—And after all, what is this "killing"? You cannot kill the Self, for he is one and eternal: the *Being* that is not liable to be affected by the *Becoming.* And as to the non-eternal body, one should not grieve for it any more than for his worn-out clothes.

Stanzas 26–28—And even if the Self be not eternal,* yet why grieve for the inevitable? [But is the Self in reality eternal, or is he not?]

Stanzas 29–30—The Self as a matter of fact is eternal. [It may be that death is natural, or that no one can really kill another; but is it not unnatural to go out of one's way and anticipate it, or at any rate to compel the Self to "change his clothes" before the proper time?]

Stanzas 31–38—[But this is shifting your grounds. You are not now afraid of death or killing *per se*, but want to know why *you* should be the instrument rather than some other agency? But in this matter each is bounden to his own nature and function. As poison must, under all circumstances, kill so] a Kṣatriya must, under all circumstances, follow his martial code. As a Kṣatriya

* It would seem that there was a section of Vedāntins at the time who maintained this view, which appears to have been endorsed by a predecessor of Śaṅkarācārya, the Vedāntin Brahmadatta.

your duty clearly is to fight. Therefore fight irrespective of consequences and for the sake of fighting.

Stanzas 39–47—This from the Sāṁkhya point of view. From the Yoga point of view also one must do action, whatever it be and howsoever little it be; for, action is eternal and faileth not in its reward. As to what specific action it is to be, the trained and ultimate determining intellect (*vyavasāyātmikā buddhi*) gives only one definite answer. If the answers ordinarily given differ, it is because we look at the action too much under the influence of the passions-and-desires (*vāsanās*) and hanker after the fruits of the actions. This happens in the case of the normal sacerdotal acts undertaken for the attainment of specific rewards. Do not make the rewards the main spring of your activity, but do not also cease to act.

Stanzas 48–53—Action on such detached platform is possible only if you reach a state of equipoise which will tell you not only what to do, but how to escape the bondage of the consequences of your act.

Stanza 54—What can be the exact nature of this "State of equipoise"?

Stanzas 55–72—It is a settled mood of serene contentment wherein are absent all longings, sorrows, and aversions; wherein we take to the things of the world with perfect equanimity, and are able to exercise complete mastery over the mind and the senses. In that state we realise that Brahman is everything, and so feel no dissatisfaction with the natural course of events. In that state we reach the conviction of the immanence of the God in everything, and so feel no hankering or slavish dependence towards anything. The mind, in other words, becomes steady, serene, and tranquil, perfectly at peace within and without, and prepared to face all contingencies. The state no doubt is very difficult to attain, but once attained, it secures eternal salvation.

CHAPTER III

Stanzas 1–2—If then such a mental attitude of equipoise is everything while the specific action to be performed is secondary — seeing that salvation is attainable not while one is doing the action, but while one is endeavouring to practise meditation with a view to secure equipoise and self-realisation—why do you insist upon my

performing the action (which is admittedly secondary), rather than renouncing it for a meditative life?

Stanzas 3–8—There are current in the world two ways to reach the goal: the "Jñāna" way of the Sāṁkhyas and the "Karman" way of the Yogins. Now, the "Jñāna" way does not necessarily exclude action, and conversely, not to do action is not to attain the summit of the "Jñāna" way. Nobody can possibly remain without actions. To try to abjure all actions *outwardly* would mean hypocrisy. Do the action, therefore, which is the *sine qua non* for life, but keep the mind firm and self-possessed.

Stanzas 9–19—This "Karman" way is practically the same as the Mīmāṅsā doctrine of the *Yajña* or the sacrifice, and the Śāstric prescriptions about the duties of the Castes and Stages. Only, while these aim at the fruit of the actions, the true "Karmayogin" ought to abjure the fruits and the egoistic consciousness about the actions, and remain self-centered and above all the *dvandvas* or opposites of pleasure and pain, and the like. Moreover, the Mīmāṅsā view of the *Yajña* is far too ritualistic; but it is possible to understand *Yajña* in a much more universal sense, thereby introducing some element of knowledge into the action.

Stanzas 20–29—Janaka and others have won their goal through such a "Karmayoga" and, incidentally, they have set an example for the world to follow. I practise "Karmayoga" merely for the good of humanity; for, otherwise, the world cannot hold together. As far as outward actions go, there may appear to be no distinction between the common man and myself; but there *is* a distinction. The common man believes that *he* does the action, and is attached to the fruits of it. I know that the action is not mine, and so can remain unconcerned about its consequences. When the common man sees me active, he is encouraged to pursue his actions, because he realises that my example harmonizes with my precept, and so he is content to act.

Stanzas 30–32—The mood of equipoise essential for the perfect "Karmayoga" can be acquired through Yogic disciplines culminating in the Avyakta-upāsanā as it is taught in the Upaniṣads; but an easier way to attain the required detached frame of mind is to dedicate all

actions and their fruits unto Me in full faith. This would ensure safety and salvation.

Stanzas 33–34—[For, the danger is great.] Every one—wise or fool—is merely the instrument of his own inner nature, which has to be properly moulded and nurtured by means of knowledge and practice.

Stanza 35—By "practice" is meant a strict conformity with the code of conduct as laid down by the Śāstras.

Stanzas 36–43—And if you would know where the danger lies and what it is that leads the man astray, the answer is furnished by that one word "passion." It is passion that obscures knowledge and creates a tumult in the mind. Restrain the senses, then, control the mind, conquer all passions, and achieve thy own salvation.

CHAPTER IV

Stanzas 1–12—The "Karmayoga" that I have just described is an ancient doctrine which ages past I had taught to Vivasvat. And this need not surprise you, for I am the unborn and deathless cause of this universe. In times of need I, through my Māyā, assume Avatārs in the world and set it on the right path, recognising and rewarding the devotion of my faithful servants, and punishing the sins and the arrogance of the wicked.

Stanzas 13–22—Do not imagine, however, that this Avatār activity involves me in the bondage of karman. For, not having any egoistic consciousness of the agent, or any hankering for the fruit of the action, I am both the agent and no-agent of the act, since I have reached the state of equipoise. The same would be true of others.

Stanzas 23–33—This proposition can be explained in terms of the Mīmāṅsā doctrine also, if we understand *yajña* (sacrifice) with a wider sense. The root-idea of a *yajña* is sacrificing the lower for the higher end. In ordinary sacrifice you offer unto the gods the best that you have instead of enjoying it yourself; and generalising this concept, in the highest *yajña* a man may be said to be laying down all his cosmic interests before the altar of Brahman. There are numerous subsidiary varieties of *yajña*. And as the highest of all goals is the knowledge of Brahman, so the "*Jñana-yajña*" is the best of sacrifices: the others are only the steps to it, and are comprehended within it.

Stanzas 34–42–Knowledge alone can be thy guide and saviour. It can place you above all the doubts and distractions. You should repair unto a Guru and learn it from him and reflect upon it and concentrate all thoughts upon it and endeavour to eventually realise it. Action would cease to bind you thereafter. So win the knowledge, brush aside your ignorance, and fight.

CHAPTER V

Stanzas 1–2—Of the two possible alternatiyes so far discussed, namely action and renunciation, Srīkṛṣṇa now definitely declares himself in favour of the former.

Stanzas 3–5—The two alternatives, however, are reconcilable, and may be said to constitute only one method leading to the self-same goal. For, Karmayoga contains in it an element of saṁnyāsa (renunciation), and the Jñāna- or Saṁnyāsa- yoga, an element of activism or Karman.

Stanzas 6–13—To take to the path of renunciation (Jñānayoga) from the very beginning is difficult. As compared with that path, the path of activism (Karmayoga) is easier, and yet involves no bondage, provided there is an absence of self-interest and of egoism in regard to the action, of which you can then be at once the agent and the no-agent. The Karmayoga leads on to self-realisation.

Stanzas 14–15—[Neither the individual] nor even the God can be said to be the real [and deliberate] agent of any action. If they seem so, that is due to ignorance. It is Nature (Svabhāva)* that brings about the activity.

Stanzas 16–26—The knowledge that dispels the ignorance removes all sins, and takes one beyond the *saṁsāra*. It ensures the mood of equipoise, the perfection of which leads to ecstatic union with Brahman and the bliss of that union. The most important point then is to restrain one's mind and senses and to curb the violence of passions. Having reached perfect equipoise one may be said to be *mukta* (free from saṁsāra).

Stanzas 27–29—The Brahma-realisation which comes as the culmination of the Karmayoga is facilitated by Dhyānayoga or meditative discipline, and the object for the meditation should preferably be Srīkṛṣṇa.

* In V. 8 above, the Guṇas were said to be responsible for it: Cp. also XIV. 23.

CHAPTER VI

Stanzas 1–4—We have just seen that between the "Karmayogin" and the "Saṁnyāsin" there exists only a difference of degree. Karmayoga involves an element of renunciation as far as the desire for fruit is concerned, and it requires as its basis a mood of detachment and equipoise which can be attained and perfected only through "Dhyānayoga." The way in which the Dhyānayoga and the "Niṣkāma" or desire-less "Karmayoga" influence each other is next explained. A few *niṣkāma* karmans at the start create in man (st. 3, first half) the aptitude for curbing passions and egoism and thereby securing, through Dhyānayoga (which ought to be steadily cultivated), the perfection of "samatva-buddhi." Further advances in Dhyānayoga in turn impel you to achieve, in the "vyutthāna" state, yet greater self-less acts. The highest stage of Dhyānayoga is marked and facilitated (st. 3, second half) by "Śama" or the perfect cessation of all activities of sense, leading eventually to a full-orbed realisation of the Absolute.

Stanzas 5–6—What is wanted is the earnest will to do it and a steady and self-less endeavour, which depends on the individual's own initiative alone.

Stanzas 7–9—The highest stage of the "Dhyānayoga" is marked by peace, serenity, imperturbability, and self-sufficiency.

Stanzas 10–13—Directions for the Dhyānayoga.

Stanzas 14–15—The "dhyeya" or the object of meditation in the Dhyānayoga should be Śrīkṛṣṇa, while its goal is the peace eternal.

Stanzas 16–32—Avoid extremes; give up longings; be steady and self-centered, and you will win the bliss that excels everything. A persistent effort is needed for this; for, the mind is fickle. At the end of the process the Yogin attains perfect equipoise. He realises the presence of God everywhere, and intuitively treats all other beings as he would treat his own self.

Stanzas 33–36—The most difficult part of this Dhyānayoga is the restraint of the mind. Constant and long-persisted practice alone will secure it.

Stanzas 37–39—If then the perfection of Dhyānayoga is the necessary condition for the attainment of that "Samatva-

buddhi" which is the *sine qua non* of the Karmayoga, and particularly because an imperfect Dhyānayoga or imperfect "Samatvabuddhi" is as good as useless, would it not be wiser to take to the path of Renunciation from the very start? True, that there too the Dhyānayoga is essential; but imperfect Dhyānayoga in that path would at least involve no bondage of *karman* as we have altogether renounced it. On the other hand, to follow the path of activism with the possibility—nay, the almost certainty—of the "samatvabuddhi" not being perfectly attained is running an unnecessary risk.

Stanzas 40–45—Not so. Supposing you die without attaining the goal during life, your effort is not quite lost. In the next life your previous effort will serve as your capital, and you can begin just where you left off. There is thus no set-back: the progress is continuous.

Stanzas 46–47—The Dhyānayoga mode of self-realisation is superior to rigorous asceticism (which is a sheer weariness of flesh); superior to the mere [intellectual] knowledge [of the the Śāstras]; and superior to the Mīmāṅsā activism (which does not abjure fruits). The Dhyānayogin is of course expected to work in faith, making Śrīkṛṣṇa the *dhyeya* of his Dhyāna or meditation.

CHAPTER VII

Stanzas 1–3—With faith in Me and constant meditation upon Me, a person obtains knowledge of My real nature.

Stanzas 4–7—He realises that I am the ultimate source of this twofold creation: the *Parā* and the *Aparā* Prakṛti.

Stanzas 8–12—He likewise realises that I am the inner-most essence of all things.

Stanzas 13–15—People do not know this My real nature because they are under the spell of the Māyā constituted out of the three Guṇas, and because they have no faith in Me.

Stanzas 16–19—There are four kinds of people who put faith in Me, but of them the *Jñānin* alone knows My real nature. He is rare to find.

Stanzas 20–23—Others have faith, but in other gods and for lower ends. I bring about the attainment for them of these lower ends, but they fail to reach the goal eternal.

Stanzas 24–28—The reason why the people often seek other gods is that, blinded by ignorance and passions, they

fail to recognise Me as the unborn, omniscient and changeless cause of all.

Stanzas 29–30—In short, the Jñāni-bhakta (knowing devotee) of mine can alone know the following six points: Brahman; Adhyātma; Karman; Adhibhūta; Adhidaiva, and Adhiyajña. And he becomes ever united with Me.

CHAPTER VIII

Stanzas 1–4—In reply to Arjuna's inquiry on the six points, Śrīkṛṣṇa explains that (i) Brahman is the Immutable Absolute; (ii) Adhyātma is the introspection of Brahman as when it thinks—"Let me be many: let me multiply;" while (iii) Karman is the volition preceding cosmic creation. Next, (iv) the Adhibhūta is all this material universe; (v) the Adhidaivata is the Demiurge (Hiraṇyagarbha) in whom all divinity is centered; and lastly, (vi) the Adhiyajña divinity is Śrīkṛṣṇa himself, who is also the Inner-controller in human bodies.

Stanzas 5–8—To whatever object a man's thoughts go at death-time, that he himself becomes; and so, if the dying thought be directed to Me, the soul comes to Me. To effect this, practice is necessary; i. e. one must always think of Me.

Stanzas 9–16—At death-time, then, one must steady one's mind, restrain the senses and the breaths, and meditate upon Me by means of the *Om*, and he will surely reach the highest goal. Having reached the goal, he would be free from saṁsāra and transmigration, from which even the denizens of the highest heaven are not exempt.

Stanzas 17–19—For there are periodic World-absorptions corresponding to the day and night of the Brahmadeva, —all the beings merging back into the "Non-manifest" (during night), and emerging from it during day.

Stanzas 20–22—This "Non-manifest" differs from the eternal Non-manifest, which is Brahman itself, and which is not subject to this process of cosmic submergence. To reach this last, Bhakti is the only way.

Stanzas 23–28—There are two Paths by which the dead ascend: the Path beginning with Fire leads one to the eternal goal from which there is no return; while the Path beginning with Smoke leads to a goal from which there is a return. It is thus incumbent upon the Yogin to know and abide the proper time of his death.

CHAPTER IX

Stanzas 1–3—As subsidiary to the Karmayoga and in order to attain the mood of equipoise (samatva), the Dhyānayoga was recommended towards the end of Chapter V, and described in Chapter VI. The object of meditation in this Dhyānayoga can be (i) The Highest, Immutable, Non-manifest Brahman from which the world proceeds, in which it subsists, and into which it is to dissolve; or (ii) Śrīkṛṣṇa, the theistic or personalistic God in his manifest form, who is identical with the Brahman, and who can be realised by means of Bhakti or loving faith alone. The nature of this realisation is now set forth.

Stanzas 4–15—The devotee realises that Śrīkṛṣṇa is everywhere: in the world and beyond it; that Śrīkṛṣṇa is the author of the world's origin and dissolution, and aportions fruits to souls according to their *karman*. It is only fools that disregard Me.

Stanzas 16–25—Says Śrīkṛṣṇa: I am the goal of all activities, the source and the centre of all the cosmic functions, the deity underlying all rites, although it often happens that the performers of these rites do not realise this fact, and so fail to attain the highest goal, which is Myself, and are then destined to wander in the cycles of births and rebirths.

Stanzas 26–28—Have faith in Me, dedicate all actions to Me, and you will be free from the bondage of Karman, and come to Me.

Stanzas 29–34—The very desire to dedicate oneself to me in full faith is a turning point in a man's spiritual life. He thereby places himself upon the sure and unfailing path of salvation, even though till then he might have been a wicked sinner or one of those classes debarred from Vedic sacrifices. This is the only sure way to salvation, particularly in this miserable and transient world of ours. Do ye all follow it.

CHAPTER X

Stanzas 1–11—For, I may say, that my real nature is known only to the wise few. All the nobler (sāttvika) emotions of man, his knowledge and so forth proceed from me. The whole cosmic process through the four Manu-ages*

* The four *Manvantaras* named after four Manus—Svāyambhuva, Sāṁvaraṇi, Sāvarṇya, and Vaivasvata—are found mentioned also in the Ṛgveda viii. 51, 52; x. 62; etc.

was started and is sustained by Me. To know this real nature of mine is an inexpressible joy: it is the lot of only a few blessed souls.

Stanzas 12–42—Arjuna now, in the interest of *upāsanā*, wants to know all the "Vibhūtis" of Śrīkṛṣṇa. A list of these, with the general winding up that whatsoever of excellence the world possesses has in it some divine spark underlying, although God cannot be wholly contained within these Vibhūtis, but also transcends them.

CHAPTER XI

Stanzas 1–55—Upon his request Śrīkṛṣṇa now shows unto Arjuna, first granting him a "divine eye" for the purpose, his cosmic form. An eloquent description of the same. Arjuna is terrified, and prays for a withdrawal of that supernatural vision. The withdrawal; after which Śrīkṛṣṇa once more enjoins upon Arjuna the necessity of doing the appointed duties, dedicating them unto God, and having no concern for their fruits.

CHAPTER XII

Stanzas 1–8—For Dhyānayoga two kinds of "dhyeyas" had been mentioned: the Non-manifest or Immutable, and the Manifest or the Qualified. Śrīkṛṣṇa now points out that the "Avyakta-upāsanā" is very difficult, while the "Vyakta-upāsanā" is relatively easier, and the one to be preferred. This last requires that the devotee dedicates his mind wholly to God.

Stanzas 9–11—This is not easy; but means—each easier than the preceding—exist which would secure concentration of the mind. These are (i) steady practice (*abhyāsa*) at concentration; (ii) temple-worship (*mat-karman*; cp. XI. 55); and (iii) dedication and self-surrender (*mad-yoga*). Having through these means secured concentration and devotion, the devotee can rid himself of all fruits of action, and attain, in *samādhi*, the peace of Brahman.

Stanza 12—Of the means above discussed, mere mechanical practice (*abhyāsa*) is the lowest; next to it is the intellectual knowledge (*jñāna*) of the Absolute; and higher than that is the realisation (*dhyāna*) of the Absolute through loving faith. The perfection of the "Dhyānayoga" leads *pari passu* to the perfection of the "Karmayoga," which last, in its most perfect stage, leads to the peace eternal.

Stanzas 13–20—Here follows a description of the perfect devotee somewhat on the lines of the other descriptions of the "Ideal man" in the Gītā (cp. II. 55–72, VI. 4–32, XIII. 7–11, XIV. 21–25, XVI. 1–3, and XVIII. 50–56). Śrīkṛṣṇa winds up by emphasizing the need for Bhakti.

CHAPTER XIII

Stanzas 1–4—As through "Vyakta-upāsanā" one comes to realise the nature of Śrīkṛṣṇa as a personal god, so through the "Avyakta-upāsanā" one gets the knowledge of the whole Universe as distributed into "the Field" and "the Field-knower," both in their individual and cosmic aspects.

Stanzas 5–6—The Field consists of the twenty-four principles (enumerated) *plus* Desire, Aversion, and the other Guṇas (*not* of Ātman), and of the cohesion of them all joined to sentiency (which also is *not* of Ātman, *nor* an adventitious product due to their cohesion only, as the Cārvākas maintained).

Stanzas 7–11—Knowledge consists of, and is marked by, humility and the other qualities mostly developed during the process of "Avyakta-upāsanā" no less than that of "Vyakta-upāsanā," both having one and the same ultimate goal to reach.

Stanzas 12–18—The object to be known is Brahman, described in such contradictory terms as are familiar in the Upaniṣads. It is within the hearts of all, and the devotee sees or realises it much more readily than does the man who meditates upon the "Non-manifest."

Stanzas 19–23—The Field as above described is the Prakṛti (Nature) with its various modifications (vikāras), and the Field-knower is the Puruṣa who can merely enjoy but does not act. As the Prakṛti is the beginningless emanation from the Lord, so the Puruṣa is identical with the Lord or the Supreme Self.

Stanzas 24–25—The Realisation takes place in the state of ecstasy induced by the "Dhyānayoga" in the case of just the few (*kecit*) who have perfected their meditation—a part (*anye*) of these few taking to the path of sāṁnyāsa (actionless-ness) which is the Sāṁkhya way, while the rest (*apare*) take to the path of activism. Others unable to follow any of these paths completely can nevertheless reach salvation by faith and devotion [in Me].

Stanzas 26–34—The knowledge of the "Field" or "Nature" thus obtained serves as the key to every other knowledge whatsoever. The Puruṣa, the Field-knower, is unconcerned and inactive. He is one with God or Brahman, the only entity that endures permanently amidst the changing manifold. He abides within the "Field" and illumines it; and to know this is to attain that perfection of equipoise which spells liberation.

CHAPTER XIV

Stanzas 1–4—The cosmological knowledge of the "Field" and the "Field-knower" is now further continued, Śrīkṛṣṇa declaring himself as the first principle of the cosmos.

Stanzas 5–18—The Prakṛti works out its evolution by means of the three *Guṇas* (qualities), the nature, effects, and characteristics of which are given in detail.

Stanzas 19–20—All activity whatsoever is due to these three Guṇas, the Puruṣa being in reality incapable of action. When a person realises this fact of his being no-agent, he attains liberation.

Stanzas 21–25—The description of the person who has risen superior to the bondage of the Guṇas, which is mainly in a line with the other similar descriptions.

Stanzas 26–27—Devotion to Śrīkṛṣṇa secures this "triguṇâtīta" condition, since He is one with the Brahman and is the source of the Bliss eternal which salvation brings.

CHAPTER XV

Stanzas 1–6—The three Guṇas described in the last Chapter combine to form the "Tree of Saṁsāra" emanating from the Highest Self, who is to be attained only after the cutting away of the meshes of Saṁsāra by the sword of "non-attachment."

Stanzas 7–11—The individual souls are only parts (aṁśas) of the Supreme Self which is Śrīkṛṣṇa. The Souls are hence the Masters of the body, the senses, and the mind; and it is not without effort and meditation that the real nature of the souls can be grasped.

Stanzas 12–18—Śrīkṛṣṇa, the Supreme Self, is the source of all the mundane and the supra-mundane processes and phenomena. He is superior to the Manifest (kṣara) and superior to the Non-manifest (akṣara=self), and hence is called the "Puruṣottama."

Stanzas 19–20—To know Me thus is to know everything.

CHAPTER XVI

Stanzas 1–3—To complete and give a point to the description of the "Karmayoga" with its accessory, viz. the twofold "Dhyānayoga" which leads on to Realisation, Śrīkṛṣṇa now describes the life and fate of those that do not take to this path of salvation, prefacing the same by first describing the characteristics of the "Wise man" who is born to the "Divine heritage (*Daivī sampad*)."

Stanzas 4–20—Description of those born to the "Demoniac heritage (*Āsurī sampad*)," of their philosophy, their goal in life, and their fate after death.

Stanzas 21–24—These people throw all Śāstric injunctions to the wind; but Śāstra is man's unfailing guide in life.

CHAPTER XVII

Stanzas 1–3—Between the highest and the lowest come in a number of intermediate steps; and these steps are now described by way of a further complement to the teaching of the Gītā, the principle of arrangement being the three Guṇas.

Stanzas 4–22—The three-fold faiths of men, their three-fold food, three-fold worship, three-fold *tapas*, and three-fold gifts are next described in succession.

Stanzas 23–28—By way of an appendix is given the application of the "*Oṁ tat sat*" formula with which most of our actions are concluded—a fourth category, that of the "*asat*," being added to the three given by the original formula.

CHAPTER XVIII

Stanza 1—Arjuna now asks for a precise characterisation of "Saṁnyāsa" and of "Tyāga" *as psychological acts*, and viewed under the category of the three Guṇas.

Stanzas 2–11—Śrīkṛṣṇa in reply defines the "Saṁnyāsa" as the actual renunciation of all voluntary and purposive activities, and "Tyāga" as renunciation of the fruits of all actions [but not necesssarily the actions themselves]. As in Chapter V, he here advises people (i) not to give up the normal ritualistic karman, but to perform it; but give up the desire for heaven etc.; and, (ii) since nobody can possibly abandon *all* actions, to endeavour, while performing them, to give up the desire for fruit. This is the real *saṁnyāsa*.

Stanzas 12–17—"Fruits of actions" was a phrase often used hitherto. Śrīkṛṣṇa next gives three classes of "fruits," and the five contributory causes for actions in general —the Individual Self being only one of these five,— adding further that even this partial activity of the Self ceases to be a bondage when the egoism of the agent is suppressed.

Stanzas 18–28—Karman is next viewed upon as a psychological act, bifurcated into a knowledge factor and a volitional factor. Knowledge, action, and agent are now classified according to the three Guṇas.

Stanzas 29–32—A life of actions being determined upon and also the attitude with which the action is to be performed, the question still remains which out of the possible actions is to be chosen. But when the mind has reached the absolute perfection of equipoise, the resulting *vyavasāyātmikā buddhi* is the man's one unerring guide, and there would no longer remain any doubt or hesitation. Buddhi is now viewed upon under the threefold Guṇa classification.

Stanzas 33–40—The specific action being determined upon, one requires endurance (*dhṛti*) to carry it through. This endurance is now viewed upon under the same threefold division; and next comes a similar division of the pleasure that is seen to result from the actions. This Guṇa classification is of universal application.

Stanzas 41–49—A guide equally unerring as the "Vyavasāyātmikā buddhi" is the Śāstric regulation as to the castes, and their several duties. These duties are briefly enumerated, and all are enjoined to follow them. If every one does his little bit, the cosmic duties perform themselves automatically. In these duties the same attitude of self-subdual and detachment is once more laid down, as leading to freedom from the bondage of karman.

Stanzas 50–56—The gradual progress towards the intuitive realisation of the Self through the "Dhyānayoga" with, preferably, Śrīkṛṣṇa as its "*dhyeya*" is next described. The highest Jñānin should also be the best devotee of Śrīkṛṣṇa. Dedication of all actions to God is once more enjoined as the easiest way of reaching the goal.

Stanzas 57–66—So then, ever act, but do not yearn for the fruit. Think of Me and dedicate all actions unto Me, and you will be saved. As a final touch to the argument

Śrīkṛṣṇa declares that all our actions are eventually determined from within—call the determining agency Nature, Prakṛti, God, or what you will. In a mood of becoming humility, therefore, seek guidance and solace only in Him, and you will reach eventually the goal eternal from which there is no return. "I have thus taught you everything: now you are quite at liberty to do as you like."

Stanzas 67–71—The usual "phala-śruti," or words in praise of the Poem.

Stanzas 72–73—Arjuna becomes ready to fight.

Stanzas 74–78—The winding up of the Poem with a view to its correlation with the rest of the Epic.

LECTURE IV

VEDĀNTA IN THE BRAHMASŪTRAS

IN my last Lecture I tried to put forward the view that the Bhagavadgītā was the last elaborate attempt made by the followers of the old Śrauta religion to defend orthodox Brāhmaṇism against the disruptive forces that were gathering to a head in the century or so immediately preceding the rise of Buddhism. I call the attempt the last of its kind; for, it was not the only one, and had others preceding it. This is indeed what we ought to expect. Such social and religious movements as are involved in the philosophical syncretism of the Gītā are never mere isolated occurrences. The impulse is sure to be felt in more than one circle and by more than one individual; and the channels which it seeks for its expression are also diverse, but possessing a fundamental affinity in their general interpretation of the spirit of the times, and in the line of action that they propose for the solution of the pressing problems of the day. In the early part of this evening's Lecture I propose to briefly review another such attempt made on behalf of the "orthodoxy" and belonging to about the same period which we have assigned to the Bhagavadgītā. The attempt in fact supplements in one very important particular the general teaching of the Bhagavadgītā. I have already pointed out (page 106 f., footnote) that while the Bhagavadgītā, as an apostle of activism or the Karmayoga, laid down the proper psychological attitude for doing the *karman*, yet just exactly what *karman* it was to be in the case of the specific individual, it called upon the Śāstra to legislate. This has been at times considered as a serious drawback in the ethical teaching of the Poem. But it need not necessarily be so. Nor need we at all suppose that the author of the philo-

sophical synthesis in the Gītā did really believe that the "cāturvarṇyavyavasthā," or the Śāstric prescriptions regarding the duties and rights of the four castes, needed absolutely no modifications or improvements of any kind. The Gītā (as also the Epic in other portions) shows full consciousness of the possible existence of anomalies in the system; but if it be the case that just about this same time there were activities going on in the different Vedic schools and recensions with a view to evolve forth an equitable and self-consistent system of secular and religious conduct, applicable, in the first instance, to those that owed allegiance to a specific Vedic Śākhā or Caraṇa, and secondarily, to the community as a whole, we cannot blame the Gītā for having put an implicit faith in the success of these activities, which probably had engaged the brains of the best and most practical preachers and legislators of the day. The activities that I am alluding to are of course those represented by the different Śrauta-, Gṛhya-, and Dharma-sūtras, as also by the several other Sūtra-works designed to regulate the daily life and conduct of specific sects or specific stages of life, such as the "Bhikṣusūtras" of Pārāśarya and of Karmanda referred to by Pāṇini in IV. iii. 110-111. The extant remains of this so-called "Sūtra-period" which, as observed by Winternitz, constitutes a literary activity having no parallel anywhere in the whole literature of the world, deserve to be studied as a totality with a distinctive impulse and life-purpose of its own. That the period is *mainly* pre-Buddhistic will hardly be contested. Sūtras as species of literary works are mentioned thrice in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (II. 4. 10, IV. 1. 2, and IV. 5. 11), and at least about half a dozen times in Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī (III. ii. 23; IV. ii. 60, 65; IV. iii. 110–111; V. i. 58; and VIII. 3. 90). Some sections of the Āraṇyakas (for instance, Ait. Āraṇ., Book V) and even of some of the Brāhmaṇas (such as Śatapatha XII. v. 2) are practically in the regular Sūtra style; and the very fact that the Jain and the Buddhistic canons came to be designated Suttas or Sūtras shows the

importance that the Sūtras were thought to possess as a systematic exposition of the doctrines of a school or a sect. The existing Sūtra texts of the Brāhmaṇas can easily exceed forty, though all of them cannot naturally claim the same antiquity. These texts will have to be studied comparatively and critically from the point of view of their vocabulary, their philosophical terminology, and the evolution of their contents. I cannot here go out of my way to deal with the whole question in its entirety;* but content myself with the offering of a few general remarks on the underlying plan and purpose of these Sūtra works, which will enable us to appreciate in their correct perspective the Brahma-sūtras, which form the immediate topic of this Lecture.

The Sūtras are concise rules expressed in the fewest possible words, not merely as an aid to memorizing, but also with a view to systematize the discursive and apparently discrepant statements on their subject-matter that were to be found in the Brāhmaṇas and other authoritative texts. The accounts of the Vedic sacrifices or domestic rites as preserved in the exegetic portions of the Brāhmaṇic texts (overlaid as they are with considerable extraneous matter, including attempts to combat the opposing practices of rival schools) could never have by themselves enabled the priests to perform the rites in question from start to finish in all their details, if there had not been in existence a full and precise oral tradition handed down from generation to generation. Such a ritualistic tradition must certainly have been already current in the pre-Sūtra period. Why then was this special attempt made to codify that tradition in the form of the several Sūtra texts? There must evidently have been some specific reason† for this; and that could have been none other than

* See Belvalkar and Ranade's *History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. iii, *The Synthetic Period*, which goes into the problem in more details.

† That the Sūtras owed their existence to possible shortage of writing material is an idea that few will now care to hold by.

what underlies every such attempt at codification: namely, the divergence of practice and the absence of any centralised authority whose ruling would be unqestionably binding upon all.* Each Vedic Śākhā therefore decided to arrange its own house in order by first harmonizing the prescriptions of its own recognised teachers. Hence there arose separate Gṛhya-, Śrauta-, or Dharma-sūtras for each Vedic Śākhā. That in some cases a few such neighbouring Śākhās joined hands together in a larger coöperative unit called Caraṇa, and adopted a common Gṛhya or Śrauta or Dharma text, as the case may be, as binding upon all the members of the Caraṇa, is a detail that need not militate against the general situation above outlined. In the Sūtra works now compiled it was evident that attention would come to be focussed upon those points wherein the several teachers were agreed, while the differences of opinion would be slurred over by allowing options. And elaborate rules of "mīmānsā" or the textual exegesis would be evolved in the process,—the process itself, ushered in for specific reasons, being further carried on in the schools and coteries long after the original reasons which called it forth had ceased to be operative.† Now, whenever any such attempts at unification and systematisation come to be made at about the same time and by all the religious and philosophical schools, should they not normally imply the presence of a common danger menacing the established social and religious institutions? Such a danger existed, as we have

* Compare the mordern proposal to codify the Hindu Law as now practised in the several Provinces.

† That the Mīmānsā or the Science of Exegesis is much earlier than our Pūrvamīmānsā-sūtras will be readily admitted. We can hardly believe that the later peculiarly "Mīmānsaka" doctrines, such as Eternality of Sound, Absence of God and of world-creation, the exclusively "injunctive" nature of the Veda, and so forth, belonged to this earlier and inchoate "Mīmānsā, which probably was a system of "Ritualistic Theism," as described in the *Assalāyana Sutta* and the other Buddhistic and Jain sources.

seen, throughout what I have designated the period of pre-Buddhistic thought-ferment. Posessing a knowledge of these attempts at re-organization and reformation that were being made in the different Vedic schools, the Gītā could be excused for not having really thought it necessary to raise the whole question of social duties and obligations *ab ovo*, but resting content with the declaration "*Tasmāc Chāstram pramāṇaṁ te kāryâkārya-vyavasthitau.*" That this "Śāstra" had become out of date; that it had failed to take full account of the new conditions of things that arose with the interfusion of the diverse ethnic elements implied by the shifting of the centre of the Āryan culture from the "Brahmāvarta" to the "Madhyadeśa" and beyond; and that it offered very little to attract the imagination or captivate the heart inasmuch as its appeal was mainly intellectual—all this was easily lost sight of; and Buddhism (which has been well characterised as "much more a social than a religious revolution") could readily score an easy victory over the Śrauta religion, partly by reason of the Buddha's own "magnetic personality and the deep human feeling which inspired his teaching," and partly by reason of his having "opened wide the doors of Āryan religion, and satisfied the spiritual desires of the masses by offering them a religious law easy to understand and accessible to all, free from elaborate and costly ceremonial, raising the social status of the lower orders, giving them their spiritual freedom and making the life of the whole community healthier and happier." *

As in the case of most of the other literary monuments (c) of Ancient India, so in the case of the Brahmasūtras, the third of the Vedāntic Prasthānas, † the first problem that we

* Havell: *History of Aryan Rule in India*, page 50.

† The orthodox view gives the second rank to the Bramasūtras because they are directly related to the first Prasthāna, the Upaniṣads, and third to the Gītā. Some schools of Vedānta recognise the Bhāgavata-Purāṇa as the fourth Prasthāna.

have to face is a textual one. The Bhagavadgītā refers to "Brahmasūtras" in XIII. 4. The context here makes it quite clear that in the second half of that stanza the word *ṛṣibhiḥ* " by sages, " has to be supplied ;* which can mean that the Gītā is not here alluding to any one specific Brahmasūtra (like the one which has come down to us), but to several such sūtras *by more than one author*. As the different Vedic schools have their own separate Śrauta- and Gṛhya- and Dharma-Sūtras, it would seem that there was not any *a priori* reason why some of them at least should not have had their own distinct Brahma-sūtras, whose function it would naturally be to harmonize the teaching of the one or more Upaniṣads recognised by the Śākhā in question. The extant Brahmasūtra refers to the views of at least six predecessors,† and of these we know from repeated references in Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya‡ that Kāśakṛtsna wrote some treatise on Mīmāṅsā which must have covered the whole field of our extant Pūrva- and Uttara-Mīmāṅsā Sūtras. And the same is probably true of Āśmarathya, and Auḍulomi, and Bādari, judging from the contexts in which these names are referred to in both the Pūrvamīmāṅsā- and the Vedānta-sūtras. This leads one to expect that there were "Brahmasūtras" earlier than the extant Brahmasūtra which is commonly attributed to the authorship of Bādārayaṇa. Deussen pointed out long ago (*The System of Vedānta*, page 122) that inasmuch as the several Upaniṣadic texts taken up for specific discussion in portions of the Brahmasūtras preserve rigidly the order in which the passages occur in the different Upaniṣads, there is reason to assume the existence of "preparatory exegetical

* Unless we take the instrumental *Brahmasūtrapadaiḥ*, as denoting the '*agent*' rather than the '*means*,' which is extremely improbable.

† Namely, Ātreya, Āśmarathya, Audulomi, Kāśakṛtsna, Kārṣṇājini, and Bādari, besides the several allusions to Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa, the reputed authors of the Pūrva- and the Uttara-Mīmāṅsā Sūtras.

‡ Kielhorn, Vol. II, pp. 206, 249, 325.

works within the different Śākhās (recensions or schools), which were then gradually united into a single whole." That the majority of the texts that are discussed in the present Brahmasūtras hail from the Chāndogya Upaniṣad has been already set forth by Deussen, so that there is nothing improbable in a "Chāndogya" Brahmasūtra having in fact formed the original nucleus of the present Sūtras, and been even incorporated therein. That a "Śārīraka" sūtra beginning with the first two sūtras of the present Brahmasūtra was actually composed by Jaimini the author of the Pūrvamīmāṅsāsūtras is unambiguously declared by no less a writer than Sureśvarācārya, author of the Naiṣkarmyasiddhi;* and this "Śārīrakasūtra" may very well have been the postulated "Chāndogya" Brahmasūtra, not only for the reason that both the writer (Jaimini) and the Upaniṣad (Chāndogya) belong to the Sāmaveda, but also for the further reason that, with one solitary exception, in all the other references to Jaimini in the Vedāntasūtras — where the references are directly to a textual exegesis—we find him discussing a passage from the several Prapāṭhakas of just the Chāndogya Upaniṣad.† And perhaps it is also due to this circumstance that we find the Brahmasūtra, in III. iii. 23, discussing a

* See the second edition of the work by Hiriyanna in the B. S. P. Series, p. 52. The problem is discussed by me in a paper on Jaimini's Sāriraka-Sūtra, contributed to the "Garbe-Festgabe," 1927.

† See "Garbe-Festgabe," page 168. The diversified nature of the contents of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad makes it probable that it also had an independent sūtra work attempting a philosophical synthesis not only of the different sections of the Upaniṣad itself, but of the two versions of it in the Kāṇva and the Mādhyaṁdina recensions. This conclusion is rendered quite probable also from the fact that in Br. Sūtras I. iv. 19-22 (which clearly refer to a Bṛhad. passage) three authoritative expositions of the text are quoted. There may have been one or two other similar inchoate "Brahmasūtras" to which the Gītā reference can conceivably have been made.

passage occurring in the Khila or the Supplement to the Rāṇāyaniya recension of the Sāmaveda. *

If then we are justified in assuming that Jaimini wrote a "Śārīraka-sūtra" which sought to harmonize the teaching of the Sāmaveda Upaniṣads (and particularly of the Chāndogya), and that this "Śārīraka-sūtra" was bodily incorporated within, and forms the main part of the contents of, the present text of the Brahmasūtra, we should naturally expect, first, that discussions of non-Chāndogya passages occurring in the extant text would be either in the beginning or at the conclusion of a pāda (where additions can be most easily made); and secondly, that where such discussions are interposed in the middle of the pāda they would be seen to break off the continuity of the sequential discussions of contiguous Chāndogya texts. That this is exactly the case becomes evident from a careful consideration of instances (illustrating the second principle above formulated) such as, Brahmasūtra I. i. 28–31 (dealing with Kauṣītaki iii. 2) coming between I. i. 24–27 (discussing Ch. iii. 13) and I. ii. 8–8 (discussing Ch. iii. 14); or Br. S. I. ii. 9–12 (discussing two Kaṭha Up. texts); or Br. S. I. ii. 18–24 (discussing a Bṛhadāraṇyaka and a Muṇḍaka passage); or Br. S. I. iii. 10–13 (discussing a Bṛh. and a Praśna passage)—interposed between discussions of two Chāndogya passages; or finally, Br. S. I. iii. 22-39 (which deal with one Muṇḍaka and two Kaṭha texts and include a lengthy discussion† in 12 sūtras as to whether the gods and the Śūdras are qualified for the study of Vedānta) thrust in between the discussion of two closely contiguous Chāndogya texts. Instances illustrating the first of the two principles above stated are the sūtras forming the

* In III. iii. 44-52 there is the discussion of a passage from the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, which may have been a heritage from the original "Bṛhadāraṇyaka" Brahmasūtra.

† The interpolated nature of this discussion was long suspected by Deussen as well as by Major Basu.

initial *adhikaraṇa* or topic of Ch. I, pādas iii and iv, and the concluding *adhikaraṇa* of I. i and I. iii. Secondly, by the very hypothesis, the "Chāndogya" sūtra would not try to bring the Chāndogya teaching in a line with the teaching of other Upaniṣads not belonging to Sāmaveda, and still less spend its efforts at unifying the teaching of these other Upaniṣads. Nor would it normally quote Smṛti texts to support its own proposed interpretations of the Śrutis in question; and, since its function would be mainly exegetic, it would not go too much out of the way to fight any "Sāṁkhya" interpretations, or to answer any "Sāṁkhya" objections to its own proposed interpretations, and still less of course to endeavour to pick holes into the Sāṁkhya, and into such other rational and heterodox systems of philosophy as might have been in actual existence at the time. This would naturally knock from out of the frame-work of the original Chāndogya Brahmasūtra the Smṛtipāda (II. i), the Tarkapāda (II. ii), the Sṛṣṭivākya-samanvaya-pādas (II. iii and iv), and the Guṇopasaṁhāra-pāda (III. iii); also the fourth pāda of the first Chapter, which is an after-thought and which introduces in two of its adhikaraṇas (sūtras 14–15, and 23–27) cosmological discussions not properly belonging to the avowed contents of the Pāda. Further, even in some of the adhikaraṇas to be retained, there will have to be effected not a little of pruning. Thus in the first adhikaraṇa of I. ii (sūtras 1-8), we will have to omit sūtra 5 because it refers apparently to the Śatapatha, and sūtra 6 because it recites the authority of a Smṛti.* In adhikaraṇa 4 of the same pāda sūtra 14 will have to be omitted, unless (as seems probable) the reference is to Chān. iv. 11. 1 and Chān. iv. 12. 1. And in Chapter I, pāda ii, adhikaraṇa 7 (sūtras 24–32) we should omit sūtras 25 and 26, make the reference in sūtra 32—with Rāmānuja—to Chā. v. 18. 12, rather than—with Śaṅkara—to

* I am not sure whether sūtras 7–8 should not constitute a distinct adhikaraṇa.

Jābāla Upaniṣad and, omitting the sūtras 29 and 30 which refer to the views of Āśmarathya and Bādari, weld together sūtras 28 and 31 into one continuous sūtra to be thus worded: "Sākṣādapyavirodhaḥ sampatteṣ tathāhi darśayati." Some other possible alterations would be — III. i, omit sūtras 3 and 4, and 13 to 16, and 19 to 20. Also drop the last three words from sūtra 7. Drop also sūtras I. i. 3 and 4. All this would naturally involve extensive reconstruction, which it would be much too temerarious to attempt at this date.*

It seems then at any rate probable that the original "Chāndogya" Brahmasūtra has undergone two radical overhaulings: first when the "prati-śākhīya" Brahmasūtra was enlarged in scope so as to be a "sarva-śākhīya" text giving a harmonious interpretation of the teaching of the Upaniṣads as a whole, and secondly, by the addition of the controversial matter—and in particular the Tarkapāda (II. ii)— meant to carry the warfare into the enemy's own territory. In the present state of our knowledge we can probably say what sūtras must have belonged to the original Chāndogya Brahmasūtra, but cannot positively assert which ones did not belong to the same, except of course in the most general way already indicated (p. 141 f.). And as to the middle or the penultimate version, we would be justified in excluding from it such sūtras as we can, on independent philological grounds, prove as interpolations. One such clear case I mentioned,† viz. II. iii. 11-53, which is taken up by a discussion of the nature and functions of "Tvam" or the individual self, and which is interposed between sūtras syntactically related to one another;‡

* It would be like attempting to reconstruct the original "Jaya" from the present "Mahābhārata."

† See my paper, "The Multiple Authorship of the Vedānta Sūtras," in the *Indian Philosophical Review*, Vol. II (1918–19), pp. 141–154.

‡ Professor Jacobi has conceded to me the validity of this proof in a private letter dated 23-9-24.

and parity of reasoning would lead us to suspect the discussion on the nature of the "Tat" or the Supreme Self (Sūtras 11–41) placed at the end of Chap. III, Pāda ii. I had always thought that the Tarkapāda (II. ii) belonged to the latest strata in the Sūtrapāṭha, although Professor Jacobi, whose main argument for the dating of the Vedāntasūtra is based upon the genuineness of this pāda, naturally demurs. There is however one other argument that I can now urge in support of my contention. It is well known, for example, that the "prasaṅga" or the *reductio ad absurdum* method of argumentation was rigorously perfected by the Śūnyavāda or the Nihilistic school of Buddhism. Now the word *prasaṅga* or *prasakti* occurs seven times in the present Sūtrapāṭha, * but is it not remarkable that these passages should come from what I have regarded as the latest interpolations in the Sūtrapāṭha? The varying use of technical terms also tells the same way. Thus the Sūtrakāra uses the word *abhidhyā* or *abhidhyāna* invariably as the synonym for God's *īkṣaṇa*. But in the suspected interpolation in III. ii that deals with the "Tat-padārtha," it occurs (III. ii. 5) in the somewhat unusual sense of "Yogic meditation." For peculiar usage of words confined to the later additions only, we may mention the word *unmāna* in the sense of limited dimension, which occurs only in II. iii. 22 and III. ii. 31. This may point to identity of authorship of these two related discussions of the natures of the individual and the supreme Selves; and this identity can be extended also to II. i on the evidence of the identity of wording and argumentation between the Parāyattâdhikaraṇa (II. iii, Sūtras 41–42) and the Vaiṣamya-nairghṛṇya-adhikaraṇa (II. i. 34–36). Further philological arguments in the matter are best eschewed here, as they are going to be followed up in another place. Sufficient, it is hoped, has been urged here to justify the assumption of an

* Namely, II. i. 1 (bis), II. i. 8, II. i. 11, II, i. 21, II, i. 26, and ii. iii. 32. The *prasaṅga* discussed in Pūrvamīmāṅsā sūtras, Chapter xii, has not the technical Buddhistic sense.

original 'Chāndogya' Brahmasūtra as being the nucleus of the present Sūtra text, as also of continued subsequent additions to the Sūtrapāṭha,* which should teach us caution in basing arguments for the date of the Brahmasūtras on the evidence of such an obviously "suspect" section of the text as the Tarkapāda. We need not accordingly attach much importance to the question whether the philosophical system refuted in Brahmasūtras II. ii. 28–32 is the Śūnyavāda (as Jacobi maintains† against the concurrent testimony of *all* Indian Commentators, thereby arriving at a date of cir. 250 A. D. for the Br. S.); or the Vijñānavāda (which would, following Jacobi's reasoning, bring the date of the Br. S. to cir. 325 A.D.). I have discussed the whole question in my Notes to the Brahmasūtras, and have come to the conclusion that Jacobi has not proved his contention as to the system intended by the Sūtras before us, and that in any case the possibility of the Sūtras referring to some forms of the Vijñāna- (or the Śūnya-) vāda views much more primitive than those familiar to us from the writings of Vasubandhu-Asaṅga (or Nāgārjuna) need not be necessarily ruled out. These earlier forms could appear to the Sūtrakāra as important enough to demand specific refutation, although, with our eyes dazzled by the most brilliant expositions of them by Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu, we may think that these earlier forms could not have been considered by any body as important enough to be rebutted. Accordingly, I am led to believe that the "Chāndogya" and other *Prati-śākhīya* Sūtras are anterior to the Bhagavadgītā; that their *Sarva-śākhīya* elaboration belongs to about 300 B. C.; and that the extant Brahmasūtras date from about the beginning of the Christian era.

*These additions, as I have shown (pp. 144 ff.) in my paper on the "Multiple Authorship of the Vedānta Sūtras" above mentioned, were being made upto a relatively very late period.

† Journal of the American Oriental Society, Volume XXXI, pages 1–29, in the paper entitled "On the Philosophical Sūtras of the Brāhmaṇas."

The postulated three recensions of the Brahmasūtras need not be regarded as mere unwarranted creations of the analytic scholar. I believe that it is possible to show that each of them was a conscious and deliberate attempt possessing a life-purpose of its own. We have already seen that the purpose of the first of these was to unify and systematize the religio-philosophical doctrines (and practices) prevailing within specific schools, in anticipation of the impending struggle for existence with the root-and-branch heresies of the pre-Buddhistic age. As to the second, it was, as I understand matters, separated from the first by the centuries during which Buddhism had triumphed over Brāhmaṇism,* but found itself nevertheless philosophically indoctrinated with the latter to such an extent that in this, as in many other recorded cases, we may say that the conquerors were themselves conquered in turn. For, it was inevitable that the more ambitious amongst the Brāhmaṇas, finding so little scope for the display of their powers in the fold of Brāhmaṇism itself, should become converts to Buddhism and endeavour to influence Buddhistic Metaphysics and Buddhistic Church-practice by importing therein several dogmas and practices of Brāhmaṇism, not always caring even to disguise them by a change in details and nomenclature. Of course it is only what is expected to happen during this process of the Brāhmaṇising of Buddhism that Buddhism itself in turn helped to round off many an angularity of Brāhmaṇism itself, with the result that the Vedic ritual of the sacrifice was

* The true cause of this success of Buddhism over Brāhmaṇism was its development of the remarkable institution of the "Saṁgha" or the corporate body of the Buddha's followers, which did for the monks (and the laity) what the Brāhmaṇic *cāturvarṇyavyavasthā* was intended to achieve for the adherents of the Vedic religion. The day of the greatest glory of Buddhism came with its recognition as a State religion by Aśoka, who sent missionaries for its propagation in the distant Ceylon, in Central Asia, and in the several bordering Græco-Persion states. When Buddhism could convert the outsiders, it is no wonder if its proselytising became equally successful againt Brāhmaṇism.

purged of several of its grosser features (such as the reckless destruction of animal life) which had provoked for generations the attacks of its 'heretic' opponents, and became transformed into a practical ethical system, such as the Gītā and the earliest forms the "Sūtra-activity" had always aspired to bring into existence. The way this great socio-religious transformation took place is a subject that may profitably enlist the energies of the student of the genesis and evolution of social and religious institutions. But we cannot stop here to follow it up in howsoever brief a manner and exhibit the transformation of the old "Śrauta Religion" into what we may, for want of an apter name, call "Paurāṇic Hinduism." The second or the "Sarva-śākhīya" recension of the Brahma-sūtras, dating from the couple of centuries anterior to the Christian era,* belongs to this stage; and such features of this recension as the attempt to harmonize and unify the teachings of all the Sākhās and schools, to oppose the "unorthodox" interpretations put upon the words of the Veda by the "Sāṁkhyas," who had by this time seceded from Brāhmaṇism and became atheistic, or to strengthen the desired conclusions by quoting the "Smṛtis," can now, in view of what has been stated above, find their most natural explanation. While on the one hand these and the other similar features may be taken to constitute evidence for the growth of a feeling of social and religious solidarity in the ranks of Brāhmaṇism, they may on the other hand be regarded as testifying to a *pro tanto* enfeebling in the hostile camp consequent upon the infiltration into Buddhism—in the manner above indicated—of the numerous ideas† characteristic

* The earlier of the Purāṇas are generally assigned to this period.

† We have already alluded to the report (page 104, above) as to the Mahāyāna borrowing its characteristic ideas of *bhakti* and *lokasaṁgraha* from Brāhmaṇic philosophy. Even a mere superficial acquaintance with Mahāyānism is enough to show how the Vedic gods had filled the Buddhistic pantheon almost to overcrowding; and what holds true of the gods must have been *ipso facto* true of social customs and religious practice.

of Brāhmaṇism. Political power was also changing hands synchronously, as evidenced by the exploits of the General Puṣyamitra and his followers, Puṣyamitra's belated attempt to restore the old-world Śrauta Religion to its pristine glory only proving that "Vedism" was still—as in fact it always has been down to present times—a good horse for the show, but unfitted for the average daily use of the masses. Following close upon the second recension of the Brahmasūtras came the third with its characteristic controversial features, which were designed to follow up the above indicated achievements of the second recension by delivering what was no doubt intended to be the last crushing blow to the opponent on his own grounds.

The above discussion concerning the probable textual evolution of the extant Brahmasūtras gives us the correct perspective for setting forth their philosophical tenets by themselves and independently of the confusing interpretations and special pleadings of the several Bhāṣyakāras. Such an examination and re-interpretation of the Brahmasūtras need not be put down as impossible. And it would probably be agreed to, much more readily in the case of the Brahmasūtras than perhaps in the case of the Bhagavadgītā, that the author of the latest "saṁskaraṇa" or revision of the Sūtras was a synthetic philosopher of no mean calibre, who had definite and pronounced views on certain fundamental philosophical problems, but allowed some option or latitude as regards minor questions of detail. Another point that is worth noting is that in the case of the Bhagavadgītā—whatever the formula that we adopt to explain its successive transformations—there took place a presumptive syncretism of view-points *initially divergent*. This need not necessarily have been the case with the Brahmasūtras. The author of the *pratiśākhīya*, the *sarvaśākhīya*, and the extant recensions of the Sūtrapāṭha may well have belonged to a school or to a line of thinkers that agreed more than they differed

on at any rate the fundamental issues involved. Hence we need not be surprised if, in trying to arrive at the philosophical stand-point of the Brahmasūtras in the form in which we have them before us, we do after all approach, as nearly as it may be feasible at this date, the philosophy propounded by Jaimini* in his original Śārīraka-sūtra written for the Upaniṣads of the Sāmaveda.

We will begin our discussion of the philosophy of the Brahmasūtras in the Indian fashion by first of all determining the proper *adhikārins* or qualified disciples for its study. Bādarāyaṇa and Jaimini are agreed in excluding infra-human species—plants and animals—from the privilege, for the obvious reason that these cannot entertain desires for heaven or for salvation. As to beings higher than men—sages and gods—there prevails a difference of opinion. Jaimini argues † that as the gods (such as Indra, etc.) cannot themselves engage in rites intended for themselves, they ought to be excluded from the right to perform Vedic sacrifices. Bādarāyaṇa thinks that as far as the knowledge of Brahman is concerned the gods are in the same boat as the men, only slightly better favoured. They are what he calls *ādhikārikas* or beings with a higher cosmic duty assigned to them; and they can undergo the life of discipline and meditation required in a student of Brahman. From the philosophical position taken on this question by Bādarāyaṇa one is led to expect that he would acknowledge the right of all the four castes for

* It is quite conceivable that the ultimate philosophical precipitate that we have in this process to attribute to Jaimini ill accords with the definite views on specific points that we usually attribute to the author of the Pūrvamīmāṅsā Sūtras. But that is because these latter Sūtras have not been yet critically studied from the point of view of vocabulary inter-quotations and the like. Nor have we any real right to attribute to Jaimini all the views that we find expounded in the Śābarabhāṣya.

† Brahmasūtra I. iii. 31, where Jaimini is quoted by name. In the Pūrvamīmāṅsā there is no Sūtra to this effect, but the argument is made use of by Śabara in VI. i. 4f.

seeking salvation through knowledge of Brahman, including the Śūdras; but on that social or ethnic issue both Jaimini (VI. i. 25–38) and Bādarāyaṇa (I. iii. 34–38) seem to be at one. The right of women (of the three upper castes) is admitted by both. It would accordingly seem that the knowledge of Brahman was regarded, like the Vedic sacraments, as the preserve of the higher castes, which in itself would imply that the Pūrva and the Uttara Mīmāṅsā were understood as constituting *one śāstra*. This is a point on which Śaṅkarācārya, as we will have an occasion to note later, holds an opinion which differs from not only that of the other Bhāṣyakāras but also of some of the earlier commentators of his own school, the discussion turning upon, and being smuggled in connection with, the proper force of the word *Atha* with which the first of the Brahmasūtras commences. — We may note here in passing that the full rights of the Śūdras for God-realisation were admitted only in the doctrine of Bhakti, on which the Gītā, as we have seen, lays far more emphasis than on the "Sāṁkhya" path of the Avyakta-upāsanā, from which the lower castes were excluded.

Next we take up the discussion of the ultimate "Pramāṇas" or authoritative Sources of Knowledge recognised by the Vedānta. Jaimini devotes specifically for the discussion of this topic the third pāda of the first Chapter, where he, as was to be expected, gives to Śruti or Veda precedence over all the other sources of correct knowledge. Jaimini's inquiry however was limited in scope. He did not attempt to determine what the sources were of valid knowledge generally, but rather to find out what authorities were trustworthy guides for regulating human conduct. Jaimini, in other words, was not seeking to determine the nature of what already existed (*pariniṣṭhita vastu*), but of what was to be brought into existence by human activity (*anuṣṭheya vastu*). In the Vedānta the inquiry was after the Real which, *prima facie*, could be the object of ordinary means of know-

ledge. But because the Real that is sought to be determined in the Vedānta is an absolute and supra-sensuous entity, the Sūtrakāra declares that Śruti is the only source of knowledge for the "Brahman" (II. i. 27), and that there remains no scope in it for inference (II. i. 18), or for perception, unless it is of the nature of a supra-sensuous intuition induced by Yogic discipline (cp. IV. i. 7ff., IV. iv. 1, 15, etc.). At the same time, however, because the exact meaning and intention of a Śruti has to be determined after a very careful process of excogitation, during which the various canons of interpretation arrived at by the Pūrvamīmāṅsā * have to be brought into operation, and particularly in view of the fact that as regards the exact sense of a given Scriptural text considerable divergence of opinion prevails even amongst

* The Vedāntasūtras exhibit a thorough acquaintance with the Mīmāṅsā rules of interpretation, frequently introducing the technical terms of the Mīmāṅsā in the sūtrapāṭha. Compare the use of words like anvaya, apūrva, abhyāsa, arthavāda, upasaṁhāra, codanā, prakaraṇa, liṅga, vidhiśeṣa, etc.; also sūtras like III. iii. 44 or 49 which discuss the relative authoritativeness of śruti, liṅga, prakaraṇa, etc. (comp. Mīm. Sūtra III. iii. 13). The Vedāntasūtras also frequently use Mīmāṅsā dṛṣṭāntas, amongst which we may enumerate— Dvādaśāhavat (IV. iv. 12), Dhāraṇavat (III. iv. 20), Kratuvat (III. iii. 57), Pradānavat (III. iii. 43), Aupasadavat (III. iii. 33), Kuśāchandastutyupagānavat (III. iii. 26) and others. As these illustrations bear witness to the Sūtrakāra's familiarity with the technical details of Mīmāṅsā, so there are others (e. g. Mahaddīrghavat (II. ii. 11); Kṣīravat (II. i. 24), Puruṣāśmavat (II. ii. 5), Payombuvat (II. ii. 3), Mahadvat (I. iv. 7, etc.), that testify to his knowledge of other philosophical schools, while there are several other illustrations besides, which are taken from common everyday events and experience. Amongst the latter may be cited, vyomavat (I. ii. 7), paṭavat (II. i. 19), tṛṇādivat (II. ii. 5), candanavat (II. iii. 23), puṁstvādivat (II. iii. 31), yathā takṣā (II. iii. 40), sūryakādivat (III. ii. 18), ahikuṇḍalavat (III. ii. 27), aśvavat (III. iv. 26), pradīpavat (IV. iv. 15), etc. The large range and variety of these testifies to the Sūtrakāra's anxiety to make the conclusions of the Śruti, even on supra-sensuous matters, comprehensible to the lay mind by the use of familiar analogies.

the followers of one and the same school — due of course to varying powers of analytic and discursive reasoning — the ultimate bed-rock foundation of truth on which even the validity of specific *interpretations* of the Śruti is to depend is the *anubhava* or the intuitive perception of the disciplined Seer, with this proviso that what such a Seer apperceives is what ought to be deducible as the direct intention of Śruti texts; for otherwise the door would be flung open for all heretic and even lunatic intuitions and other spacious half-truths that may mislead the unwary.

Certain peculiarities of the Sūtrakāra's style and method of argumentation may be briefly indicated here as bearing upon the topic before us. The Sūtrakāra refers to the Veda by using words like Āmanana, Āmnāna, Upaniṣad, Darśana, Nigada, Nigama, Pratyakṣa, Mantravarṇa, and Śāstra; or śāsti, adhīyate, āmananti, and uktam — the differences in Vedic śākhās being referred to by ubhaye, eke, ekeṣām, and itareṣām. Where actual Vedic texts are to be cited, that is done by quoting the most important or significant word (e. g., Vāmadeva, camasa, Vaiśvānara, Bhūmā, Caitraratha, ārambhaṇa, setu, Ānandamaya, guhām praviṣṭau, Antaryāmī, priyaśirastva, parovarīyastva, etc.). At times, somewhat unaccountably, the Sūtrakāra paraphrases the original word, as when he uses caraṇa for pāda (I. i. 24), bhū for prithivī (I. iii. 1) ambara for ākāśa (I. iii. 10), kampana for ejati (I. iii. 39), abhidhyā for √kāmaya or √īkṣa (I. iv. 24), abda for saṁvatsara (IV. iii. 2), etc. The reason here may have been the Sūtrakāra's partiality for rare words and phrases, or even a deliberate attempt at obscurity, as suggested by Deussen, assuming that the commentators are right in identifying the specific passages intended by the Sūtrakāra.

It is worth noting in this connection that the Sūtrakāra, while discussing opposed systems of philosophy, takes the trouble to use their own technical terms, as when he

speaks of Puruṣa, pravṛtti, and aṅgitva while discussing the Sāṁkhya view; samudāya, pratyaya, nirodha, bhāva, kṣaṇikatva, pratisaṁkhyā, apratisaṁkhyā, etc. while dealing with the Buddhistic systems; samavāya and parimaṇḍala while discussing the Vaiśeṣika theory; and so on. There are present also, besides, a number of general philosophical terms such as—atireka, adhiṣṭhāna, anapekṣatva, anavasthiti, anupalabdhi, anumāna, anuśaya, apyaya, aprāpti, abhivyakti, arthasāmānya, avadhṛti, avasthiti, aviśeṣa, asambhava, āpatti, upakrama, upādāna, karaṇa, kāraṇa, kārya, guṇa, pariṇāma, prakṛti, pratipatti, pratyakṣa, prasakti, prāpti, vikaraṇa, vikaraṇatva, vikāra, viśeṣa, viśeṣaṇa, viśeṣya, vailakṣaṇya, vyāpāra, vyāpti, sampatti, sāpekṣatva, etc. This shows that the age of the Sūtrakāra was one quite familiar with philosophical reasoning on all manner of problems: logical, ethical, or metaphysical: so that it would not be correct to say—as it has been done by some scholars—that after the age of the Upaniṣads there was no attempt at philosophical systematisation in the Vedāntic schools prior to the advent of the Gauḍapādīya-kārikās.

A point of interest in connection with the philosophical style of the Sūtrakāra is his dialectics, or mode of arguing and refutation. It was of course natural that where the problem was purely exegetical the Sūtrakāra should have adopted the strictly Mīmāṁsā methods with their emphasis upon confirmatory Scriptural statements, upon significant features like the beginning, the ending, the repetition, the novelty, the promise of fruits, and glorificatory and expository statements, as also upon the other approved canons of interpretation, illustrations of which are to be found practically in every adhikaraṇa. When dealing, however, with opponents (like the Bauddhas, the Jainas, or even the Vaiśeṣikas) who did not recognise, or gave more or less a subsidiary position to, the Veda, the Sūtrakāra confines the battle within the limits of reasoning almost exclusively, one of the

usual grounds of refutation being self-inconsistency. Compare II. ii. 10, II. ii. 13, II. ii. 21, II. ii. 45, etc. The Sūtrakāra also tries to bring home the inadequacy of the proposed theory to meet the unnoticed complicacies of the actual problem, in illustration of which we may refer to II. ii. 1, II. ii. 3, II. ii. 15, II. ii. 20, II. ii. 25, II. ii. 29, II. ii. 34, 36, II. ii. 38, 39, II. ii. 43, etc. Yet another feature of the Sūtrakāra's dialectics is what may be called "the proof by exhaustion," by showing, in other words, that every one of the several alternatives conceivable in the case is untenable as leading to some illogical or unpropitious consequences (aniṣṭa-prāpti or prasakti). This was quite a favoured mode of argumentation with the Buddhistic dialecticians, who, proceeding by rigorous dichotomy, made sure that the alternatives discussed were really exhaustive and left no loop-hole for a *tertium quid* between the proposed alternatives. This assumed a four-membered form like A is B, A is not B, A both is and is not B, and A neither is nor is not B. The nearest approach to this in the Sūtrapāṭha is II. i. 26, II. ii. 12, 23, II. iii. 22, III. iii. 29, and II. iii. 32. Elsewhere the method followed is less rigorous. We have already seen (p. 87 above) that the method originated in the pre-Buddhistic period.

As regards the formal fallacies of logic, the Sūtrakāra makes the absence or the inadequacy of a dṛṣṭānta or illustrative case (e, g., II. i. 9, II, ii. 5, 29, etc.), the negation of the basic hypothesis (pratijñā-hāni, e. g., II. ii. 21, II, iii. 6, etc.), the regressus in infinitum (e. g., II. ii. 13, also II. i. 11 and II. i. 35), and svapakṣa-doṣa or inability to solve the same difficulties in one's own system for which you take the opponent to task (e. g., II. i. 10, 29, etc.) as valid grounds of refutation, besides of course the purely Mīmāṅsā grounds of prakaraṇa-bheda (III. iii. 9), vākya-bheda (III. iv. 24), prayojanâbhāva (III. iii. 14), and the like. The Sūtrakāra aims at giving for each Scriptural passage its widest and most direct connotation as far as possible, although in not

a few cases he is constrained to offer only a secondary or figurative sense to certain texts (cp. II. iii. 16, III. i. 4, 7, etc.). The Sūtrakāra summous not only the aid of the Smṛtis and views of the wise or Śiṣṭas, as is natural, to support his interpretation, but seems evidently happy when he can cite an every-day illustration to support his thesis.

Proceeding to an account of the philosophical views of the Sūtrakāra as they stand forth by a study of the vocabulary of the Sūtras alone, and irrespective of the specific interpretations of the Bhāṣyakāras (who every one of them brings an axe of his own to grind), we have to remark in the first place that the Sūtrakāra declares unhesitatingly the Brahman to be the cause of the origin, subsistence and dissolution of the world (I. i. 1), cause both material and and instrumental (I. iv. 23), the Brahman having created the world—even though it exhibits qualities divergent from those of the cause (II. i. 4)—from out of itself, unaided by any extraneous means (II. i. 24), by the process of *pariṇāma* or progressive modification (I. iv. 26). The world so created is not a new something coming into existence out of an absolutely non-existent state; it can be said in some sense already to exist and be immanent in the cause (II. i. 16), forming no independent entity from it (II. i. 7), and yet not contaminating or diversifying the nature of the cause even when it endures, in the condition of Dissolution, undistinguishably absorbed within it (II. i. 8-9). The order of creation as established by the concurrent testimony of the Scriptural texts interpreted one in the light, and with the help, of the other is: Ether—Wind—Heat—Waters—Earth: the Brahman at each stage entering the successive products and enabling them to be the causes of the next successive products in the series (II. iii. 13). The creation of the Buddhi, Mind, and other Indriyas is to be placed in between the creation of the Bhūtas (II. iii. 15), the Sūtrakāra not showing sufficient interest in determining their exact order, nor in following the further

process of the creation coming after the five great Elements.* As at each step of the creation the Creator exercises a specific 'seeing' or 'meditation' or 'tapas' (cp. I. i. 5, I. iv. 24, II. iii. 13), and as, presumably, the contents of this meditation must have a relation to the object that is to result therefrom, we can understand why the various created objects differ from one another in nature and functions, and yet how they can be said to issue from a common and unitary source of origin, undifferentiated in nature. † From this point of view the creation can be said to be an idealistic one affording an analogy with the individual soul's dream-creations (cp. III. ii. 1–6). And just as we would be ready to invest our dreams with an objective reality if a group of individuals were to dream at one and the same time of one and the same object, in exactly the same fashion, the world-creation, which is idealistic with reference to the Creator, does come to have a sort of an objectivity imposed upon it when the various individual souls—who are the parts of the Creator like so many sparks issuing from the central fire (II. iii. 43)—come into a perceptual relation with the same. It is in this sense that the Vedāntic view of creation can be said to be neither entirely idealistic, as that of the Vijñānavāda Buddhists, nor again frankly realistic, like that of the Dualistic Sāṁkhyas or the Materialistic Cārvākas.‡ — The process of world-dissolution, we are told, follows the order of world-creation inversed; and that the Creator, as the inward Controller (antaryāmin, I. ii. 18), is both immanent in the creation and also transcendent

* It would probably be worked out along the method of "trivṛt-karaṇa" accepted by the Sūtrakāra in II. iv. 20 and II. iv 22.

† As a concession to human understanding the Sūtrakāra is prepared to take the creative process out of the category of Time by declaring it to be without any beginning in Time (II. i. 35).

‡ The full-fledged doctrine of Māyā is implicit and can be logically deduced from the premises. But the Sūtrakāra has not made the deduction, and quotes views (I. iv. 20–22) on either side of the thesis.

and yet retaining His own unitary and impartite nature (II. i. 26 f.) follows first because the Scriptures so declare it, and secondly because it is impossible to make the ordinary logical categories of sense applicable to transcendental entities (II. ii. 11). The Creator has no ulterior object to serve through His cosmogenic activity (II. ii. 33 f.). He voluntarily allows His own cosmic dispensation to be governed by the Law of Karman (II. i. 34, II. iii. 42, and III. ii. 38). The Sūtrakāra's metaphysics is in short a clever combination of monism and pluralism; of idealism and realism; of pantheism as well as transcendentalism; and of evolution sa well as freedom of the will. And although he has at times yielded to the temptation of following the convenient maxim of *credo quia impossible,* his sturdy common-sense almost as often prevails and makes him seek a justification for the articles of his faith in reason and experience.

The Sūtrakāra's doctrine as to the nature and functions of the individual soul seems also to be definite and clear. The soul is distinct from intellect, mind, sense-organs, and life-breaths; as also from both the gross physical body and the subtle transmigrating body conceived as a totality (cp. II. iii. 15, II. iii. 30, II. iii. 32, II. iv. 1, II. iv. 17, IV. ii. 10, etc.). He is minute in size* (II. iii. 21), has his abode in the heart (II. iii. 24, I. iii. 14, etc.), where he dwells along with the Lord the Creator (I. ii. 11), from whom he is a distinct entity (I. i. 16, 17, 21, I. ii. 3, 17, 22, I. iii. 5, 18, 20, II. i. 21f., III. ii 5), but is nevertheless related to Him like the drop to the ocean or the sparks to the fire. As the soul's essence is identical with that of Brahman, there is no creation of the soul as such (II. iii. 17). The soul is immortal and liable to transmigrations from life to life (II. iii. 19, III. i. 1, III. i. 13) until he is able to win his salvation through proper knowledge and discipline. During life the soul is subject to the three states of waking, dreaming, and sound-sleep, in the last

* See, however, p. 160f. below.

of which he enters the *nāḍīs* (III. ii. 7) and thus cuts himself off from conscious experiences of both the waking and the dreaming states, and becomes, for the time, funded back into the Absolute Brahman, from whence he re-emerges at the awakening. Details about the gradual process of death and of the *post-mortem* career of the soul are also discussed (IV. ii and iii) in reliance upon the Pañcâgni-vidyā and the other eschatological texts from the Upaniṣads.

While the characteristics of the soul so far enumerated are acceptable to almost all the Vedāntic schools, there are others regarding which a difference of views prevails, and may possibly have prevailed also in the time of the Sūtrakāra himself. The data for determining the issues involved come from that portion of the Sūtrapāṭha—the "Tvam-padārtha-vivecana" in II. iii—which is placed under the suspicion of being a later addition, and hence it is somewhat difficult to make positive statements in the matter. The following issues form the bone of contention. (i) What is the size of the individual soul, atomic or all-pervasive (II. iii. 19–32)? (ii) Does the function of the agent belong to the individual soul, and if so, with what limitations (II. iii. 33–42)? (iii) What is the relation of the individual soul to the Absolute Brahman (II. iii. 43–53)? Lastly (iv), does the function of knowing belong to the individual soul, and if so, in what precise significance (II. iii. 18)? Now, as regards the first issue, it should seem evident that since the Sūtrakāra has refuted the doctrine of Atomism as put forth by the Vaiśeṣikas, the *aṇutva* that forms the subject of the discussion cannot be understood in the technical Vaiśeṣika sense. In other words *aṇutva* cannot connote *nityatva* or eternality; or, what is the same thing, the individual soul's atomic size need not be associated with him for all time, but that it can be destroyed or replaced by *vibhutva* or the all-pervading nature, as is in fact plainly asserted in Śvetāśvatara V. 9. From the point of view of the ordinary *vyavahāra* there is

nothing wrong in declaring the soul to be of atomic size, but we cannot follow Rāmānuja and others in holding that even in the liberated condition the soul would retain that size. As the diversified contents of the human mind in the waking as well as dreaming conditions need not involve a pluralism of the thinking agency as such, and as even this variety and manifoldness—real as long as it lasts—can be sublated in the states of sound-sleep or Yogic concentration, in exactly the same manner the aṇutva and other limiting adjuncts of the soul—real as long as the soul retains his individuality—can disappear in the condition of Mukti or liberation, as also during periodic Pralayas or world-dissolutions, without leaving any trace behind. Sūtras II. iii. 19–28 declaring the atomic size of the soul, which Śaṅkarācārya regards as stating the *prima facie* or Pūrvapakṣa view, may in the light of the above explanation, be regarded as the Siddhānta or the final doctrine, provided we are prepared to partially modify it by the conclusions of the Sūtras 29–32 (whatever they be), as is evident from the presence of the word *tu* in Sūtra 29. This important Sūtra reads—*Tad-guṇa-sāratvāt tu tad-vyapadeśaḥ prājñavat.* The Sūtra evidently meets an objection, and normally it is to be expected that the objection would be actually stated in one of the immediately preceding Sūtras of this sufficiently long and detailed adhikaraṇa. This Rāmānuja is not able to show. He introduces in this Sūtra the issue as to whether the soul is *vijñānasvarūpa* or *vijñānâśraya*, an issue already dealt with in Sūtra II. iii. 19 and separated from the present Sūtra by the whole discussion of the size of the individual soul. Śaṅkara's rendering of the Sūtra (buddhyādyupādhiguṇasāratvāt aṇutvavyapadeśaḥ) is no doubt open to the several objections raised by Thibaut and others. As far as the interpretation of Sūtra 29 goes, Nimbārka, Vallabha and even Madhva agree. The Sūtra according to them explains why, in spite of the aṇutva of the soul, he could be spoken of as one with Brahman, because the essential nature of the two

is alike. The simile in the Sūtra (prājñavat) is not unfortunately satisfactorily explained by any of the Bhāṣyakāras. Why not take prājña here to mean what it means in ordinary usage, the wise man? Why must we take prājña = Brahman? A wise man in ordinary parlance is called a wise man in spite of the fact that once in a while he may be led into an action not absolutely wise. The majority of his actions are wise, and so he is called wise: "Vaiśeṣyāt tu tadvādaḥ." The same applies to the aṇutva, which is easily outbalanced by the numerous other essential characteristics in which the Individual and the Supreme Souls agree. In case, however, some were still to argue that the aṇutva constitutes a very vital difference, they could be easily silenced by the next Sūtra which, in my opinion, should mean that the individual soul retains its aṇutva (and other limitations) only as long as he retains his individuality: *sa cânantyāya kalpate* (Śv. Up. v. 9). Subject to this modification the atomic size of the soul may be regarded as real. As to the next issue, inasmuch as the Sūtrakāra had refuted the Sāṁkhya view of the activism of the inert Pradhāna, he must be supposed to have assigned that nature to the conscious Ātman or Soul. All the Bhāṣyakāras, including Śaṅkara, are practically agreed on this point, and consequently on their general interpretation of Sūtras II. iii. 33–39. But Sūtra 40, which brings in the illustration of the takṣā (wood-cutter or carpenter) to explain the activistic aspect of the soul, is not quite satisfactorily explained by any of them. The word *ubhayathā* (both-wise) in the Sūtra cannot mean, with Vallabha, 'kartṛtva' and 'bhoktṛtva;' nor, with Madhva, 'svârtha-' and 'parârtha-' kartṛtva; nor yet again, with Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, the 'kādācitkatva' or the occasionalness of activism. All these interpretations introduce an idea which is extrinsic to the actual wording of the Sūtra. I propose the following explanation, which brings the Sūtrakāra's views on the subject in a line with his general philosophical stand-point as set forth

above. The soul's activity is like the activity of the wood-cutter, which ceases the moment the wood to be cut becomes exhausted. Hence the soul has both pravṛtti and nivṛtti, activity and no-activity. In the condition of liberation the soul accordingly rids himself of both the aṇutva (as pointed out above) and the kartṛtva. That this activity of the soul, so long as it endures, is controlled by the Supreme Soul is declared in Sūtras 41–42, and herein all are agreed. The next issue as to the relation of the Individual to the Absolute need not present much difficulty after what has been urged hitherto. The individual soul, so long as he retains his individuality, is an aṁśa or part of Brahman in the direct sense of the term, on the understanding of course that in the state of liberation he becomes one with the Brahman, also understanding this oneness in an equally direct sense,—any apparent physical or logical contradiction involved in the conception being resolved by the *ultima ratio* of an appeal to the Śruti as well as to the corroborative testimony of the intuitions of the Seers. Sūtra 46 tells us that the Absolute is not affected by the taints and limitations of its aṁśas even though these remain united in him; and conversely, Sūtra 48 tells us that these individual aṁśas may be subjected (so long as they remain unliberated) to their own respective adjuncts, limitations, prescriptions and prohibitions, in spite of their oneness with the Absolute, just as we can speak of one lamp being dimmer or brighter than another, and even of its being lighted and extinguished, although they are all one when looked upon *qua* light.* In ordinary vyavahāra, says Sūtra 49, we never confuse one light with another (avyatikara), because we see so many distinct lamps and not one enmassed light-substance (asaṁtateḥ). The individual lamps are but so many forms or appearances or aspects of "light,"

* I suggest here a newer and more natural way of understanding the simile.

real as long as they last.* To think of the souls as many and yet make each one of them all-pervading (as do the Vaiśeṣikas and the Sāṁkhyas) would lead to confusion of rewards and punishments, since all the souls would be equally in contact with all the adṛṣṭas. The theory in fact would hardly explain even every-day perceptive and reflective acts, as no amount of ingenuity spent in postulating parts of what is *ex hypothesi* impartite and all-pervading would get over the difficulty of the all-pervading Soul including everything in the sweep of his contact.† The last issue, which is really the first in the order of the Sūtras (II. iii. 18), discusses the important problem as to whether the individual soul is the knower, and if so, what is the relation between the knowing soul and the knowledge. Now since the Sūtrakāra has taken his stand against the Sāṁkhya view which assigns all conative and cognitive functions to the inert Pradhāna, it is evident that he must in his own system assign these functions to the soul. For if the soul is not to know, how is he to secure salvation which comes of knowledge? At the same time, if the knowledge is to be an adventitious quality of the soul, how are we to conceive of the soul as a substance in which the quality of knowledge is to inhere? We must recall that the Sūtrakāra has rejected (II. ii. 13) the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of Samavāya. Consequently he cannot be party to any theory in which the Dharma and the Dharmin, the substance and its quality, are regarded as two entities to be brought into relation, permanently or temporarily, by a third something. The only way out would be to regard the knowledge and the knower as ultimately identical; and it seems to me that the Sūtrakāra must be held to be subscribing to

* I prefer here the interpretation of Śaṅkara and Vallabha to that of Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, who take "ābhāsa" to mean "hetvâbhāsa" or fallacy, which is quite improbable.

† It will be seen that, in the interpretation of Sūtras II. iii. 51-53, I generally follow Vallabha.

some such view when he characterises the soul as "jñaḥ" and not "jñātā," as he could very easily have done on the analogy of the word "kartā" in Sūtra II. iii. 33. Such a view would accord with the ordinary experience of knowledge and of Yogic meditation, wherein the consciousness of the knowing agent as such is lost in a wrapt contemplation of the object of knowledge, within which the knower finds his individuality submerged for the time. However impossible or illogical this may appear to a dualistic consciousness, there is the universal experience to vouchsafe for it, as also the word of the Scripture in passages like Bṛhad. II. 4. 14, and elsewhere. And the view would be not inconsistent with the other conclusions about the nature of the Individual Soul which we have hitherto found it possible to ascribe to the Sūtrakāra.

How does the Sūtrakāra understand the nature of the Absolute with which the Individual Soul (as also the phenomenal world) becomes identified, partially and temporarily in deep sleep, trance and Yogic meditation, and completely and permanently at liberation? This question is much more difficult to answer than the other question as to the nature of the Individual Soul; but it is necessary, and in my opinion not altogether impossible, to answer both from a philosophically consistent view-point. The crucial Sūtra discussing the issue is III. ii. 11, which reads: *Na sthānato 'pi Parasya ubhaya-liṅgaṁ sarvatra hi.* Śaṅkara expands it thus — Na sthānato [pṛthivyâdyupādhibhedato] 'pi Parasya ubhaya-liṅgam; sarvatra hi [anubhaya-liṅgaṁ varṇyate], —which leads to the conclusion that the undifferentiated nature of Brahman is the only ultimate truth. Rāmānuja takes it as follows—Na sthānato [hṛdayâyataneṣv avasthānato] 'pi Parasya [āyatanadoṣa-saṁsargaḥ]; [tasya] ubhayaliṅgam (i. e. doṣâbhāvaḥ and guṇavattvam) sarvatra hi [varṇyate],—which not only raises a question already disposed of by Rāmānuja under sūtras II. i. 8 and 13, but also

fails to offer an adequate opposition between the two terms included under the word "ubhaya." Vallabha paraphrases "ubhaya-lingatva" by "jaḍa-jīva-dharmavattva" and supplies "Bhagavatsvarūpeṇa varṇanam" to complete the new sentence beginning with "sarvatra hi." Even this explanation is not very satisfactory, and fails to bring out the full force of "api," as also perhaps of the opposition that is implied in "ubhaya." None of the other Bhāṣyakāras offers, as far as I can see, any independent and convincing interpretation. Now, in sūtra 12 it seems clear that "atat" should mean "abheda." Rāmānuja and Nimbārka get the sense desired by them only by omitting the important word "na" in the Sūtra. So also in Sūtra 14 "tat" should refer to "arūpavat." Rāmānuja's way of explaining this Sūtra is altogether unsatisfactory. These three are the really crucial Sūtras, and I propose interpreting them anew so as to make the Sūtrakāra agree in admitting *both* the *saviśeṣa* and the *nirviśeṣa* aspects of Brahman as real, although the palm of superiority has to be assigned to the latter.* The word "sthāna" in Sūtra 11 has, I think, to be understood in conformity with the context of the Upaniṣadic passage which is selected for discussion in the present and the preceding adhikaraṇas, and which seems to speak of the states of dreaming, sound-sleep and waking as the three "sthānas" of the soul : comp. Bṛhad. (IV. iii. 9)—Saṁdhyaṁ tṛtīyaṁ svapnasthānam ; Chān. (V. 10. 8)—Etat tṛtīyaṁ sthānam. Out of these three "sthānas" the Supreme Soul is associated with qualities and attributes in the states of waking and dream, but with none of them in sound-sleep. Hence the presumption is that the Supreme Soul has "ubhaya liṅgas" or both aspects *in reality.* To this the Sūtra III. ii. 11 gives a direct negative. The word "Na" in the Sūtra must be connected with "ubhayaliṅgam." To put a full stop after "Na sthānato 'pi" would

* Bhartṛprapañca seems to have held a view not much differing from the above.

require the supplying of the predicate, while the earlier Sūtras do not throw any hint as to what that predicate can be. And having once denied the absolute reality of the "ubhaya liṅgam," it is obvious that the statement beginning with "sarvatra hi" and giving the cause of the preceding denial can only be interpreted in the manner of Śaṅkara. In Sūtra 12 we are next told that the eka-rūpatva or unitary and impartite nature of the Highest Self, as concluded from Sūtra 11, cannot be upset by Scriptural statements about the difference (between the Individual and the Absolute Self), because, wherever such statements are made, the texts are careful to emphasize the "atat" or the non-difference as the *ultimate* truth. The "rūpavat" or qualitative description of the Highest Self, wherever it occurs, is subordinate to the "arūpa" or negative description, which is the primary intention of the Śruti.* The sarūpa forms have a purpose of their own, just as a second light lighted from the first—although *qua* light they are both of them exactly alike—may serve the purpose of illumination (in a different room). The lamps, as lights, constitute just one essence: are light pure and simple: just as the Brahman is ultimately describable only as the "mere That" (tanmātram, Sūtra 19). The rest of the adhikaraṇa does not offer any serious difficulties.† We would be accordingly justified in concluding that, just as in the case of the individual soul, so also in the case of the qualified aspect of

* If "arūpavad" is understood as predicated of Brahman (the subject), then "tat" cannot be the word intended to refer to Brahman; we should expect "sva" instead. This point is ignored by Vallabha.

† The "sūryaka" simile in Sūtra 18, it may be noted in passing, is perhaps capable of a slightly different explanation than the traditional one about the reflected sun-images in water. Formed on the analogy of the word *candraka*, the word may denote the little globules of light that we notice under the tree when the rays of the sun penetrate its thick foliage. The fluctuating no light ringlets that seem to divide the mass of light into so many separate lights, are like the more familiar ghaṭākāśa and the maṭhākāśa divisions of the all-pervading Ākāśa.

the Absolute, the Sūtrakāra is prepared to concede its real character in view of the purposes such as upāsana that hang upon it. But the very object of the upāsana (for which the postulate of the saviśeṣa aspect is required) is to achieve an identity of essence between the upāsya and the upāsaka or the object and the agent of enrapt-meditation, so that from that ultimate point of view the arūpa or nirviśeṣa aspect of Reality can be the sole and the exclusive truth.

It is worth noting in this connection that in Sūtras 27, 28 and 29 the Sūtrakāra seems to admit the possibility of two or three alternative views akin more or less to the cognate views similarly set forth in I. iv. 20–22, where they were said to belong respectively to Āśmarathya, Auḍulomi, and Kāśakṛtsna. Āśmarathya held the souls to be the aṁśas or "parts" of the Absolute, like sparks of the fire, and may be said to have allowed a 25 per cent. reality to the Bheda. On the question of the saviśeṣa or nirviśeṣa character of the Brahman a view philosophically akin to the above is that in Sūtra III. ii. 27. Auḍulomi is prepared to concede a parallel reality to both the Bheda and the Abheda,* the illustration of the river, sand, ocean, or the coiled and extended forms of the serpent (III. ii. 27) being adduced in support. Kāśakṛtsna attributes the Bheda as due to the avidyā or nescience† ; and inasmuch as the view occurs last in both the places, there is some little justification perhaps for regarding that view as the Ācārya-mata, the other two being just Ekadeśi-matas. Very likely, however, the Sūtrākara may have been content to allow the matter to be adjudicated at the court of Sākṣātkāra or direct intuition.

* Bhāmatī quotes the following stanza as giving expression to this view:—

Ā mukter bheda eva syāj jīvasya ca Parasya ca ।
Muktasya tu na bhedo 'sti bhedahetor abhāvataḥ ॥

† The Prakāṣa on Vallabha's Aṇubhāṣya distinctly says that the view in III. ii. 29 belongs to Kāśakṛtsna.

The means prescribed and available to the Individual Soul for the achievement of this Sākṣātkāra are Yogic discipline and meditations. These latter are discussed in III. iii, and the treatment is mainly exegetic and not of much philosophical significance.* The same holds true of the discussion of the Yogic methods found in IV. ii. 1. A philosophically important issue is however raised in the fourth quarter of the third or Sādhana adhyāya. Assuming that Mokṣa or liberation is attainable by Sākṣātkāra or intuitive realisation of the Absolute, is the candidate for liberation required, both prior and subsequent to the attainment of the goal, to carry on his daily routine of prescribed ritual and conduct, or must he abjure it altogether? On this point, as may be readily gathered, a sharp difference of view prevails. Commentators on the Vedāntasūtras prior to Śaṅkarācārya—as for example Bhartṛprapañca†—held the view that Karman and Jñāna, action and knowledge, were like the two wings of the bird, both equally essential for flight—

> Dvābhyām eva hi pakṣābhyāṁ
> Yathā vai pakṣiṇāṁ gatiḥ ।
> Tathaiva jñāna-karmabhyām
> Prāpyate Brahma śāśvatam ॥ —Hāritasmṛti, vii. 11.

The wording of Sūtra III. iv. 26 — Sarvâpekṣā ca yajñādi-śruter aśvavat—is quite clear on the point at issue; and even Śaṅkara says—apekṣate ca vidyā sarvāṇi āśrama-karmāṇi: knowledge does stand in need of all the āśramic duties. But, the Ācārya hastens to add that they are required only upto a point, and not beyond that point. This qualification does not however follow from the wording of the Sūtra. It

* It will be recalled that the whole of the "Guṇopasaṁhāra" section has been assigned by us to the second stage of the Brahma-sūtra elaboration: see p. 143 above.

† For a succinct account of his views see Hiriyanna, Indian Antiquary, Vol. LIII, 1924, pp. 77-86; Report, Madras Oriental Conference, pp. 439-450.

also seems necessary to understand the simile of the horse given in the above Sūtra more or less differently. There appears to be no unity amongst the Bhāṣyakāras regarding the interpretation of this simile. Śaṅkara says—as the horse is yoked not to a plough, but only to a chariot, so āśramic duties are useful in the early stages of knowledge, and not for securing the ultimate fruit. Bhāskara's explantion is for the most part the same. Rāmānuja explains—as the horse carries the rider to the goal only on the condition that the rider for his own part girds up his loin and takes the mount, so knowledge leads to salvation provided it is auxiliarly supplemented by āśramic duties. Madhva points out that as the horse is useful on the highway, but never for actually entering into the house, even so is the Karman useful as a means, but is not needed when the ultimate goal is being reached. Vallabha's and Nimbārka's explanations are also similar. It is thus obvious that there was no settled tradition in the matter. I have just quoted above a stanza from the Hārītasmṛti. Immediately before it comes another:

Yathâśvā rathahīnāś ca
Rathāś câśvair vinā yathā ।
Evaṁ tapaś ca vidyā ca
Ubhauv api tapasvinaḥ ॥

—which would seem to bring out the implication of the "aśva" simile quite well. Bhāskara, in his commentary on Brahmasūtras III. iv. 20 and 26, argues the point at a considerable length and concludes—jñānakarmaṇor ekaprayojanatvād avirodhaḥ.* The fundamental Upaniṣadic text herein involved is the Īśa line—*Kurvann evêha karmāṇi* etc. Śaṅkara is somewhat inconsistent in his explanation of it. In his gloss on the Īśopaniṣad he considers the stanza as primarily applying to the candidate prior to the acquisition of knowledge, while in his Bhāṣya apud Brahmasūtra III. iv. 14 he refers the stanza to the man of knowledge, but understands

* "Knowledge and action have a common aim, and are not opposed."

the injunction to perform duties as merely laudatory or concessive, but not actually intended. It is quite possible of course that Śaṅkara's subordination of action to knowledge is philosophically self-consistent; but as far as the actual wording of the Brahmasūtras is concerned, it seems that the Sūtrakāra was willing to give scope to actions throughout.* The salvation may be the result of knowledge, but that knowledge does not necessarily imply an absolute renunciation of all activities: in fact, as Bhāskara argues (Bhāṣya, p. 206 and 209), such an absolute renunciation is not possible even for the parivrājaka (ascetic) or for any other *living* man. The renunciation of attachment to action, and of the egoistic conciousness about it, is possible, and ought to be aimed at: herein all are at one.

Finally, a few words about the Sūtrakāra's doctrine of salvation or Mukti. The "mythologizing" aspect of it, as involving a belief in the doctrines of transmigration, of the Devayāna and the Pitṛyāṇa Paths, and of the career of the Soul, under the lead of the "Man of Light," through successive Regions or Lokas on to the highest, the Brahmaloka: all that is a matter of Mīmāṅsā or self-consistent exegesis of the different and the apparently divergent Upaniṣadic texts. There are likewise various Upāsanas or meditative practices prescribed for the winning of the above Lokas; and the texts assure us that, while from the earlier and lower Lokas there may ensue a return to the World of Mortals under certain circumstances, once the Soul has gained the Highest Region

* A critically important textual matter may here be relegated to a foot-note. Sūtras III. iv. 18–24 which, according to Saṅkara, discuss the question as to whether saṁnyāsa is obligatory, cut off Sūtra 25 from its context. And as these intervening Sūtras ignore the explicit wording of the Jābālaśruti (see the concluding portion of Saṅkara's Bhāṣya on Sūtra 18) we would not be unjustified in concluding that these Sūtras constitute a later addition made by some champion of the "no-action" view. If so, the original view must have been opposed to it.

of Brahman,* "there is no return for ever more!" All these topics may here be safely ignored. There are however three philosophically vital questions that deserve to be discussed. First, having attained the Highest Region of Brahman, does the Soul retain his individual consciousness as such, and does he experience the joy of at-one-ment with the Highest? Secondly, must every candidate for Mukti rise through this prescribed ladder of ascending Lokas which culminates in the Brahmaloka, or is there any royal-road, any short-cut, to the process? And, thirdly, is this highest state of emancipation an exclusively post-mortem experience into which no vistas of any kind are available during the candidate's present mortal existence, or can such vistas be actually opened out—for howsoever brief periods—to the qualified few even before they have shuffled off their mortal coil? It is of course essential that these questions be solved in a way consistent with the metaphysical postulates that we have found it possible to ascribe to the Sūtrakāra.

Dualistic Vedāntins like Madhva, or even the disguised dualists like Rāmānuja, swayed more or less by the devotional fervour of the Bhakti Doctrine, do not like to be deprived of those religious raptures that come to the disciple during the course of his ecstatic meditative worship of the Deity. Consequently, they answer the first question in the affirmative and endeavour to explain away in a secondary manner all the Scriptural texts to the contrary. This we cannot accept. Monism is the unambiguous teaching of the Sūtras, no less than of the vast majority of the Upaniṣads. All dualistic consciousness, like the experiences of waking or dreaming states, must absolutely merge into the unitariness of the deep-sleep, the Yogic trance, or the enrapt union with the Absolute. A

* Whether this Region is Viṣṇu-loka or Śiva-loka is philosophically of little consequence, even though the sects may have engaged in battles royal concerning the issue.

staunch champion of the Doctrine of Devotion like Vallabha sees no inconsistency in subscribing tothe doctrine of pure Monism, and we are not required to compromise the Sūtrakāra's philosophical position by admitting any vacillating "Bhedâbheda" forms of it. The phenomenal world and all its experiences might be real to the ordinary seer; and so an answer given from the point of view of such an ordinary seer *as well as* of the Mukta has to be clothed in the language of Bhedâbheda or unity and plurality, or else, as an alternative, in that of the Māyāvāda or the Doctrine of Illusion; but our answer to the question as we have put it must not make any sort of a compromise with Dualism: honorable or otherwise.

The second question can be much more readily answered. There is really no valid reason why a properly qualified person should not be allowed to take leaps by eschewing such intervening steps in the process as can be eschewed, especially in view of the fact that the qualifications in question need not all be gained in the present life alone, but can be cumulated through series of such lives. We have the classical examples of Śuka and Vāmadeva who were endowed with the freeing knowledge from their very birth and even earlier. While the Sūtrakāra would therefore be justified in teaching a graded liberation or "Krama-mukti" as befitting the average man (and even in concluding his treatment by exalting the graded liberation at the close of the treatise), in theory at least he would not hesitate in recognizing what is known as "Sadyo-mukti" or liberation at the very moment of Illumination. I accordingly see no force in the objections usually raised to Śaṅkara's interpretation on the score that the concluding portion of the Brahmasūtras, as explained by him, does not relegate the discussion of the highest goal right at the end. The Upaniṣadic texts* do in any case contemplate the possi-

* E. g.—Atra Brahma samaśnute (Br. Up. IV. 4. 7); Brahmaiva san Brahmâpyeti (Ibid. iv. 4. 6); Tasya tāvad eva ciraṁ yāvan na vimokṣye: atha sampatsye (Ch. Up. vi. 14. 2).

bility of a "Sadyo-mukti" in special cases. The more vital issue is the answer to the last question. Can body and soul hold together after the experience of Brahmasākṣātkāra or the Intuition of the Absolute? In other words, are we justified in recognizing what is known as "Jīvanmukti" or salvation during life-time? As is well known, opinions are sharply divided on the point—Śaṅkara admitting such a possibility and Rāmānuja rejecting it. The present issue, it is easy to see, is vitally connected not only with the question of the persistence of the individualistic consciousness in Mukti, but also with the other problem as to the scope and value of the āśramic duties as a means to salvation. Bhāskara clearly sees the bearing of the two, and concludes: Ato jīvad-avasthāyāṁ na mokṣo; muktyupāyabhūtaṁ jñānaṁ karma ca anuṣṭh-eyam (Hence there can be no liberation during one's life-time, and consequently one has to cultivate *both* knowledge and action to the end of one's days). Much as usual can be and has been said on both sides of the questions. When there are Vedāntic teachers like Kṛṣṇa or Vyāsa who are able during life to propound and teach the highest truths to mortals, it is hard to deny the possibility of any body attaining the Absolute even while alive. If salvation be once declared as a purely post-mortem affair, all incentive to strive to bring it nearer and nearer disappears. Nor can we quite legitimately argue in that case that there are vouchsafed to us in this very life, and in certain rare moments of ecstatic trance, intimations of the Immortal, howsoever fleeting. These and other practical considerations should suffice to induce a belief in Jīvanmukti; and Śaṅkarācārya would then appear to be perfectly justified in wishing to elevate that condition far above the common by dissociating from it all limitations of varṇas, āśramas, and karmas. The other view is also—theoretically—quite unimpeachable. The Realization of the Absolute, it can be plausibly argued, ought to be such a unique fact that subsequent to that event it should appear quite ridiculous that the soul

be still seen setting the bodily mechanism into operation to discharge such paltry purposes as the satisfaction of hunger and thirst. As Bhāskara has trenchantly argued (p. 209)—"If indeed you have become one with the Brahman, should not your hunger and thirst cease? What fool, once that he has become free, would still continue to carry upon his shoulders the dead-weight of these two carcasses?" And the burden will not cease to be less reprehensible because it is wrapped up in cloth of gold and takes the form, not of the need to satisfy the cravings of a solitary lump of flesh, but of catering for the good of the whole world, which falls to the lot of certain so-called "Ādhikārika" individuals (Br. S. III. iii. 32). A repeated study of the Brahmasūtras by themselves has as yet failed to give us any definite clue as to the Sūtrakāra's exact views on the point at issue. The last two Sūtras of Adhyāya III, Pāda iv, come nearest to the discussion of the topic. Looking to the wording of the two Sūtras it would seem that *aniyama* or absence of any definite rule is sought to be predicated *both* (evam) of the rise of the liberating knowledge and of the consequent liberation.* If there be hindrance, the knowledge may not arise in this life nor also its fruit, viz. liberation. If there be no hindrance, both may rise "in this very life." If here the phrase "in this very life" is taken in its direct significance, it can be held to countenance the possibility of Jīvanmukti; but if it is taken to mean "immediately *after* the dissolution of the present body" (etam itaḥ pretyâbhisambhavitâsmi, Chāndogya III. 14. 4), the exact implication of the text becomes somewhat doubtful.

To recount the broad issues set forth in this Lecture, we began by indicating the main features and the underlying motives of the so-called "Sūtra" period, and showed how its

* Rāmānuja does not seem very satisfactory when he distinguishes between two kinds of knowledges, abhyudayaphala and muktiphala, and understands a reference to them respectively in the two Sūtras before us.

earliest phases were designed to supplement in an important particular the central doctrine of the Bhagavadgītā. We then advanced grounds for postulating three recensions of the Brahmasūtras, ignoring the seveval primitive forms of the Sūtras prior in origin to the Bhagavadgītā and aiming at very little beyond harmonizing the philosophical teachings of the Vedic Śakhā or the Caraṇa to which each had attached itself. The first of these recensions, following in the wake of the same philosophical impulse as the Gītā and the cognate episodes of the Epic, sought to achieve a compromise and a synthesis with a view to tighten up the ranks of the "Orthodoxy" in the face of the militant and menacing "Heresy." The second comes some centuries later, and so reflects the view-point of aspiring Hinduism; while the last, dating perhaps from about the beginning of the Christian era, presents the general appearance of an endeavour to gather together and review one's own ranks—both on the offensive as well as the defensive sides—after the struggle for existence had been practically decided in its own favour. Thereafter we gave a brief characterisation of the philosophical style of the Sūtrakāra, discussing at the same time such preliminary questions as the persons for whom the Śāstra was intended, and the authorities upon which it professed to be built up. This was followed up by an attempt to elicit from the Sūtras—and as far as possible, independently of the Bhāṣyakāras—their views on Cosmology or the creation, regulation, and disolution of the world; on Psychology or the nature and functions of the Individual Soul; on Metaphysics, involving a discussion of the nature of the Absolute and of the relation of the Individual to the Absolute; and on Ethics and Epistemology, which led on to a discussion of the Sūtrakāra's views on such problems as the nature of salvation and the ways for its realisation. It will no doubt have been perceived by the attentive reader that the various topics hitherto discussed were bound to involve a critical

consideration of several knotty textual questions, not all of which could, however, be adequately disposed of in view of the limitations of space that had necessarily to be obeyed. Hence, towards the end of the Lecture, the treatment had to become more speculative and dogmatic than I had perhaps originally intended. — It is now time that we take up a consideration of the form assumed by the Vedānta Philosophy during the dark period anterior to the advent of the great Śankarācārya.

LECTURE V

PRE-ŚAṄKARA VEDĀNTA: GAUḌAPĀDA

THE leap from the Bhagavadgītā and the Brahmasūtras to the Advaitism of Śaṅkara covers an extensive gap of centuries during which, by processes not yet properly studied or understood, the Śrauta religion and the Brāhmaṇic philosophy of Ancient India became slowly transformed into the Smārta or Paurāṇic Hinduism of the Mediæval and Modern India. For, it was during this period that, on the one hand, the original missionary Buddhism, having attained its culminating point in the reign of Emperor Aśoka, became doctrinally diluted by the very extensiveness of its vogue, and even infiltrated well-nigh to saturation by a free commingling with the divergent Deistic and Tāntric undercurrents so utterly at variance with primitive Buddhism; while on the other, the ancient but now more or less universally deprecated Vedic Religion of the sacrifice, after the failure of the ill-conceived and short-lived attempt at its resuscitation in its pristine form and glory made by the General Puṣyamitra and his Śuṅga successors, decided, under the patronage of the Imperial Guptas and their comtemporary Princes north and south of the Narmadā and the Godāvarī, to burn out its effete wings and arise, phœnix-like, from out of its very ashes, reared upon the broad and tolerant shoulders of the revered authors of the several Purāṇas, Smṛtis, and Nibandhas, that played so siginficant a part in the general organizing and consolidating work confronting the age. Several extrinsic factors co-operated to complicate the problem. One obvious factor of the kind was the great extent of the territory, with its extraordinarily diversified geographic conditions, that formed the theatre for the play of the forces involved. Further, the successive waves of Yavana,

Hūṇa, and Śaka invaders from the North—whose inroads often penetrated the very heart of the Bhāratavarṣa, and who, upon the conclusion of each such inroad, left behind batches of their military and non-military followers, that very often would settle down in the different parts of the Country—served to profoundly affect the ethnic, social and even the religious features of the populace,—already confused as these had been in the course of the centuries of the advance of the "Āryan" culture and civilization amongst the "Non-āryan" inhabitants of the extreme east and south of India. There accordingly prevailed throughout the Country an extraordinary variety of cults and creeds, sects and worships, customs and practices, so that even the authors of the various Sūtra works, essaying the task of collecting and regulating the social, legal, and religious activities of the people, had to give up the idea of exhaustively indenting the Provincial beliefs (Deśācāras) and superstitions of the masses as lying beyond their powers. Newer schisms and fresher dogmas were appearing upon the surface of the established religions: the earlier and later schools of Buddhism have to be counted by dozens and scores, while Jain canonic texts have preserved names of over three hundred of these diṭṭhis or darśanas. Several newer systems of philosophy were also on the anvil: some original and militant, others eclectic and tolerant; a few bent upon compromise by glossing over the differences; the majority interested in accentuating the differences, and so ready to fall apart upon the least provocation. The only tie that held these motley elements together was, for one moiety of them, their more or less nominal allegiance to the Vedic religion of the sacrifice and the Brahmaṇic regulations of the castes and stages (varṇāśrama-vyavasthā), which were now more honoured in the breach than in the observance; and for the other half, their lip-devotion to the name of the Buddha and to the doctrines propounded by him, in the true interpretation of which even the Saṁgha Doctors were divided apart, wide as the Poles. People changed their religions almost as

easily and as fitfully as they would their clothes. The situation is well epitomised in the familiar stanza*—

Śrutir vibhinnā Smṛtayaś ca bhinnā
Naiko Munir yasya vacaḥ pramāṇam ।
Dharmasya tattvaṁ nihitaṁ guhāyām
Mahājano yena gatas sa panthāḥ ॥

The great and onerous task of reorganizing upon secure and adequate bases a society like this, tottering almost to its foundations, was accomplished by a band of far-seeing politicians and legislators who have very often received, at the hands of an undiscerning and ungrateful posterity, condemnation rather than credit for their achievement. Although therefore it might appear to be somewhat of an excursus away from the exact theme of this evening's Lecture, it will, I believe, contribute towards a correct appraisal of Śaṅkarācārya's work if I were here to indicate the main features of the social and religious reconstitution that was accomplished under the auspices and protection of the Gupta Empire in particular, but somewhat less persistently also under that of the smaller princes and patriots, who seem all to have been dominated by a common impulse. For one thing, to the "Cāturvarṇya-vyavasthā," the corner-stone of the Śrauta religion, which had for generations ceased to exist except in theory, they gave a new lease of life by inventing the device of hypothetical "anuloma" and "pratiloma" marriages, which brought all these newly-formed ethnical and social groups technically under the wonderfully elastic theory of the four "varṇas" or castes. *Secondly*, they developed to their uttermost possibilities the convenient notions concerning the "Āpad-dharmas" or duties regarded as permissible under stress of circumstances, and the "Kali-varjyas" or actions (e. g. the animal sacrifices) which, although once permissible

* "The Vedas are diverse, and the Smṛtis divergent; and there is no Sage who commands authority; the essence of Religion lies hidden in the cave: the way to follow is that of the great majority."

and even obligatory, have to be abjured under the present fallen times of the Kaliyuga. These two doctrines, worked out with a profusion of hair-splitting details, served to ensure a nominal allegiance to the old-world Vedism, while actually affording ample scope to the inevitable modifications in belief and practice that were bound to come in with the progress of the times. The art of deviating from the past while yet honestly professing to revere it was thus cultivated well nigh to perfection. *Thirdly*, the theory of the "Avatāras" or incarnations of the Deity, adumbrated long before the age of the Bhagavadgītā, was given an all-round extension so that the varied objects of adoration put forth by the votaries of the innumerable religious sects that appeared to have dotted the land at the time, or that were almost yearly springing up into existence, could all be regarded as sparks, emanations, powers, or forms of one and the same Deity—call it Viṣṇu, or call it Śiva—howsoever diverse may be their methods of adoration and the paraphernalia of worship: provided of course they did not obtrusively offend against certain well-accepted notions of decency and morality. Indeed, they were not unwilling to spread this mantle of the "Avatāra" theory over Buddhism itself and the other "Heretic" opponents of Brāhmaṇism—if they would but consent not to rake up old hostilities. Buddhism, however, had the weight of a long and glorious tradition and the advantage of living institutions like the famous Universities of Takṣaśilā Nālandā, and other places; and it resisted long and vigorously the all-embracing arms of this insinuating octopus. *Fourthly*, an organized effort on a large scale was made to check the disintegrating tendencies of the countless sects and cults amongst which the Country was divided by establishing and developing, always in conformity with the scenic surroundings and the social customs, specific places of pilgrimage of more or less sanctity and scattered all over the length and breadth of the land, in connection with which there grew up in time various accredited legends of gods, goddesses, and saints, eagerly listened to by the young and the old of both

sexes, and embellished as they were passed on from mouth to mouth. *Fifthly*, fully realizing the weakness of the average human mind which hates to take every extra trouble to exercise an independent judgment, but always likes to resort to a universal "Ready Reckoner," our statesmen and legislators supplied, in the form of the several codes and treatises a complete guide to man, prescribing for him exactly what he should do and what he must avoid almost every hour of the day, and every day of the year, and under all conceivable situations. That such a detailed codification of conduct became, with the steady lapse of time, desperately wooden, and provoked further opposition and revolt, constitutes a chapter belonging to the later history of Hinduism with which we are not here concerned for the moment. *Lastly*, an effort was made to afford for this re-formed state of things a full and adequate philosophic basis and background by the development of the monistic and deistic "Sāṁkhya" of the Bhagavadgītā, formulated in association with the theory of the three guṇas, in doing which they had naturally to wage several wordy wars with opposing philosophical schools or tendencies. *

Concentrating our attention on the last of these points, it would seem that the dominating philosophy of the age of the Purāṇas was Sāṁkhya, which was not only theistic, but

* The traditionally enumerated contents of a Purāṇa (viz. Sarga or creation, Pratisarga or dissolution, Vaṁśa or genealogy, Manvantaras or world-periods dominated by the specific human Progenitors, and Vaṁśyânucarita or accounts of successive royal dynasties), howsoever true they might have been at some time when there existed only one archetypal Purāṇa, do not by any means exhaust the actual contents or explain the true life-purpose of our present Purāṇas, which one should rather seek in the points above enumerated. Hence it was as natural for the various Purāṇas, when briefly describing the somewhat unessential traditional five-fold contents, to use different words, as that they should have glorified different deities or recounted different legends. The facts of the case do not therefore lend themselves, without forcing, to any deductions similar to those made by Kirfel in his "Purāṇam Pañcalakṣaṇam," pp. XLVIII f.

even pantheistic after the manner of the Bhagavadgītā. This was in fact *the* "Vedānta" of the period, which was particularly cultivated in some of the "Ascetic" or the Aupaniṣada schools. The earlier of some of the more important Minor* Upaniṣads appear to have been produced during this age; but beyond these there does not seem to have been produced (or there does not seem to have been extant at present) any strictly "Vedāntic" work outside the older Purāṇas. This circumstance has misled many into supposing that "Vedānta" as a philosophy was really developed at a relatively very late period. But they ignore that the Māyāvāda is not the only form of Vedānta. We have pointed out (pp. 111 ff.) that the Gītā does not countenance the "Māyāvāda" in its normal narrower interpretation; but it would be hard to deny the name "Vedānta" to the philosophical view-point of that Poem.

Professor Walleser has however put forward a somewhat novel view on the question, and as our treatment of the Pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta must turn upon our attitude towards that theory, we will have to discuss it in some detail. In his German book entitled "Der ältere Vedānta," Heidelberg, 1910, he has adduced a passage from Sureśvara's Naiṣkarmyasiddhi, iv. 41–44 (B.S.S., 2nd ed., pp. 192–93), where two stanzas from the Gauḍapādīya-kārikās and one from Śaṅkara's Upadeśasāhasrī are respectively referred to as uttered by "Gauḍaiḥ" and "Drāviḍaiḥ," i. e., "by the Gauḍas" and "by the Drāviḍas." This constitutes M. Walleser's starting point. He argues that the reference here is to some Vedāntic *school* of the Gauḍa country and the Draviḍa country respectively, in spite of the fact that the latter reference is to an individual author of the Upadeśasāhasrī, namely, Sureśvara's own immediate teacher Śaṅkara.† In a similar context we normally expect that the

* That is, excluding the 12 or 13 so-called "Principal Upaniṣads."

† The one or two other passages where the author of the Māṇḍūkya-Kārikās is referred to as Gauḍācārya can *at their best* prove that the author belonged to the Gauḍa country, but cannot suffice to obliterate the personality of Gauḍapāda.

words will possess a similar connotation. Having thus raised, in his own opinion, a doubt as to the genuineness of an individual author named Gauḍapāda, Walleser next points out that in Buddhistic philosophical disquisitions references to strictly "Vedāntic" views, works, or authors are conspicuous by their absence until we come to Bhāvaviveka (cir. 550 A.D.), who attempted to tone down the extreme negativism of the Prāsaṅgika school (according to which the phenomenal world was denied existence even as phenomenon, the alpha and omega of the teaching being unmitigated "Silence") by founding a new school called Svātantrika, which was prepared to concede the phenomenal validity of the world. This Bhāvaviveka wrote a commentary called the Tarkajvālā on his own metrical treatise entitled the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā,* and there, in the course of refutation of an "Īśvara-vāda" occurs a stanza closely allied in sense to Gauḍapādakārikā iii. 3. This, according to M. Walleser, would demand the existence of the Gauḍapādīyakārikās not later than cir. 450 or 500 A. D., which clearly miltates against his traditional identification with the teacher's teacher of Śaṅkarācārya. But here too Walleser does not seem to build upon secure foundations. The parallelism between the Tarkajvālā and the Kārikā (as indeed Walleser himself concedes, p. 21) is not absolutely convincing, and even admitting the same, there remains the possibility of the Tarkajvālā referring to an independent text or author that may have been also drawn upon by the author of the Gauḍapādīyakārikās.† This possibility cannot be ruled out, especially in view of the fact that the couple

* Both the treatise and the commentary are now extant only in a Tibetan translation.

† Compare for instance the frequent references in the Kārikās to earlier Vedāntic writers such as ii. 12, and especially ii. 31—

Svapnamāye yathā dṛṣṭe Gandharvanagaraṁ yathā ।
Tathā viśvam idaṁ dṛṣṭaṁ Vedānteṣu vicakṣaṇaiḥ ॥

This Kārikā is astonishingly alike to Mādhyamikakārikā vii. 34, and is yet declared to be a statement of those "expert in Vedāntic doctrines."

of passages adduced in evidence of the parallelism contain just a few typical illustrations, like that of the space-within-the-jar (ghaṭâkāśa). The case of course stands upon a different footing with the actual quotations attributed to certain "Aupaniṣadânusāriṇaḥ" occurring in Śāntirakṣita's Madhyamakâlaṁkāra (cir. 750), and in Kamalaśīla's Pañcikā on the same (cir. 800), where the references are unquestionably to Gaudapāda's Kārikās; but that does not mililate against the traditional chronological place of Gauḍapāda.*

The two main props of Walleser's theory, viz. that Gauḍapāda is not an individual name and that the Gauḍapādīya-kārikās cannot possibly belong to a date later than about 500 A.D., being thus rendered untenable, the whole edifice that he has built upon them falls to the ground. For instance, he makes much of the fact that earlier Buddhistic writers do not quote any "Vedāntic" texts or views as such. But, as Jacobi has pointed out, even Jain writers of note observe an equal silence even as late as the eighth or ninth century. Bhâvaviveka professed clear leanings towards some sort of a Realism as against the rigorous negativism of the Prāsaṅgika school, and it was therefore incumbent upon him to show in what respects his own position differed from the Buddhistic Śūnyavāda on the one hand, and the Vedāntic Absolutism on the other. Hence he could not avoid quoting from Vedāntic writers; and even if it were to be established that his so-called quotations come from Gauḍapāda himself, and not from any of his predecessors—the experts in the Vedānta—it does not follow that the Kārikās is the earliest work of the systematiz-

* Barnett in his review of Walleser's work in the JRAS for 1910, and Jacobi in an article on the Māyâvāda in the JAOS for 1913, agree in holding that the author has not succeeded in destroying the individuality of Gauḍapāda. They seem however to think that Walleser has adduced sufficient evidence against Gauḍapāda being assigned to a date later than A. D. 500. Although I do not wish to hold any brief in favour of the traditional date, it has to be said that Walleser's arguments are not in themselves enough to shake our confidence in it.

ed Vedānta. It is possible, as is in fact urged by Jacobi, that the Vedānta-sūtras (whose prior existence to the Kārikās must remain undisputed) did not lend themselves readily for being quoted. Moreover, as Barnett has correctly pointed out, it is methodologically defective first to restrict the use of the term Vedānta to the "Māyāvāda" and then to essay to prove that such a Vedānta is not known earlier than a given date. It stands also unproved that the "Māyāvāda" cannot be a legitimate development from the Upaniṣadic teachings.* As already pointed out by us while dealing with the Vedānta in the Brahmasūtras, the Sūtrakāra quotes a number of Vedāntic predecessors, some of whom (e. g. Kāśakṛtsna), on Śaṅkara's own showing, substantiated by commentators of his opposing schools, held doctrines akin to the Māyāvāda. And when we take into consideration the whole line of thought-evolution from the Upaniṣads to the predecessors of the present Vedānta-sūtrakāra; and from there—after the Sūtras had assumed a more or less definitive form—to the earlier Bhāṣya- and Vṛtti-kāras, whose names (and occasional quotations from their works) are preserved to us in the older and authoritative writings of the several Vedānta schools; and finally to Gauḍapāda† and Bhartṛprapañca (whose name is just issuing out of the mists, and assuming a concrete shape), and the great Śaṅkarācārya, the period of about three hundred years (between 450 to 750 A. D.) which Walleser wants to assign to it seems absurdly inadequate. We need not therefore occupy ourselves much longer with an examination of his views.

That an Advaitic-Pantheistic view-point bordering upon the Māyāvāda was in existence long before Śaṅkara, can be easily demonstrated. Even if we agree not to summon the

*Walleser curiously enough ignores the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, and regards the Muṇḍaka and the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣads as containing the genuine "Vedāntic" teaching.

† Nobody has accepted the theory of Walleser, which makes the Brahmasūtras *follow* the Gauḍapādakārikās.

evidence of the Epics and the Purāṇas, as it may be objected to on the ground of its being chronologically rather insecure, we have poets like Bhavabhūti (Uttararāmacarita vi. 6), Bhāravi (Kirātârjunīya v. 22, xi. 66, xvi. 32, xviii, 30, etc.), and Kālidāsa (Raghu x. 16, 20; Kumāra ii. 6,10,13,15, etc.), whose incidental references to a First Principle which is the source, the stay, and the goal of everything; which is to be attained by knowledge; which is one, unique, and all-pervading; and in the description of which several expressions reminiscent of the Bhagavadgītā and the Upaniṣads are used, should be enough to raise a prima facie presumption for the existence and diffusion of Advaitic views in the early centuries of the Christian era. The Laṅkāvatārasūtra (translated into Chinese 443 A. D.) refers (Nanjio's ed., page 59) to some non-Buddhistic views promulgating a First Principle that is eternal and beyond thought, and even suggests (p. 78)* that the Buddhistic view shows great similarity to the Ātmavāda of the "Heretics." That this refers to a Sāṁkhya doctrine based upon Upaniṣads follows from the unmistakable reference to the familiar Pariṇāma text about gold and its modifications referred to on page 159 of the same Sūtra. Finally, even after ignoring the older Smṛti works like Manu (i. 7, 11, etc.), or the Āpastamba-adhyātma-paṭala (Trivandrum Series No. 41 p. 11), there is the evidence deducible from the writings of Bhartṛprapañca (an old Vedāntin who belongs, in the opinion of Prof. Hiriyanna, to about A. D. 600) whose philosophical views, pieced together by the same patient and unassuming Professor of Mysore, afford us a glimpse into the development of Vedānta Philosophy in the centuries anterior to Śaṅkarācārya, and who maintains a continuity with the philosophical "Anschauung" of the Bhagavadgītā and the Purāṇas, which certainly preceded Bhartṛprapañca. Gauḍapāda's theory of negativistic absolutism—whatever be the influence of the collateral Buddhistic

* Tat katham ayam Bhagavaṁs Tīrthakâtmavādatulyas Tathāgatagarbhavādo na bhavati? Tīrthakarā api Bhagavan—Nityaḥ kartā nirguṇo vibhur avyaya—ity ātmavādopadeśaṁ kurvanti.

thought upon its formulation — can gain in value and significance only if viewed as coming at the end of a series of positivistic (and therefore not rigorously logical) developments in the Advaitic schools.

Before we pass on to the critical consideration of the work of Gauḍapāda, we will briefly indicate the main points of Bhartṛprapañca's Vedāntic position as stated by Professor Hiriyanna. Bhartṛprapañca was a monist in the sense that he conceived the whole universe as possessing a basal unitary foundation in the Brahman or the Highest Self in his non-manifest, non-particularized or quality-less condition. The world and the individual selves are evolved from this Brahman, and are therefore real as its "modes" or modifications, and yet non-different from the First Cause, just as the waves are non-different from the ocean. The Brahman is knowledge; and as the individual selves possess consciousness, they are nearer transformations of the First Cause, than are the other non-sentient parts of the creation, and are in fact parts (aṁśas) of the Highest Self, but unconscious of this their affinity by reason of ignorance and of attachment to worldly objects. It is only when the soul withdraws his mind from the outward objects of sense, and concentrates it on the contemplation of the Highest, that he may come to *intellectually* realize his oneness with Brahman in this very life, the actual Sākṣātkāra of the same being possible only after the dissolution of the body. The intellectual realisation may be vivid and convincing, and the man may for all practical purposes be called Mukta or free; but the perception cannot yet attain the perfection of Sākṣātkāra; for, at that moment, all the conscious or unconscious activities—including those which hold the tissues of the human body together—must cease. As a consequence of the above view, Bhartṛprapañca enjoins that all *nitya* karmans (such as the Agnihotra) must be performed throughout life, — salvation being attainable only by knowledge joined to action (jñānakarmasamuccaya). There is little

wonder that rigorous Advaitins like Śaṅkarācārya contended strenuously against Bhartṛprapañca's position, as it failed to recognize the highest possibilities attainable by Yogic concentration, which was held to secure the vivid Sākṣātkāra of the object of meditation—at any rate during the state of Samādhi; and as that must be supposed to be a unique experience, it must make the subsequent life different *toto caelo* from the anterior life of the Mumukṣu or the candidate for liberation. The world and the individual selves to whom Bhartṛprapañca conceded a real existence *in* Brahman—the "Bhedâbheda" view—the absolutistic Advaitin was prepared, and was even compelled, to reduce to a condition of Māyā, because their illusory character was capable of being actually (and not merely intellectually) realized in this very existence by the "Jīvanmukta," who was naturally held to be immune from all obligations of duty after the Brahma-realization. We thus see how the ultimate metaphysical position of a writer turns primarily upon what he regards as the *ethical* purpose of his life; and this naturally turns upon certain factors of the political and social history of the people, which arrest and engage the attention and the efforts of the generation to which the writer in question belongs.

We turn next to a consideration of the philosophy in the Gauḍapādīya-kārikās. Gauḍapāda, to whose authorship the Kārikās are traditionally assigned, is also supposed to be the author of a commentary on the Sāṁkhya Kārikās of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, and of another commentary on the Uttara-gītā. We have elsewhere* tried to show that the Sāṁkhya Commentary now passing under the name of Gauḍapāda is very largely based upon an earlier commentary on the Sāṁkhya-kārikās by Māṭhara (Chinese translation, cir. 450 A. D.). At a time when the existence of Māṭhara's commentary was not known and the commentary now passing under the name of Gauḍapāda was believed to represent more or less the original of

* Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume, pp. 171–184, and the Annals of the B. O. R. Institute, Vol. V, pp. 133–168.

the Chinese translation, chronological difficulties came in the way of regarding the author of the Sāṁkhya commentary as being identical with the teacher's teacher of Śaṅkarācārya. With the interposition of Māṭhara between the Sāṁkhya-kārikās and Gauḍapāda that chronological difficulty vanishes, and it only becomes a question whether we regard the teacher's teacher of the great Vedāntic teacher to be capable of writing such a patch-work commentary. In this connection it has to be pointed out that the commentary on the Uttara-gītā which is believed to come from Gauḍapāda (published in the Vani Vilas Series, Srirangam, 1910) is not marked by any brilliant flashes of intellect or exegetic skill. But its metaphysical view-point (see com. on I. 7, ed. p. 5f.; cp. also p.10f.) approaches closely that of the Māṇḍūkya-kārikās, while statements like "yajñadānādiśravaṇādikam eva tattva-jñāne kāraṇam (p. 37)," or that *apud* I. 23 (p. 15) regarding "loka-saṁgrahârtha karman" suggest an affinity more to the ethics of Bhartṛprapañca than that of Śaṅkara. We can therefore for the present only assert that there is nothing so far discovered in these two commentaries that necessarily militates against the traditional identification of their author with the author of the Māṇḍūkya-kārikās.

These Gauḍapādīya-kārikās on the Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad consist of four Prakaraṇas: the first, called the "Āgama," has 29 stanzas; the second, styled the "Vaitathya," has 38; the third, entitled the "Advaita" has 48, while the fourth, passing under the significant name of "Alātaśānti" or "Quietus of the Fire-wheel," is the longest, with as many as one hundred stanzas. A number of critical questions have been raised about these Kārikās and will have to be resolved before we proceed to a presentation of the philosophy contained in them. To consider the most obvious one first, the fourth Prakaraṇa*

* For a detailed discussion see Vidhuśekhara Bhaṭṭācārya's paper in Second Or. Conference, Calcutta, pp. 439–461, and in the Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. I, pp. 114–125 and 295–302. Compare also Poussin in JRAS, 1910, pp. 134–140.

begins with a distinct benedictory stanza highly reminiscent of Buddhistic phraseology (cp Dvipadāṁ varam with the Pāli Dipaduttama and the use of words sambuddha, gaganopama, dharmas, etc.). It employs a large number of other Buddhist technical terms like Asparśayoga, Dharma, Dhātu, Agrayāṇa, Lokottara, Vaiśāradyam, deśita, dīpita, or Tāyin, possessing specific Buddhistic connotations. In several places whole kārikās exhibit closest parallels in language and thought to works like the Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā, or Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikās. More than about twenty of these parallelisms are fully exhibited by Poussin and Vidhuśekhara Bhaṭṭācārya, but it may be easily possible to discover several others not noticed by them. And the wordings in such cases are so close* as almost to preclude the possibility of the two being independent of each other. The dialectics or the lines of reasoning adopted in both these works are exactly alike. For instance:

G. K. iv. 4–Bhūtaṁ na jāyate kiṁcid abhūtaṁ naiva jāyate;

M. K. ii. 1–Gataṁ na gamyate tāvad agataṁ naiva gamyate;

—the reasoning turning upon the four "koṭis" or dichotomic divisions of possibility already familiar to us from the pre-Buddhistic "Heretics" like Saṁjaya Belaṭṭhiputta (see above, p. 87) and specifically referred to by Gauḍapāda in iv. 83–84. And while it is true that some of the features last described are not entirely absent in Gauḍapāda, Prakaraṇas ii and iii, any unbiassed reader of the several Prakaraṇas cannot help

* Compare G. K. iv. 22—

Svato vā parato vāpi na kiṁcid vastu jāyate ।
Sadasatsadasad vāpi na kiṁcid vastu jāyate ॥

with M. K. i. 1—

Na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṁ nāpy ahetutaḥ ।
Utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana ॥

or M. K. XXI. 13—

Na svato jāyate bhāvaḥ parato naiva jāyate ।
Na svataḥparataś caiva jāyate; jāyate kutaḥ ॥

forming the impression that Prakaraṇa iv breathes an atmosphere quite different from that of the other Prakaraṇas : an impression which gets further confirmation from the circumstance that Prakaraṇa iv contains several verbatim quotations from the earlier books.* And a point to note regarding these citations from earlier Prakaraṇas is that where the citations are not verbatim, the change often consists in changing some word like "bhāva" or "manaḥ," familiar to Hindu orthodox philosophy, to the Buddhistic technical term with the same sense, viz. "dharma," or "cittam." For all these reasons it has been argued that the last or the "Alātaśānti" chapter belongs to a relatively later period and to a distinct authorship.

Now, it is very difficult to meet adequately the argument based upon a distinct benedictory stanza at the beginning of Prakaraṇa iv, or upon the presence in it of quotations from Prakaraṇas ii and iii. As to the other arguments, it must be remembered that analogies to Buddhistic expressions and technicalities are not entirely absent in Prakaraṇas ii and iii. Thus the famous formula "Na nirodho na côtpattiḥ," which resembles the initial stanza of the Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikās of Nāgārjuna, occurs in Prakaraṇa ii, stanza 32, where also occur technical terms like saṁvṛta (ii. 7 and 3), advaya (ii. 33), or smṛti (ii. 36), in specific senses. In Prakaraṇa iii again occur the well-known reference to "Asparśayoga" (st. 39) and to "Nirvāṇa" (st. 47), besides the use of terms like saṁghāta (iii. 3 and 10). Hence it becomes only a question of degree. It is true that the two middle Prakaraṇas use words like jīva, ātman, Prabhu, Deva, Brahman, muni, tattvavid, dhīmat, vicakṣaṇa, etc., which are *almost* taboo in Prakaraṇa iv, where other synonyms such as dharma, buddha are pre-

* Thus, G. K. iv. 3 or 6=G. K. iii. 20; G. K. iv. 7–8=G. K. iii. 21; G. K. iv. 29cd or iv. 7cd=G. K. iii. 21cd; G. K. iv. 31–32=G. K. ii. 6–7; G. K. iv. 33–34=G. K. ii. 1–2; G. K. iv. 61–62=G. K. iii. 29–30; G. K. iv. 71=G. K. iii. 48; etc.

ferred. They also contain many pointed references to specific Upaniṣadic texts* like Īśa (iii. 25=st. 12), Kaṭha (iii. 13=II. i. 11), Taittirīya (iii. 11), Bṛhadāraṇyaka (ii. 3=iv. 3. 10, iii. 12=ii. 5, iii. 13=iv. 4.19, iii. 15=ii. 1. 20, iii. 24=iv. 4.19 and ii. 5. 19, iii. 25=iii. 9. 28), and Chāndogya (iii. 14=vi. 3. 2 †, iii. 15=vi. 1. 5). All this cannot be mere chance; but one would be not unjustified in looking for its adequate explanation in some theory other than that which postulates for Prakaraṇa iv an author different from that of the two earlier Prakaraṇas, especially when we observe that the last Prakaraṇa has also its own references to the Upaniṣads—compare iv. 78, iv. 80, iv. 85, and iv. 92, wherein familiar Upaniṣadic expressions seem to be employed of purpose—and when it is perceived that, in spite of a difference of terminology, the ultimate philosophical view-point of the last Prakaraṇa does not materially differ from that of the earlier Prakaraṇas, and from even the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad itself, for the matter of that. We will advert to this problem presently.

Regarding the relation of the original Upaniṣad to the first or the " Āgama " Prakaraṇa of the Kārikās (which constitutes the last critical question that we must discuss before proceeding to set forth the peculiar view-point of Gauḍapāda) it has been urged in recent times‡ that the traditional view

* Which are designated by name [e. g. Taittirīyaka (iii. ii), Madhuvidyā (iii. 12), etc.] ; or cited by the initial or significant word [cp. iii. 15, iii.24, iii. 25, etc.]; or by a vague reference to Śruti (lii. 23), Āmnāya(iii. 24), or Vedānta (ii. 12, 31).

† It will have been noted that the first reference in the bracket is to the Gauḍapādakārikā and the second to the Upaniṣad. The reference to the Chāndogya in Kārikā iii. 14 is to the well-known passage—Anena jīvena ātmanā, etc. That the author of the " Bhāṣya " on the Kārikā should have failed to identify it, proves conclusively that it is not the work of the great Śaṅkara. Several other facts also point to the same conclusion.

‡ Compare Prof. Vidhuśekhara Bhaṭṭācārya in the Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. I, pp. 119-125 and 295–302.

which regards the Kārikās as the commentary (vārttika* or vyākhyāna) of the Upaniṣad is not correct. It is the Kārikās which are chronologically prior and which have later served as the basis for a new Upaniṣad. Bhaṭṭācārya's arguments seem however to be feeble and not quite convincing. The commentators upon whom he relies are late, and their testimony goes againt that of Śaṅkarācārya. To imagine that the author of the new or pseudo Upaniṣad, in order to secure credence for his handicraft, added the line—Atra ete ślokā bhavanti—before the Kārikās does not seem in itself to be natural or probable. Further, if the Upaniṣad be based upon the Kārikās, why are the numerous extra topics occurring in the Kārikās † passed over by the Upaniṣad in mere silence? It is much more likely that the first Prakaraṇa of the Kārikās constitutes a discursive comment, which further elaborates the view-point of the Upaniṣad without being strictly pledged to explain every single word therein like an ordinary word-by-word gloss. The sentence—Atra ete ślokā bhavanti—belongs therefore to the author of the following Ślokas or Kārikās, who seems to have been far more concerned to find for his own philosophical views an authority in an older Upaniṣad, than for explaining certain terms in the original like "saptâṅga." The several small points—each unconvincing in itself, and capable of being explained just as cogently on the opposite hypothesis—which Vidhuśekhara Bhaṭṭācārya has gathered to a focus have not therefore much probative value.

* I am prepared to admit that the words—Atha Vārttikakāroktaṁ vākyam—given in a few Mss. (vide Ānand. ed., p. 25) is an error based upon some scribe's mistaken reminiscence of Sureśvara's Vārttikas.

† For example, the loci of the Viśva, Taijasa, etc, in the right eye, the mind, and so forth; or the various views about creation mentioned in kārikās i. 7ff., which ought to have been explained in the Upaniṣad if this is supposed to have "simplified, modified, and explained" the kārikās. The language of the Upaniṣad is archaic. This cannot be convincingly explained as a conscious effort to imitate Brāhmaṇa phraseology.

Our own explanation of the genesis of the Gauḍapādīya-kārikās is rather different. The negativistic view-point of the Buddhistic Śūnyavāda, embellished by the "catuṣ-koṭika" or four-cornered dialectics of Nāgārjuna and of his followers, was by no means a Buddhistic creation *ab ovo.* We have not only to take account, in this connection, of the "Heretic" predecessors of the Buddha like Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta (above, page 87), but of the "solipsist" conclusions of Yājñavalkya (Bṛ. Up. II. 4. 13–14), which led his philosophic wife Maitreyī to doubt if the ultimate drift of her husband's teaching was sheer negativism. Compare also Indra's doubts concerning Prajāpati's teaching, Chān. Up. viii. 11. 2. The Absolutistic Vedānta wanted to transcend this negativism; but the clear and convincing way of achieving that is to be found neither in the teaching of Prajāpati nor in that of Yājñavalkya. The latter even doubts whether Maitreyī would be able to at all comprehend the teaching, while other texts declare that in regard to that ultimate teaching silence alone is the most convincing eloquence. Such a stultifying of reason was felt to be extremely unsatisfactory. It was felt that while the Solvitur Ambulando of direct intuition may eventually be trusted to resolve all inveterate contradictions or "Antinomies of Reason," at least an intellectual conviction concerning its reality—as far as Reason could evoke it—ought to be possible, and should be produced by argumentation. And a clear way of achieving this presented itself by a critical analysis of the waking, the dreaming and the sleeping states of the Self familiar to our normal experience.

The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad proper sought to do this in a succinct sūtra-like fashion by equating these three states with the three morae ($a + u + m$) of the mystic symbol *om*, to which a fourth mora-less part was added corresponding to the fourth condition of enrapt-concentration upon Brahman in this life, and the state of disembodied freedom and union in Brahman after death. In the waking state the Self was designated as

Vaiśvānara, had an extrospective knowledge of gross objects, and consisted of seven constituents* and nineteen openings.† In the dream-state the Self was known as Taijasa, possessed the same number of constituents and of openings, but was limited to introspective knowledge of refined (mind-created) objects. In the state of deep-sleep the Self abides as mere consciousness and bliss consequent upon a merging together of the object and the subject. In that state all individual and phenomenal distinctions are at rest, the Self remaining in his unqualified oneness, at once so-to-say the source, the centre, and the goal of the whole creation. In the fourth, trans-phenomenal and timeless state of the Self he is said to possess neither extrospective nor introspective knowledge, nor both of them together; ‡ nor does he remain mere enmassed consciousness ¶; neither knowing nor not knowing; beyond the ken of the senses, beyond the sphere of activity, beyond grasping and beyond description by words. He is unthinkable, unnameable; his essence only realizable through the intuitive apperception of the unity of the All in the Self. Such a state gives the quietus to all phenomenal existence: is calm, serene, and without-a-second.

Such is the purport of the teaching in the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad. The Gauḍapādīya-kārikās merely develop the tacit implications of the teaching, hardly introducing any absolutely new feature. Thus the various views on cosmology, occurring briefly in i. 6–9 and more elaborately in ii. 19–30, are introduced in both at the same point in the argument where the world is described as being created afresh by the Self waking out of deep sleep. All these cosmological view-points, as necessarily falling within the category of Time, have

* Head, eye, breath, belly, bladder, feet and mouth.

† Five perceptive sense-organs, five conative organs of motion, five vital airs, and the four mental functions: namely, attention, intellection, self-consciousness and memory.

‡ As happens in a state between dreaming and waking.

¶ As happens during deep-sleep.

to be transcended in the "Ajātivāda" or the "No-creation" view, which is simply asserted in i. 11, i. 16–18, and again in ii. 31–34; is based on the authority of Scriptures in iii. 23–30; is argumentatively established in iv. 3–23 (as far as the external or physical causation is concerned), and in iv. 24—46 (as far as the internal or mental causation is concerned); and the way to whose eventual realization through Yogic discipline and enrapt meditation is indicated in the same succinct and detailed fashions in i. 25–29, ii. 36–38, iii. 31–47 and iv. 78–100. An identical philosophical view-point and an identically sequential flow of arguments is thus seen on examination to be present in the four Prakaraṇas of the Gauḍapādīyakārikās, and even the Buddhistic looking technical terms and the four-cornered (catuṣkoṭika) dialectics, which are obtrusively present especially in the fourth Prakaraṇa, cannot be said to be entirely unknown even to the first Prakaraṇa and indeed to the Upaniṣad itself: cp.—Nântaḥprajñaṁ, na bahiṣprajñaṁ, nôbhayataḥprajñaṁ, etc. That there is a sufficient sprinkling of "Buddhistic" terms in the two middle Prakaraṇas we have already stated. Under the circumstances, is it absolutely essential to postulate the theory of an entirely different author for the fourth Prakaraṇa, or, in some hyper-critical mood, to assign a separate author for the first Prakaraṇa, another such for Prakaraṇas ii and iii, and a third for Prakaraṇa iv,—to say nothing of an equitable distribution of the four Prakaraṇas amongst as many authors? In case, however, on grounds of the initial benedictory stanza and the inter-quotations—which are the only valid arguments urged on the other side—a distinct author is to be believed in for the last Prakaraṇa alone, he must be supposed to have very faithfully reproduced and elaborated the main philosophical thesis and the dialectics of the author of the earlier Prakaraṇas, even down to a casual approach to the theistic view-point in ii. 29,* which

* Compare Gītā vii. 21-23 and ix. 23.

curiously enough recurs exactly at the transition point from the third to the fourth state in Prakaraṇa iv, Kārikās 42–43.

The fact of the matter is that it is not absolutely correct to suppose that certain forms of Idealism and Negativism, which are too generally associated with Vasubandhu and Nāgārjuna, actually originated with them *ab ovo.* There were not only several earlier if somewhat less rigorously logical formulations of these theories in the Buddhistic school, but their beginnings can be traced right up to the Upaniṣads like Bṛhadāraṇyaka. If this is once admitted, it would not involve a very great demand on our credulity to suppose that certain sections of the ascetic thinkers, amongst whom the "Vedāntic" philosophy of the Upaniṣads was assiduously cultivated, arrived at certain idealistic or negativistic conclusions deducible directly from the Upaniṣadic premises. The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad is an extant illustration in point. The Upaniṣads were in fact capable of being the one common matrix from which arose the "orthodox" Advaitic philosophy, the as yet not fully "heterodox" Sāṁkhya philosophy, as well as those free or "heterodox" modes of thought which for the while culminated in Buddhism. Latterly, when the thought waves of Buddhism, which had swept almost everything before them in all directions, began to show signs of ebbing, the idea would naturally suggest itself to some acute thinker of the day—(whether we decide to name him Gauḍapāda* or not is unessential for the argument)—especially when he saw how the post-Nāgārjuna developments from the Buddhistic

* When Walleser suggests that "Gauḍa-pādīya Kārikās" should mean the Kārikās *divided into pādas* that were current in the Vedāntic schools of the Gauḍa country, he forgets that Pāda in the sense of a Quarter, when used as the name of a work, presupposes the existence of *four* such quarter-units. But if the fourth section of the Kārikās is to be regarded as having a separate author, the argument will fall through unless we make a further supposition that the first three sections were known by a separate name prior to the composition of the fourth.

Śūnyavāda were verging towards a positivistic position akin to the Absolutism of the Vedānta—to show, by the use of the very dialectics used by the Vijñānavādins to sublate the world of physical objects, and by the Śūnyavādins to sublate the world of mental ideas, that there was a still higher point of view—*Asti vāva tato bhūyaḥ*—which was positivistic and absolutistic, if also necessarily beyond the reach of discursive reason, and which was even attainable in some rare, ecstatic reaches of the mind. If understood as one of the most remarkably successful attempts of the kind, the Gauḍapādīya Kārikās, it was natural, should show equal assiduousness to use Buddhistic arguments and technical expressions on the one hand, and to quote older Upaniṣadic texts in support of the positions reached on the other. To suppose that orthodox Hindu writers, in quoting the doctrines of the heretic schools that they wished to demolish, never cared to go to the origins and study the opposite systems from the writings of the most authoritative and up-to-date exponents of the schools themselves is too sweeping a generalization often made by modern scholars. Tradition and facts point in the other direction, especially where we are dealing with first-rate debators like Śaṅkara or Vācaspatimiśra.*

Supplementing the arguments given in one Prakaraṇa by those in the others, we can present the main argument of Gauḍapāda as follows. The experiences of the dream, so long as they endure, have the same verisimilitude as those of the wakeful life. The wakeful life is left behind—has no existence—during the dream world, just as much as the dream

* In my Notes to Brahmasūtra (II. ii. 28), I have tried to show how Yamakami Sōgen, in trying to accuse Śaṅkara of a grave misrepresentation of the views of his Buddhistic opponents, has only succeeded in betraying his own ignorance of certain peculiar Buddhistic doctrines. In fact the keen passages at arms between the successive writers on both sides from Diṅnāga to Vācaspati would be ridiculous if based upon imperfect knowledge of the opponents' views.

creations are seen to be mere figments of our imagination when we become wide awake. We visit some far-off lands, associate with distant friends, receive wounds on the body, and undergo other strange experiences in our dreams which, from the evidence of the bystanders and from a consideration of the probabilities of the case, we can demonstrate to be unreal; and yet while we are actually living those experiences they appear to us just as real as real can be. The dream-world, as a world of *actual* experience, does not keep company with us in the wakeful world of sense any more than does this latter follow us on into the visionary realms of dream. For, we may be actually hungry or surfeited in the wakeful life, but may find ourselves in just the opposite state during the dreams; and the water that we may drink in the dreams quenches our thirst in dreams just as effectively as does the ordinary drink of wakeful life. Why not suppose then that the wakeful world of sense is nothing but dream? The direct tangibility or objectivity or liability to produce *actual* joy or sorrow, which we associate with the waking life, cannot be said to be entirely unknown to the dream life. Further, just as, being aroused from a dream, we pronounce the dream-experience as unreal, so must we be pronouncing the wakeful experience to be unreal as long as we remain immersed in the dream. True, there are some few differences between the waking and the dreaming worlds. The one we see with our eyes open and the senses alert, and it abides with us longer. The other is an inward and more or less hazy perception (saṁvṛta). The experiences of the former have not only a clearness but a chronological inter-relation, so that a sense-datum of one moment we can view in relation to another sense-datum of another moment either preceding it or following it (dvaya-kāla). We cannot normally have a continuation of the same dream day after day as we seem to have in the case of the day-to-day waking experience. An erroneous or illusive experience of wakeful life (e. g. mistaking a rope for snake) can be reproduced in some subsequent

dream; but an erroneous experience of the sort belonging to dream-life is not known to cause its reproduction during wakeful life (iv. 39). These few differences between the two states, however, do not amount to very much, and they can be plausibly attributed to the condition of their experiencer (sthānin). A sick person lacking in vitality can obtain a hazy and feeble experience of the wakeful life in the same manner as a vivid and powerful dreamer can encounter an impressive night-mare or some other life-like hallucination. A subjective idealist (Vijñānavādin) is wont to deny reality to the external world because it resembles the world of dreams, which we can easily prove for ourselves as being unreal. We can follow him so far; but when he goes on to assert that *therefore* the objects are unreal and the ideas alone are real, we have to point out to him that the ideal experience such as that of the dream life does not differ, *qua* experience, from that of the waking life. There is the same distinction between the subject and the object (grahaṇagrāhakâbhāsa), the same imaginary projection of the object "out there," and the same liability to pleasure, pain, and to all the other ills, to fly away from which one desires to have recourse to Philosophy. Belief in the reality of the objective world, with which is naturally associated belief in the law of physical causation,* may be useful—and even essential—for minds that cannot grasp higher truths; and great teachers and holy scriptures have at times based their ethical or religious teachings on just such normal and work-a-day foundations of sense in the hope that, having first thoroughly assimilated the lower lessons, people may, in due time, learn to grasp the higher ones also (iv. 42–43; cp. ii. 29 and iii. 23). The idealistic position which sublates the physical world and reduces everything to mere "ideas" or Vijñānas is no doubt a view-point higher than the above which is rooted in sense,

* Which takes the form either of the Satkāryavāda (causation out of existence) of the Sāṁkhyas, or the Asatkāryavāda (causation out of non-existence) of the Vaiśeṣikas.

but it is still far removed from the true haven of philosophical rest. The downright realist and the dreamy idealist, in their endeavours to fight against each other's view-point, only prove themselves like two enraged snakes that attempt swallowing each other by the tail. What they encounter eventually are the so-called "Antinomies of Reason," which can only be got round by critically transcending them.

Gauḍapāda begins by raising (ii. 11) an issue like this: If both the dreaming and the waking consciousnesses be unreal from each other's point of view, the very possibility of such a "double-barrelled" statement by one individual implies the existence of a *basal* consciousness underlying the two states, and so not having as its contents anything that can be said to belong, exclusively, to any one of the two states. And as these two states of waking and dreaming in fact exhaust all our conscious experience, we have to imagine that this basic, unindividualized and unparticularized consciousness, exhibiting no distinctions between subject and object and no amenability to the ordinary dualistic categories of time and space and causation, belongs to a third state distinct *toto cœlo* from that of waking and dreaming. This can be no other than the state of sound-sleep, wherein the Self endures only as a mass of consciousness (Caitanyaghana), *being*—rather than enjoying—the bliss that is serene, self-centered and eternal. In this state all the extrospective operations of the senses, and all introspective broodings by the mind on the results of these operations, absolutely cease. The phenomenal manifold is now reduced to unity. The Self abides within himself in the blissful enjoyment of his own unique self-hood. He is not inert or unconscious; but his consciousness is not now sense-induced and mind-born, but a sort of a direct intuitive presentment that is past all description by words, which necessarily involve dualism and the categories of time and space and cause. The ordinary laws of causation do not apply here. Gauḍapāda at this stage affords consider-

able acute reasoning in disproof of the law of causation on the physical side in iv. 4—23, and on the mental side in iv. 24—46. The Buddhistic believers in the external world—the Sautrāntikas and the Vaibhāṣikas—are the opponents in the former case, and the Yogācāras alias Vijñānavādins in the latter. The argument is largely sophistic. "The becoming (as being already produced) cannot be produced; the non-becoming (as being incapable of being produced, cannot be produced (iv. 4)." Even if one were somehow to admit the possibility of production, the process backwards from the effect to its cause, or forwards from the cause to its effect, results in a both-ways unending chain (anavasthā), which you can neither complete nor comprehend (iv. 20). The average type of the cosmologist, while arguing for some specific First Principle on the ground of the universality of the law of causation, contradicts his basal principle by postulating, at this end, an uncaused First Cause, and—in case he happens to be a non-dualist—he throws the same principle overboard again in supposing, at the other end, that the self-reproducing causal manifold is finally funded back into the unity from which it originally took its start. It was easy for Gauḍapāda in these cases to bring the "Antinomies" home to his opponent. The transformation of the imperishable and unborn cause, possessing its own nature as cause, into the effect that is successively perishing and is being born—if not a mere figment of the imagination—becomes a sheer logical contradiction, particularly if—to make the confusion worse confounded—you, as a deist or a monist, make "The One" the goal (i. e. to say the effect) of "The Many." The result can only be Scepticism, Agnosticism, or downright prostitution of Reason (iv. 19).

The case is not very much altered if from physical causation we pass on to mental or spiritual causation. An idea arises in us. We are directly aware of its existence. Our acquaintance with the idea is far more intimate, and hence

far more likely to be real, than our knowledge of the so-called external objects. A safer way would hence seem to be to reduce everything to mere ideas. The ideas come and go, and their succession is for the most part an inwardly and deliberately regulated process which one can generally follow step by step. But because sometimes ideas spring up in the mind almost involuntarily (upalambha), it is often argued that they must be evoked from some external objects independent of us (paratantra). This need not be the case. For we may assume that the mind can become steeped in certain beginningless *vāsanās* or subliminal impressions, which by themselves can fully account for the manifoldness of the ideal phenomena. But even here, we are forced to extend the chain of mental causation into the beginningless and the endless infinity (iv. 23, 30), and thus fail to afford a really convincing explanation of causality even in the mental sphere. If the waking world is denied real existence bacause it is sublated in the dream-world, the dream-world must also be pronounced as being unreal because it no longer continues on into wakeful life; and both these experiences must be considered to be nugatory from the point of view (if we can speak of one where there is no *viewing* at all) of the deep-sleep. Causation, objectivity, movement : these are mere figments; Reality is one, unique, unborn, serene and quiescent mass-of-conciousness (caitanya-ghana). The so-called birth and death that are generally associated with Self do not belong to the Self, but are falsely predicated of him. These resemble the birth and death that the dreamer associates with his own dreaming self (iv. 68). The continuity of the consciousness is nowise disturbed by these temporary breaks or hindrances caused by sleep, death, or re-birth. As the Chāndogya says (vi. 9. 2-3)—" Whatever the Self was (prior to falling asleep), whether a tiger, or a lion, or wolf, or a boar, or an insect, or a butterfly, or a gnat, or a fly, just that, once more, the Self becomes (upon his return to wakeful life)." It is of course true that upon return from the sleep to the waking or dreaming experience

the Self shows no awareness of what he was doing or feeling during sleep, or indeed of whether he at all existed during the time. "He has been entirely annihilated (vināśam eva apīto bhavati)" is what one normally imagines. But the fact is that the Self does endure. Negativism or Śūnyavāda is not the final word of philosophy. Beyond sleep there is the fourth state of Yogic *samādhi*, where all finite relations including that of subject and object cease, and wherein what we had called the mind or consciousness on the lower plane becomes itself one with the Aboslute Brahman (iii. 35, 46).

It will thus be seen that the Ultimate Reality in the world is Cit or intuitive consciousness bereft of all relations and limitations. The individualized mind or Self (jīva) of wakeful and dreaming life as well as the finite sensuous experience derived therefrom is an illusion superimposed upon this Cit; and there ensues a daily escape from the domination of this Māyā or illusion in deep-sleep. When from sleep the Self reverts, owing to persistence of the force of his unspent-up or unconsumed *vāsanās*, to the waking life, he *creates* the whole Saṁsāra anew. He is thus identical with the Lord or the Creator as the ordinary theist might style him (i. 8-10, ii. 12-13); while the other conceptions of Him by the erring philosophers (several of these are enumerated in i. 7–9, ii. 20–28) are only partial expressions for Him (ii. 29). The escape from the bonds of illusion that ensues when the Self, by the saving grace of knowledge, wins emancipation is permanent—or, more accurately speaking, is timeless,—so that we could, with a truth deeper than what sheer negativism might convey, echo the dictum: "Na bandho, na mokṣaḥ—there is neither real bondage nor real freedom therefrom." For, if Mokṣa or emancipation were an event in time, possessing a definite beginning, it can never become endless, permanent or immortal (iv. 30); and what is true of Mokṣa must needs hold in the case of the bondage. If the bondage be real, its reality must be of the same grade and nature as the reality of the Mokṣa.

Now Reality as such is one and unique, and one portion or aspect of Reality cannot negate or destroy another portion or aspect. And if bondage be non-existent from the ultimate point of view, the usually accepted cause of bondage—the jāti or birth in Saṁsāra—must also be pronounced unreal from the highest point of view. Thus we arrive at the famous "Ajātivāda" (iv. 46). Gauḍapāda endeavours to elucidate the purport of the Ajātivāda by the familiar illustration of the whirling fire-brand (iv. 47–50). "All that is "born" is "born" through illusion. Hence there exists nothing eternal. From the ultimate view-point everything is unborn, and hence there ensues no destruction of anything" (iv. 57).

The true purport of one's life, therefore, is to realise the highest truth of the "ajāti." To bring this about, one's mind must withdraw from the outward world of sense and fix itself steadfast upon the Absolute. And then the mind, steadily weaned from the contact and contemplation of all duality, becomes itself the Absolute. And this union of the mind with the Absolute differs fundamentally (iii. 34) from that day-to-day union with the Absolute in our deep sleep (iii. 34). It is very difficult to realise, and the way to do so lies only through the so-called "Asparśa-yoga" (iii. 39), which depends upon severe Yogic discipline and perfection. The resulting state is akin to what in Buddhistic texts is known as the "neva-saññā–nâ'saññā" Samādhi, through which the Buddha passed before he attained the "Parinirvāṇa."* The

* The earlier stages are designated in Buddhistic texts as Kāmāvacara, Rūpāvacara, and Arūpāvacara, which may be taken roughly to correspond to the three states of the Self. These do not rise above the categories of the subject and the object (jñāna and jñeya), and ordinary ethical teachings, whether of the Veda with its prescriptions and prohibitions or of the Mahāyāna Buddhism with its Four Truths of Duḥkha (heya), Samudaya (jñeya), Nirodha (āpya), and Mārga (pākya), are valid only with reference to these, but are not valid with reference to the Vijñeya (iv. 90), which is the very Highest Truth (the "Arahattamaggacitta") that baffles every word-description.

state is a steady, serene, sorrowless, and self-centered bliss, unruffled by cares and contradictions. It is a direct presentment or illumination, *not* by the way of the senses. It is one, unique and eternal : or rather it is time-less, seeing that having once attained it you realise that you always had it. There is no description of it in words, no possibility of its being set forth by the ordinary categories of the subject and the object, which are the basic factors of all human experience as such. Hence, with an apparent paradox, it can be truly asserted that the Omniscient Self that has secured his release possesses no knowledge (that is to say, the ordinary sense-knowledge) of the Reality, and therefore has not explained it in words (iv. 99)*—as how could he ?—" *Yatra hi dvaitam iva bhavati tatra itaraḥ itaram paśyati......abhivadati......vijānāti...* (Bṛ. Up. ii. 4. 14). Whatever the achievements of Buddhism in the domains of Ethics and Dialectics, it can nevertheless be truly said that the Upaniṣadic Advaitism still contrived to give the last word in Metaphysics.

In many ways the Kārikās of Gauḍapāda can be said to be a typical product of the age to which they belong; and they mark a definite stage in the endeavours of the Hindu Orthodoxy to stem the tide of encroaching Buddhism, and to re-assert its own age-worn superiority. Whatever may have been the original causes of the success of Buddhism against the Vedic Religion of the sacrifice and the Brāhmaṇic organization of the castes (varṇa) and stages (āśrama), it became increasingly obvious to the discerning minds of the day that, after the rehabilitation of the old Vedic Religion in its Paurāṇic garb in the manner set forth in the beginning of this Lecture,

* " Naitat Buddhena bhāṣitam."—The Commentator here—but only here—takes the word "Buddha" as a proper name, referring it to the founder of Buddhism, whose deficiency is supposed to be here exposed. Since however the word buddha is elsewhere consistently used of the Enlightened Self—with a *double entente* it is true — we propose to interpret the stanza in the manner above suggested.

Buddhism was able to maintain its own only by an increasing adoption of the cult and pantheon of Hinduism—including in this term, Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism, Tāntrism, and the several other " isms " with their costly rituals and pompous processions intended to catch the imagination of the masses, that constituted the vogue of the day.* From its very inception Buddhism was averse to metaphysical speculations as such. And the powerful dialectics that it developed under such profound logicians as Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu, Asaṅga, Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti was more potent as a weapon of offence. If a system were to be put forth that could elude the four-edged rhetoric of the Prāsaṅgika School, and that could at the same time range itself on the side of Hindu Orthodoxy, as being based, in its ultimate premises, on some ancient Scriptures like the Upaniṣads, its triumph was assured. Such a system was the Advaita Vedānta, which could afford to bid defiance to all logic and look with unconcern upon the battle of wits ranging between different philosophical Darśanas all around, because its First Principle was beyond the pales of finite human reasoning. The system professed to build upon the unshakable foundations of the mystic experience which was induced by arduous Yogic discipline; and in so far as this aspect of the system was concerned, it may be said to have built upon foundations, which are more or less common to all the great Religions. It was this part of the programme that Gauḍapāda may be said to have carried out. He proved in effect that at the root and core of all self-destructive negations there ought to be something real and positive which is the cosmic counterpart of the psychic Self and which not even the most thorough-going sceptic can succeed in gainsaying. " You can doubt everything, but cannot doubt the Doubter." Unfortunately, however, the extreme ultra-logical standpoint

* Witness the gorgeous annual procession of the image of Buddha described by Hiuen Tsang, wherin King Harṣavardhana took a part: Beal, Life of Hiuen Tsiang, pp. 177ff.

which Gauḍapāda ushered forth involved a leap between the finite and the Infinite which made the Infinite a negation of all finite, rather than a comprehending and a transcending of the same. Ethically it marked a rift between the ignorant masses that choose to walk and even bravely face the thorny path of the Particular and the Seeker after the Absolute who must renounce the world and retire into the sequestered mountain-recesses to find the Self; and what is more, having found the way to the Self through this arduous and self-denying ordeal of Saṁnyāsa, it was not permitted to the Mukta to point the way to Salvation to the unfreed multitude that he may have left behind struggling in the mire of sense, because, from those giddy heights of the Absolute, all distinction between the Self and the Non-self—between the freed and the unfreed—was nugatory. The position attained was safe, as far as the Buddhistic dialectic was concerned; but it was pitched so high as to be absolutely beyond the reach, and therefore, absolutely incapable of giving any real guidance to the weltering humanity. It was now left for the great Śaṅkarācārya, by a tactful variation of the emphasis, but without sacrificing anything essential, to bridge the gulf and to blaze a path which nobody need be so weak or humble as to altogether despair of attaining and following to the limits of his own power and ability. This great achievement, which will have to be studied in close association with the social and religious environment which brought it about, will now form the subject of our next two Lectures.

LECTURE VI

ŚAṄKARA: HIS LIFE, AND TIMES

THE date of Śaṅkarācārya, thanks to the researches in particular of Professor K. B. Pathak,* is now based upon evidence which it is not easy to set aside; but as attempts † have been made very recently to call it into question, it has become necessary to re-state the position. Śaṅkara according to tradition (see Vidyāraṇya's Śaṅkaradigvijaya, Canto vii) was the younger contemporary of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. Śaṅkara in any case quotes views akin to those of Kumārila in the (Metrical) Upadeśasāhasrī, Section xviii, verses 139–141, (which can be regarded as a genuine work of Śaṅkara since it is frequently quoted in the Naiṣkarmyasiddhi of Śaṅkara's immediate pupil Sureśvara), as also in the introductory portion of his Bhāṣya on the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, as explained by Sureśvara's Vārtika.‡ Śaṅkara therefore must have lived after Kumārila. Now, the date of Kumārila is determined by three independent lines of evidence. Kumārila in his Tantravārtika quite frequently quotes for refutation verses from Bhartṛhari's

* Of his several papers bearing on the subject the following may be here singled out: (1) Dharmakīrti and Śaṅkarācārya (BBRAS, XVIII, pp. 88–96); (2) Bhartṛhari and Kumārila (*Ibid.*, pp. 213–238); and (3) The Position of Kumārila in Digambara Jaina Literature (Transactions of the Ninth International Congress of Orientalists, pp. 186-214). Some other important papers of his, which have been here in part utilised, are now awaiting publication in the Annals of the B. O. R. Institute, Poona.

† See, for instance, S. V. Venkateswara's note in the JRAS for 1916, pages 163 ff., as well as T. R. Chintāmaṇi's paper on "The Date of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya" in the Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, Vol. iii, pt. 1, pp. 39–56.

‡ Ānad. ed. p. 5, verse 9, ascribed by Sureśvara to some "Mīmāṁsakammanya," actually occurs in Kumārila's Ślokavārttika, Chowkhamba Series ed. p. 671, verse 110.

Vākyapadīya,* and the Chinese pilgrim I-tsing informs us that Bhartṛhari died some forty years previous to his own time, that is to say, in A. D. 650. Kumārila must accordingly have flouished after 650; but by how many years subsequent to 650? The reply is furnished by another line of evidence. Akalaṅka is a celebrated Jaina philosopher who composed a commentary called Aṣṭaśatī on Samantabhadra's Āptamīmāñsā. Akalaṅka (together with his pupil Prabhācandra) is cited in Jinasena's Ādipurāṇa (written in Śaka 760 = A. D. 838), and he himself cites from Bhartṛhari and Dharmakīrti. Akalaṅka accordingly seems to have been, conformably to tradition, a contemporary of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa Emperor Sāhasatuṅga Dantidurga, whose date is furnished by the Samanagad grant of Śaka 675 = A. D. 753. Now, Akalaṅka's opinions have been frequently cited and criticised in Kumārila's Ślokavārttika, while this latter work has received a similar treatment at the hands of Akalaṅka's pupils, commentators and junior contemporaries such as Vidyānanda named also Pātrakesarisvāmin, and Prabhācandra, the author of the *Kamalamārtaṇḍa.* Professor K. B. Pathak, from the evidence cited, correctly surmises that Akalaṅka did not probably live long enough to defend his own position against the attacks of Kumārila,—a task which was taken up by Vidyānanda and Prabhācandra, who seem to have been separated from Akalaṅka by about a quarter of a century at the most, seeing that Prabhācandra is mentioned in the Ādipurāṇa of Jinasena, the preceptor of the Rāṣṭrakūta king Amoghavarṣa I, whose known epigraphic dates range from A. D. 817 to 877. Akalaṅka's mean date would thus seem to be nearer 750 than 650, and Kumārila who appears to have survived Akalaṅka cannot be placed earlier than A. D. 700 or even 720. Two or three generations thus seem to lie between the reported death of Bhartṛhari in cir. 650 and Kumārila. This easily accounts for the failure to

* Such as I. 13, II. 14, II. 121, II. 309, II. 377, etc. For details see JBBRAS, Vol. xviii, pp. 214 f.

mention the name of Kumārila on the part of both the Chinese pilgrims: Hiuen Tsang, who left India in 645 A. D., and I-tsing who died in China (713) long before Kumārila had attained eminence in the world of letters. The third independent line of evidence follows from the circumstance that the celebrated Buddhistic writer Dharmakīrti, whom I-tsing (634–713) mentions as his contemporary, is quoted by Samantabhadra, whose commentator Akalaṅka was, as we have seen, the senior contemporary of Kumārila. Śaṅkara has himself quoted the stanza beginning with—*Abhinno pi hi buddhyātmā* in his (Metrical) Upadeśasāhasrī. The same stanza is quoted in Kumārila's Ślokavārtika and Sāyaṇa-Mādhava's Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha by the Jaina writers Vidyānanda and Pātrakesarin, and by Sureśvarācārya in the Bṛhadāraṇyakavārtika (IV. iii. 476), where the commentator Ānandagiri ascribes it to the authorship of Dharmakīrti. Sureśvara has named Dharmakīrti in IV. iii. 753. It is hence obvious that Śaṅkara knows and quotes the Buddhistic writer Dharmakīrti. And inasmuch as between Dharmakīrti and Śaṅkara there must lie the major portion of the literary labours of Akalaṅka (who has attacked Dharmakīrti's *trilakṣaṇa-hetu*) and of Kumārila (who in turn attacks Akalaṅka's proof for the existence of an Omniscient Being), we cannot place Kumārila earlier than 720, nor Śaṅkara, consequently, earlier than 750. Śaṅkara's traditional date (788–820 A. D.) as preserved in a short anonymous Ms. first brought to light by Prof. K. B. Pathak, and giving an account of Śāṅkara and Mādhva sects, viz.—

Nidhināgebhavahnyabde(3889) vibhave Śaṅkarodayaḥ ।
Kalyabde candranetrâṅkavahnyabde(3921)prāviśad guhām ॥

may therefore be accepted as abundantly confirmed, seeing that the same date is also given in the *Śaṅkaramandārasaurabha*, where the Kali date (4000 – 111 =) 3889 is expressed as "Ekādaśâdhikaśatona-catussahasrīyām."

The really cogent arguments that have been so far urged against the above date may now be considered. It will have

been noticed that the date above assigned to Śaṅkara is based upon the independent evidence of quotations, and does not merely rest upon traditional statements of works like the *Śaṁkaramandārasaurabha*, to set against which other divergent traditional statements,—such as that of the *Darśanaprakāśa* (a work written in Śaka 1560 = A.D. 1638 and belonging to the Mahānubhāva sect),* where Śaṅkarācārya is declared to have "entered the cave" in "yugmapayodhirasānvitaśāke," i. e., the Śaka year 642 (= A. D. 720), or of the *Keraḷotpatti*,† where Śaṅkarācārya is said to have become incarnate in the 3501st year of the Kali-yuga (= A. D. 400) and lived for 38 years—can be cited, seeing that the traditional succession lists in the several Maṭhas have been unscrupulously manipulated. It is only the weighty and unimpeachable evidence based on quotations and cross-references occurring in early and reliable texts that alone can shake the date that has been assigned above to Śaṅkarācārya.

The following are some of the main considerations urged against the above date, and it is rather curious that they all centre around some known predecessor of Śaṅkarācārya such as Gauḍapāda and Kumārila, or one of the Ācārya's immediate pupils. (1) Gauḍapāda is reputed to be the "*prācārya*" or the teacher's teacher of Śaṅkarācarya. But one of the reputed works of Gauḍapāda, the Sāṁkhyakārikābhāṣya, was translated into Chinese by Paramārtha between A. D. 546 and 569. This will not warrant the assigning of the "praśiṣya" or the pupil's pupil of Gauḍapāda to a date removed by over 250

* Published by the Chitraśālā Press of Poona. The Six Darśanas described in this late tract are Kāmaśāstra, Dharmaśāstra, Yogaśāstra, Sāṁkhyaśāstra, Vedāntaśāstra, and Nyāyaśāstra. From the description given, and the first sūtra of each 'Śāstra' quoted, it is evident that, except the Nyāya, the works intended by the author must be quite different from the current texts, some of which he has declared in so many words to be not Śāstras. The work is unhistorical, and its statements should not deserve much credence.

† Indian Antiquary, VII. 282f.

years from that of the prâcārya. The force of this argument is however vitiated by the discovery of the Māṭharavṛtti* which seems to have been the original not only for the translator Paramārtha but for the commentator Gauḍapāda, who may or may not be regarded as identical with the celebrated Prâcārya of Śaṅkara and the author of the Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad-Kārikās.† (2) We have seen that according to the tradition, and upon the evidence of Sureśvara's quotation in the Taittirīya-Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya-Vārttika, Kumārila has to be placed earlier than Śaṅkara (as being his senior contemporary). He has accordingly been assigned to about A. D. 750. But, on the evidence not only of an old but solitary Ms. of Bhavabhūti's Mālatī-Mādhava,‡ but of the Yuktisnehaprapūraṇī, a commentary on the Śāstradīpikā (Nir. Sāg. ed., p. 30), as well as of the Citsukhī (Nir. Sāg. ed., page 265), one of Kumārila's pupils seems to have been Umbeka, the name being supposed to be an *alias* of the famous dramatist Bhavabhūti. But Bhavabhūti's usually accepted date is the first quarter of the eighth century. Hence, to square these facts, we must either (i) bring Kumārila nearer to Bhavabhūti's time by giving up the contemporaneity of Kumārila and Śaṅkara; or (ii) take Bhavabhūti nearer to Kumārila's time by discountenancing the story of Bhavabhūti's being patronised by Yaśovarman; § or (iii) discard the equation of Bhavabhūti=Umbeka : or finally (iv) upset the date above arrived at for Śaṅkarācārya. The second of these seems to me the most plausible way out. Kalhaṇa's referring Bhavabhūti to the

* See the R. G. Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume, pp. 171–184.

† See page 189 before.

‡ S. P. Pandit's edition of the Gaüḍa-vaho, Introd., pp. covff.

§ Yaśovarman of Kanauj lived some fifteen years after his defeat by Lalitāditya of Kashmir, and Kalhaṇa's allusion (Rājataraṅgiṇī iv. 144) to Yaśovarman's patronage of Bhavabhūti, *if real*, can be taken to refer to this subsequent period. So too, the words *ajjavi* in Gaüḍa-vaho, Stanza 799, can denote a rather very short interval between Vākpatirāja and Bhavabhūti. The " water-drop " stays only for a while, and is then evaporated.

reign of Yaśovarman may be on a par with Shakespeare's being referred to the Elizabethan period, although some of the best plays of the English Dramatist were produced after the death of that Queen. (3) Maṇḍana, the Mīmāṅsist, is supposed to have been Kumārila's pupil as well as brother-in-law. This Maṇḍana, subsequent to his defeat by Śaṅkara, became Sureśvarācārya—says the tradition. Sureśvara was one of the elderly pupils of Śaṅkara. Now Sureśvara is quoted by the Jaina author Vidyānanda in the Aṣṭasāhastrī, and Vidyānanda is referred to by Jinasena, whose Harivaṁśa was written in Śaka 705 or A. D. 783. Thus Maṇḍana alias Sureśvara is at least two generations earlier than 783, which would militate against the date proposed for Śaṅkara. This objection is easily met. First, the identity of Maṇḍana with Sureśvara is not beyond cavil. Professor S. Kuppuswami* of Madras believes that he is in a position to prove that the "Maṇḍana-Sureśvara equation in the history of Advaita is a myth; that Maṇḍana is a representative Advaitin of the Pre-Śaṅkara stage......... ; and that Maṇḍana is not, but Sureśvara undoubtedly is, a disciple of Śaṅkara." Secondly, it must not be forgotten that Jinasena had a very long literary career. His last work, the Ādipurāṇa, where Vidyānanda is quoted, was written full 55 years after his earlier work, the Harivaṁśa. Vidyānanda and Sureśvara are best regarded as contemporaries; and that can remove all our difficulties. (4) Padmapāda, the author of a commentary (the Pañcapādikā) on the first five Pādās of the Śārīraka-bhāṣya on the Vedānta-sūtras was, according to tradition, one of the direct pupils of Śaṅkara. Vācaspatimiśra, one of whose works is dated 898 Saṁvat or A.D. 841, refers often enough† to this Pañcapādikā. So too, on the evidence of Amalānanda's Bhāmatīkalpataru, Vācaspatimiśra frequently cites and refutes the objections of

* Report of the Third Oriental Conference, Madras, 1925, p. 480.

† According to the commentator Amalānanda on Vācaspatimiśra's Bhāmatī *apud* I. ii. 26, I. iii. 17, etc.

Bhāskara to Śaṅkara's interpretations of the Vedāntasūtras.* If Śaṅkara is to belong to A. D. 788–820, this does not leave sufficient interval between Saṅkara and Vācaspati. To this objection the reply is that the interval available *is* sufficient as far as the interposition of Padmapāda between Śaṅkara and Vācaspati is concerned; and as to the position of Bhāskara, sufficient evidence for placing him earlier than Vācaspati is not yet forthcoming. The alleged citation in Bhāmatī in the form of the stanza occurring on p. 18 of the Chowkhamba edition of the Bhāskarabhāṣya is itself a quotation in the latter work; and, as we shall try to prove in a subsequent Lecture, more than one commentator on the Vedāntasūtras must have lived between Śaṅkara and Bhāskara. Lastly, (5) tradition speaks of Hastāmalaka, one of the direct pupils of Śaṅkara, as having been a dullard son of Prabhākara who, along with Umbeka and Maṇḍana, is believed by some to be a pupil of Kumārila, while others regard Prabhākara as a predecessor of Kumārila. And to further complicate the matters, distinction is drawn between an older Prabhākara, the predecessor of Kumārila, and the modern Prabhākara, the pupil of Kumārila. Under the circumstances, the force of the objection which the presumed relation of Hastāmalaka with Prabhākara raises against the usually accepted date of Śaṅkara becomes very feeble and is by no means adequate to disturb our conclusion based as this is upon the unimpeachable evidence of contemporary quotations in Jaina and Buddhist Literatures.

We have attempted, at what might appear to be a some what disproportionate length, to settle the date of Śaṅkarācārya, because the question whether he lived in the fifth, the seventh or the eighth century after Christ becomes of considerable importance in evaluating the problem of the social, religious, and philosophical reconstruction as it presented itself to him, and in the solution of which the pre-eminent

* See Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, Vol. III, pt. 1, p. 46.

qualities of the Ācārya as the preacher and the writer, the leader and the statesman, the disputant and the devotee, most clearly manifest themselves. The fifth century in the history of Northern India is dominated by the great Gupta Emperors: Samudragupta (330–380), Candragupta (380–415), and Kumāragupta (415–455), the seventh century by the Emperor Harṣavardhana of Sthāṇvīśvara (Thanesar) in the North (606–647), the Cālukya King Pulakeśin II (608–642) in the Deccan, and the Pallava Mahendravarman I (600 to 625) and his successor Narasiṁhavarman I (625–645) in the South. With the fame of these mighty rulers and distinguished patrons of art resounding in the air it is extremely unlikely that Śaṅkara, if he had lived in the fifth or the seventh century, could have given a description of the social and political condition of the India of his own days in these words (Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya, I. iii. 33; Thibaut, vol. I, page 222)—"A person maintaining that the people of ancient times were no more able to converse with the gods than people are at present...........might as well maintain that because there is at present no prince ruling over the whole earth (sārvabhauma), there were no such princes in former times; or he might maintain that in former times the spheres of duty of the different castes and *āśramas* were as generally unsettled as they are now." There are other local and contemporary touches in the writings of Śaṅkara—to say nothing of the attempts* to identify Pūrṇavarman, Balavaman, Jayasiṁha, Kṛṣṇagupta, and other princes mentioned by Śaṅkara in his authentic works with certain known historical figures—which accord well with his being assigned to the end of the eighth and the beginning of the ninth century. And once this is fixed, we are in a position, with the help of ascertained facts of the literary and religious history of India, to settle the predecessors and compeers of the Ācārya belonging not

* Vide Br. S. Bhāṣya on II. i. 20, II. iv. 1, IV. iii. 5; Ch. Up. Bhāṣya on i. 23; etc. Compare Ind. Ant., vol. XLI (1912), p. 200.

only to his own religion and his own philosophical school, but to those manifold sects and persuasions with whom he had to wage war of offence and defence; and then to ascertain the nature of the problem of the socio-religious reconstruction of Hindu India as it presented itself to him—its dangers and difficulties—and to evaluate the measure of success he may have attained in judging the malady aright, and in applying the correct remedy to cure it. Before however we can do so with certainty it becomes necessary to determine which of the hundreds of works, small and large, attributed to Śaṅkarācārya can be said, with a fair measure of probability, to come directly from the Ācārya himself. For, some short minor works like, say, the Ṣaṭpadīstotra, if admitted as genuine, reveal to us the real psychology of Śaṅkara the man much more correctly than some of the Ācārya's longer and more erudite works. Here again the problem is mainly philological, but we cannot well avoid it—nay, it must form the basis of all our further generalisations—seeing that, the neglect of this basic precaution has led more than one research student astray.

On the evidence of the three parts of Aufrecht's *Catalogus Catalogorum*, the Triennial Reports and the Descriptive Catalogues of the Govt. Oriental Library, Madras, the Collected editions of the Ācārya's major and minor or miscellaneous works brought out in Mysore, Śrīraṅgam, Poona, and elsewhere, we have been able to enumerate some 400 works generally attributed to the great name of Śaṅkarācārya and regularly giving at the end the stereotyped colophon: "*Iti Śrīmat-Paramahaṁsa-Parivrājakācārya-Śrīmat-Śaṅkara-bhagavat-pūjyapāda-kṛtau*"................etc. These fall into three main divisions: commentaries, *stotras* (hymns of praise), and *prakaraṇa-granthas* (miscellaneous religio-philosophic—particularly Vedāntic—tracts). On grounds which we cannot fully set forth in this place* we regard the following

* These form the subject of a separate paper awaiting publication.

eleven commentorial works as most probably coming, in the main, from Śaṅkarācārya himself—

1 Brahma- or Vedānta- sūtra- (alias Śārīraka-)Bhāṣya
2 Īśa–Upaniṣad–Bhāṣya
3 Kena–Upaniṣad–[Pada–]Bhāṣya
4 Kaṭha–Upaniṣad–Bhāṣya
5 Praśna–Upaniṣad–Bhāṣya
6 Muṇḍaka–Upaniṣad–Bhāṣya
7 Taittirīya–Upaniṣad–Bhāṣya
8 [Mahā–]Aitareya–Upaniṣad–Bhāṣya *
9 Chāndogya–Upaniṣad–Bhāṣya
10 Bṛhadāraṇyaka–Upaniṣad–Bhāṣya and
11 Bhagavad-Gītā–Bhāṣya.

The ascription of the following fifteen commentaries to Śaṅkarācārya is more or less debatable—

(1) Māṇḍūkya–Upaniṣad–Bhāṣya
(2) Māṇḍūkya–Upaniṣad–Kārikā–Bhāṣya†
(3) Śvetāśvatara–Upaniṣad–Bhāṣya
(4) Nṛsiṁha–[Pūrva–]Tāpanīya–Upaniṣad–Bhāṣya ‡
(5) Kena–Upaniṣad–[Vākya–]Bhāṣya
(6) Kauṣītakī–Upaniṣad–Bhāṣya
(7) Maitrāyaṇīya–Upaniṣad–Bhāṣya
(8) Kaivalya–Upaniṣad–Bhāṣya
(9) [Mahā]–Nārāyaṇa–Upaniṣad–Bhāṣya §
(10) Hastāmalaka-stotra–Bhāṣya

* Otherwise known as Bahvṛcabrāhmaṇa-Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya, being a commentary on Ait. Āraṇyaka II and III, the Ait. Upaniṣad proper being = Āraṇ. II, Chaps. 4-7.

† Otherwise known as Āgamaśāstra-vivaraṇa.

‡ Although supposed to be, according to tradition, the earliest work (ādya-kṛti) of Śaṅkara it refers to the Prapañcasāra and the Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya as the author's own earlier compositions.

§ The one printed as appendix to the Ānandāśrama edition of the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, on the ground of two of its maṅgalācaraṇa stanzas and its quotation from the Prapañcasāra (ed., p.810), seems to belong to a Śaṅkarācārya of some later date.

(11) Viṣṇu-sahasranāma-Bhāṣya
(12) Sanatsujātīya-Bhāṣya
(13) Adhyātmapaṭala-Bhāṣya*
(14) Gāyatrī-Bhāṣya and
(15) Saṁdhyā-Bhāṣya.

The following 31 commentaries seem almost certainly to be spurious works—

[1] Aparokṣānubhava-Vyākhyā
[2] Amaru-Śataka-Ṭīkā
[3] Ānandalaharī-Ṭīkā
[4] Ātmabodha-Ṭīkā, designated as Adhyātmavidyā-Upadeśavidhi, Ajñānabodhinī, and Saṁkṣipta-Vedānta-Śāstra-Prakriyā
[5] Uttara-Gītā-Ṭīkā
[6] Upadeśasāhasrī-Vṛtti
[7] Ekaślokī-Vyākhyā
[8] Gopāla-Tāpanīya-Upaniṣad (Pūrva and Uttara)
[9] Triśatī-Nāmârtha-Prakāśikā
[10] Dakṣināmūrti-aṣṭaka-Ṭīkā
[11] Pañca(padī)-Prakaraṇī-Ṭīkā, otherwise named Saccidānandânubhava-Dīpikā
[12] Pañcīkaraṇaprakriyā-Vyākhyā
[13] Paramahaṅsa-Upaniṣad-Hṛdaya
[14] Pātañjala-Yogasūtrabhāṣya-Vivaraṇa
[15] Brahma-Gītā-Ṭīkā
[16] Bhaṭṭikāvya-Ṭīkā
[17] Rājayoga-Bhāṣya
[18] Laghu-Vākya-Vṛtti-. īkā
[19] Lalitā-Sahasranāma-Bhāṣya †
[20] Vijṛmbhita-Yoga-[Sūtra]-Bhāṣya

* Being a commentary on the eighth Paṭala of the first Praśna of the Āpastamba-Dharmasūtra. It has been published in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series.

† There is also a Lalitā-triśatī-Bhāṣya.

[21] Viṣṇu-sahasranāma-Saṁgraha-Bhāṣya *
[22] Vṛddha-Brāhmaṇa-Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya†
[23] Sataśloki-Vyākhyā
[24] Śākaṭāyana-Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya
[25] Śiva-Gītā-Vyākhyā
[26] Ṣaṭpadī-Ṭīkā, styled Vedānta-Siddhānta-Dīpikā
[27] Saṁkṣepa-Śārīraka-Bhāsya
[28] Saṁdhyā-Vandana-Bhāṣya ‡
[29] Sambandha-Dīpikā (?)
[30] Sāṁkhya-Saptati-Ṭīkā Jayamaṅgalā and
[31] Sūtasaṁhitā-Bhāṣya.

Passing next to a consideration of the *stotras* attributed to Śaṅkarācārya (of which about 220 can be easily enumerated), one cannot fail to notice, in the first place, a sort of an artificiality about them. Thus we have at least 15 stotras composed in the "Bhujaṅgaprayāta" metre (⏑– –, ⏑– – । ⏑– –, ⏑– – ॥) and addressed to gods like Gaṇeśa, Gaṇḍakī, Dakṣiṇāmūrti, Datta, Devī, Nṛsiṁha, Bhavānī, Rāma, Viṣṇu, Sāmba, Śiva, Subrahmaṇya, Hanumat, etc. Their subjects too are of a stereotyped nature,§ containing many identical expressions and sentiments; and not one of them has any old commentary on it or has its authenticity vouched for by any reliable and ancient author. I feel no hesitation in regarding them all (with one possible exception) as spurious. Next we have the "aṣṭakas" of which I have been able to count over 35, being addressed to the deities such as Acyuta, Annapūrṇā, Ambā, Ardhanārīśvara, Kālabhairava, Kṛṣṇa, Gaṅgā, Gaṇeśa, Govinda, Cidānanda, Jagannātha, Tripurasundarī, Dakṣiṇā-

* See No. (11) above.

† Same (?) as the Maṇḍala-Brāhmana-Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya.

‡ Same (?) as No. (15) above.

§ At least half a dozen of them allude to the torments of Saṁsāra and bemoan in feeling language the miseries of old age, domestic unhappiness, and the like. It is obvious that Śaṅkarācārya could not have been their author.

mūrti, Narmadā, Pāṇḍuraṅga, Bālakṛṣṇa, Bindumādhava, Bhavānī, Bhairava, Bhramarâmbā, Maṇikarṇikā, Yamunā, Rāghava, Rāma, Liṅga, Śāradâmbā, Śiva, Śrīcakra, Sahajā, and Hālâsya. There are only two amongst these, viz., Dakṣiṇāmūrti-aṣṭaka and Gopāla-aṣṭaka (the former with commentaries attributed to Sureśvara, Vidyāraṇya, Svayamprakāśa, and even Śaṅkara himself, and the latter with one attributed to Ānandatīrtha) that, in style and contents, can put forth a plausible claim to authenticity. The rest are late, and falsely attributed to Śaṅkara's authorship. And similar remarks hold in the case of the over thirty hymns named after the number of stanzas (5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 50, 64, 70, 100, and 108) comprised in them, of which only the well-known *Ṣaṭpadī* and *Daśaślokī* stand forth with a claim to genuineness grounded upon the existence of more than one reliable and ancient commentary on them. Other artificialities of composition exhibited by these minor *stotras* are: (i) an attempt to make the initial letters of the successive stanzas follow the order of the Devanāgarī alphabet;* (ii) an endeavour to describe all the parts of the object of adoration beginning with the feet and ending with the hair; † (iii) an arrangement of the stanzas to follow the normal ritual of worship in 16 (or 64) stages; ‡ or (iv) conceiving of the same ritual as an ideal process (mānasa-pūjā) which is addressed, in a majority of cases,§ to the Ātman or Self within, conceived as the Highest Principle, rather than to some Deity different from, and external to, the human body or the individual soul.

Without arguing the pros and cons of each case, we will now enumerate what we regard as very probably the genuine *stotras* of Śaṅkarācārya. These are—

* There are three or four such hymns.

† There are at least three such hymns.

‡ Ṣoḍaśopacāra or Catuḥṣaṣṭyupacāra Pūjā. There are four such hymns.

§ Over twelve.

12 Ānandalaharī, consisting of twenty stanzas in Śikhariṇī metre,* and honoured by over 30 commentaries, one attributed to Śaṅkara himself

13 Govindâṣṭaka as printed in the Vāṇīvilāsa ed., vol. 18, p. 56–58, and honoured by a com. attributed to Ānandatīrtha

14 Dakṣiṇāmūrti-stotra in 15 stanzas, on which Sureśvara wrote a com. called *Mānasollāsa*. Other comm. are also available, being attributed to Vidyāraṇya, Svayamprakāśa or Prakāśātman, Pūrṇānanda, Nārāyaṇatīrtha, and even Śaṅkarācārya himself. The Stotra consists of 15 stanzas, but there is a doubt as to the genuineness of the last five stanzas. The genuine part of the work is often styled Dakṣiṇāmūrti-aṣṭaka

15 Daśaślokī, also known as Cidānanda-daśaślokī or Cidānanda-stavarāja, with the famous commentary called the Siddhāntabindu by Madhusūdana-Sarasvatī

16 Dvādaśa-pañjarikā, usually known as the Mohamudgara, in twelve stanzas, beginning with — *Mūḍha jahīhi dhanâgama-tṛṣṇām*

17 " Bhaja Govindam " stotra, also called the Carpaṭa-pañjarikā, in 17 stanzas

18 Ṣaṭpadī or Viṣṇu-ṣaṭpadī, honoured by more than half a dozen commentaries, one attributed to Śaṅkara himself, and another from the Viśiṣṭādvaita School of Rāmānuja and

19 " Harim īḍe " stotra, on which Vidyāraṇya, Svayamprākāsa, Ānandagiri, and even Śaṅkara himself, are reported to have written commentaries—that of Svayamprakāśa being printed in the Bibliotheca Sanskrita series of Mysore (No. 20).

* As printed in the Vāṇī-Vilāsa ed., Vol. 17, pp. 159–164, and to be distinguished from the Saundarya-laharī in 100 stanzas. The authenticity of the work is not however absolutely certain.

The ascription of the next three *stotras* to the authorship of Śaṅkarācārya is plausible, but not altogether certain—

(16) Manīṣā-pañcaka (Vāṇī Vilāsa ed. XVI, p. 55 f.)

(17) Sopāna-pañcaka, also known as Upadeśa-pañcaka (Vāṇī Vilāsa ed. XVI, p. 127 f.) and

(18) Śivabhujaṅga, fourteen stanzas, omitting stanzas 1, 15–34, and 36–40 (Vāṇī Vilāsa ed.).

The following over 210 *stotras* may be safely pronounced as not genuine works of Śaṅkarācārya. We refrain from enumerating them all, but content ourselves with the following classification by groups:—

[32–62] Śaivite *stotras* (31) addressed to Śiva (19), Sāmba (3), Mṛtyuñjaya (2), and Śaṅkara, Maheśvara, Pañcavaktra, Hālâsya, Ardhanārîśvara, and other names of the God

[63–104] Stotras addressed to the Consort of Śiva (42) under names such as Devī (9), Tripurasundarī or Sundarī (6) Bhavānī (5), Lalitā (4), Ambā or Ambikā (3), Bālā (3), Kālī or Kālikā (2), Gaurī or Girijā (2), Śyāmā or Śyāmalā (2), and Śivā, Pārvatī, Mātaṅgī, Sahajā, Jvālāmukhī, and Rājarājeśvarī

[105–121] Vaiṣṇava stotras (17) addressed to Viṣṇu (4), Kṛṣṇa (5), Hari (2), Govinda (2), Mukunda, Nārāyaṇa, Acyuta, and Cakrapāṇi

[122–136] Stotras (15) addressed to the Gods and Holy Places in and about Benares,* such as—Bhairava (4), Ganges (3), Annapūrṇā (2), Maṇikarṇikā (2), and Bindumādhava, besides general praises of Benares viewed as a whole (3)

[137–151] Stotras (15) addressed to the Gods, Goddesses and Holy Places believed to have been

* Where Śaṅkara lived for years according to tradition.

visited by the Ācārya in the course of his wanderings: Jagannātha (2), the Twelve Liṅgas (2), Śrīcakra (2), Gaṇḍakī, Yamunā, Triveṇī, Sarasvatī, Narmadā, Kāmākṣī, Mīnākṣī, Śaradā, and Paṇḍuraṅga

[152–159] Stotras (8) addressed to Nṛsiṁha or Lakṣmī-Nṛsiṁha

[160–164] Stotras (5) addressed to Dakṣiṇāmūrti

[165–169] Stotras (5) addressed to Datta or Dattâtreya

[170–173] Stotras (4) addressed to Gaṇeśa or Gaṇapati

[174–177] Stotras (4) addressed to Rāma or Rāghava

[178–180] Stotras (3) addressed to Hanumat or Āñjaneya or Subrahmaṇya

[181–182] Stotras (2) occasioned by the traditional "Shower of Gold" episode, called Kanakadhārā or Kalyāṇa-vṛṣṭi

[183–187] Individual stotras (5) addressed to Cintāmaṇi, Daśa avatāras, Puṣpavīra, Śarabha-hṛdaya, and Harihara, one each

[188–189] Stotras (2) addressed to " Ajapā "

[190–230] General devotional and Vedāntic stotras (41) including topics like Mānasapūjā [mental adoration] (8), the soliciting of forgiveness for sins, and protection (8), praise of Sages, Teachers, and Blessed Persons of the past (7), description of the state of beatific union with the Absolute (12), and exaltation of Saṁnyāsa (6) and

[231–246] Miscellaneous and as yet unidentified stotras (16), some of which may turn out to be duplicates of some of those already listed above.

When we turn next to what are called the *Prakaraṇa-granthas* or shorter philosophical works, the proportion of what can be confidently put down as the genuine works of

Śaṅkarācārya to the dubious or the distinctly spurious works is almost as outrageous as in the case of the *stotras*. I have been able to put together over a hundred and ten of these *Prakaraṇagranthas*. Some of them in their style and contents bear so little relation to Śaṅkarācārya that their ascription to his great name seems little more than downright mistake. Others are philosophic compendia after the style of the Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha, or digests of Yoga and Tāntrism. Still others deal with the life and conduct of ascetics and recluses, giving also rules for the various Maṭhas as well as, occasionally, moral instructions suitable to all classes of men. The rest—barring the considerable number of miscellaneous and non-descript tracts—treat of Vedāntic topics proper, describing the nature of the Ātman or the Absolute, expounding the ultimate sense of the great Upaniṣadic utterances, commenting upon specific Vedāntic technicalities like Māyā, Kāraṇa, Tripuṭī, Nirvāṇa, etc., or constituting a complete manual of Vedāntic teaching in all its aspects, such as the later Vedāntasāra. A large majority of these texts can be declared as unauthentic, especially when we find them to contain ungrammatical words like *Gāṇāpatyaiḥ* (Jīvanmuktānandalaharī, stanza 14), or *ramantaḥ* (Yatipañcaka, st. 4); or to indulge in such artificialities as the composition of a series of stanzas with their initial letters following the alphabetical sequence; or to contain adjurations about attentiveness in service at the Royal Court, or refusal to cultivate the " Yavana" language (Praśnottaramālikā, stanzas 35 and 37); or to advocate ideas* like–'Anāder api vidhvaṁsaḥ Prāgabhāvasya vīkṣitaḥ' (where the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika division into different kinds of Negations—against which Śaṅkara has expressed himself so emphatically in the Br. S. Bhāṣya *apud* II. i. 18 — is tacitly assumed). Very few of them, in their style and thought, rise above mediocrity, or are quoted by any reliable and ancient authors, and the burden of proof must hence lie on him who wishes to claim authenticity for any of these tracts, rather

* Compare Vivekacūḍāmani, st. 202.

than of disproof on him who would *prima facie* deny such a claim. We are prepared to regard the following works as having a fairly satisfactory claim to Śaṅkara's authorship—

20 Aparokṣānubhava or °bhūti, being honoured by many commentaries, amongst others, one altributed to Śaṅkara himself, and anothor to Vidyāraṇya*

21 Ātmabodha, with several commentaries, including one attributed to Śaṅkara himself and another to Madhusūdanasarasvatī. A stanza from it (No. 13) is quoted in the Vedāntaparibhāṣā

22 Upadeśasāhasrī. The fuller title is—Sakalavedopaniṣatsārôpadeśasāhasrī. There are two works with this title, one in prose in the form of a dialogue between the teacher and the pupil, and the other in verse. The latter alone appears to be genuine, several verses from it being quoted in Sureśvara's Naiṣkarmyasiddhi. The Vṛtti on the U. S. attributed to Śaṅkara can hardly be authentic; but there are others attributed to Ānandatīrtha, Rāmatīrtha,† Bodhanidhi, etc.

23 Pañcīkaraṇa, or °prakriyā,‡ honoured by several commentaries attributed to Ānandatīrtha, Svayamprakāśamuni, etc., as also by a Vārtika supposed to come from Sureśvarācārya. There is even a vṛtti believed to be the work of Śaṅkara himself. There is nothing in the work itself that warrants its ascrip-

*This last is published in the second vol. of Śaṅkara's Miscellaneous Works brought out at Mysore in 1898. The editor is not sure about the ascription of the com. to Vidyāraṇya. Even the original work does not rise very much above the common-place, and may have been an early effort of the Ācārya.

† Rāmatīrtha comments also on the prose U. S., and we are told that the Viśiṣṭādvaita writer Vedānta-Deśikācārya (cir. 1300) refers to the prose work in his Śatadūṣaṇī.

‡ The work called Mahāvākya-Pañcīkaraṇa may be on a distinct topic. Some however identify it with the Pañcīkaraṇa.

tion to Śaṅkara, except the fact that it has called forth such extensive commentorial activity

24 Śataślokī, printed with a com.* in the Mysore ed. of the Misc. Works of Śaṅkara, Vol. ii, as also elsewhere (without com.). The work is remarkable for the easy familiarity with which it marshalls forth Vedic and Upaniṣadic texts in support of Advaitic conclusions. Consists of 101 stanzas† divided into Vijñānātman, Ānandakośa, Jagan-mithyātva, and Karma-mīmāṅsā prakaraṇas. The com. upon the work, attributed to Śaṅkara himself, can hardly be genuine.

Passing on next to the works which are usually, but not convincingly, supposed to belong to Śaṅkara's authorship, we select the following for specific mention—

(19) Ātmajñānopadeśa-prakaraṇa, probably the same as another work listed under the title of Bālabodhinī, Ātmopadeśavidhi, or Ātmavidyopadeśa. The work claims to possess commentaries by Ānandatīrtha or °giri, Pūrṇānandatīrtha and Rāmacandrasarasvatī. Can the work be the same as the Adhyātmavidyopadeśavidhi, which is the name of a com. on the Ātmabodha?

(20) Upadeśapañcaka, consisting of five stanzas beginning with " Vedo nityam adhīyatām"

(21) Upadeśasāhasrī, the prose work : see No. 22 above

(22) Māyāpañcaka, being five stanzas describing the nature of Māyā, and ending with the refrain—"aghaṭita-ghaṭanā-paṭīyasī Māyā"

(23) Laghuvākyavṛtti, consisting of 18 stanzas, and beginning with—" Sthūlo māṁsamayo dehaḥ. " Several comm. on the work seem to be in existence, amongst others one attributed to Śaṅkara himself and another to Rāmānandasarasvatī

* The editor is uncertain as to its ascription to Ānandagiri.

† The last stanza does not appear to be genuine,

(24) Vākyavṛtti, consisting of 53 stanzas, and beginning with—"Sargasthitipralayahetum." Commentaries on it attributed to Ānandatīrtha and Viśveśvarapaṇḍita have been listed

(25) Vākyasudhā, otherwise known as Dṛgdṛśyaviveka-prakaraṇa. Several comm. on the work have been enumerated, e. g., those by Brahmānanda-sarasvatī, Rāmacandratīrtha, Viśveśvara, Ānandatīrtha, Bhīmadāsa-bhūpāla, Rāmānandayati, Ātmārāma, etc. The work has not however been included in the Vāṇīvilās edition and so stands suspect. The Com. printed in the Benares Sk. Series calls it a work of Bhāratītīrtha .and

(26) Vivekacūḍāmaṇi or Vedāntaviveka,* consisting of 581 stanzas in different metres.

The prakaraṇagranthas which can almost without hesitation be put down as non-genuine may finally be simply enumerated—

[247–264] Regulations for the conduct of the ascetics and in particular for the seven Maṭhas † or pontifical sees, including works such as Śaṅkarasmṛti, ‡ [Sapta-]maṭhâmnāyādi-vicāra, Saṁnyāsakarma, as also Saṁdhyā-vandana, Śikṣāpañcaka, Jñānasaṁnyāsa,

* Occasionally the stanzas in non-Anuṣṭubh metres strike one as expositions of the Anuṣṭubh stanzas, but the theory cannot be consistently worked out so as to determine the original nucleus of the poem, if any. I regard the work as dubious. There is also another work called Vivekacūḍāmaṇi-saṁgraha.

† Only four: Śṛṅgeri, Badarī-nārāyaṇa, Dvārakā, and Jagannātha in the South, North, West and East, are supposed to be the original foundations. A claim on behalf of Kāñcī is put forth as being the most basic of all. Kumbhakonam, Saṁkeśvara, and Karavīra are later branches. In some enumerations there are included three ideal or metaphysical Maṭhas: Summer, Self, and the (Niṣkala) Brahman.

‡ Said to be current to the present day amongst the Nambudri Brahmins belonging to Śaṅkara's native District.

Sadācāravivaraṇa or °prakaraṇa or °anusaṁdhāna, etc.

[265–272] Disquisions on Yoga and Tāntrism, including the Prapañcasāra and the Yogatārāvali, both of which the Vānīvilās edition has, without sufficient justification, admitted as genuine works of the Ācārya

[273–275] Compendia for all the different Schools of Philosophy. Amongst these is included the Sarvasiddhāntasaṁgraha, which was published (1905) by the Govt. of Madras with an English Translation by M. Rangacharya

[276–304] Concise Vedāntic manuals for the beginners. These include works such as Tattvôpadeśa, Sarvavedāntasiddhāntasārasaṁgraha, and Prabodhasudhākara (these three being admitted into the Vānīvilās edition), as also works figuring under names such as Śāstradarpaṇa, Bālabodhasaṁgraha, Paramârthasārasaṁgraha, Vedāntatattvamañjarī, Jñānapradīpa or °dīpikā or °upadeśa or °gītā, or °naukā, Tattvasāra or °bodha or °saṁgraha, and even Vedāntasāra & Siddhāntabindu. Deserving of a particular mention is a Sarvopaniṣadarthasaṁgraha, a Vajrasūcyupaniṣad, and an Ekādaśottaraśatavākyasaṁgraha,—the last being a collection of 111 benedictory sentences (ending with *bhūyāt*) and embodying several distinctive Upaniṣadic doctrines

305–341] Discussions of specific Vedāntic topics such as meditation on the Self, or intuition of Brahman; the nature of Cause; of Beatific realization (including the Advaitânubhūti, Jīvanmuktânandalaharī, and Prauḍhânu-

bhūti, which all have found a place in the Vānīvilās edition); of Māyā and Nirvāṇa; of the "tripuṭī" or three factors in knowledge; of the fourfold Doubts and fivefold Means; etc.

[342–349] Discussions of the well-known Upaniṣadic utterances or Mahāvākyas

[350–353] Stray works, the ascription of which to the authorship of Śaṅkara has to be pronounced as an error, seeing that they include a phonetic discussion on the *padas* of the Vājasaneyi-saṁhitā, an alaṁkāric work called "Kavikar(a)paṭṭi," and the erotic Amaruśataka, which Śaṅkara is supposed to have composed by *parakāyāpraveśa* with a view to answer certain awkward questions of the wife of Maṇḍana-miśra to justify his title to omniscience

[354–358] A few miscellaneous works too difficult to identify or classify.

The facts above set forth yield the following net result. The works which we can almost confidently call Śaṅkara's own include 11 commentaries, 8 stotras, and 5 prakaraṇa-granthas, making a net total of 24. The works which are most probably and in the main unauthentic include 15 commentaries, 3 stotras, and 8 prakaraṇagranthas, making up a total of 26. The remaining 358 works—small and large—(comprising 31 commentaries, 215 stotras, and 112 prakaraṇa-granthas) are to be put down as non-genuine.* In evaluating

* There is perhaps discernable a similarity of style and contents amongst some of the works falling under class II, as also amongst a few others falling under class III. We can thus distinguish the hands of at least two other "Śaṅkarācāryas" that have helped to gratuitously swell the number of works to be ascribed to the first Śaṅkarācārya. Nor is the possibility ruled out of the existence of a few more works, other than those above listed, parading under the name of the Ācārya,

the philosophy of Śaṅkarācārya we will base our arguments mainly on the genuine works. Occasionally we may derive help in elucidating a few minor points by using the evidence furnished by the dubious works. But the bulk of the unauthentic works we will have to leave severely alone.

Every great man leaves behind him, as a legacy to the incoming ages, the great task of understanding and interpreting him and his life-work aright: a task which gains in difficulty in proportion to the variety and the magnitude of his achievement. And the task practically borders upon the impossible in the case of Śaṅkarācārya, where even such fragmentary and highly exaggerated biographical details about the Ācārya as happen to be preserved by the zeal of partisans and the animus of opponents are seen to be inconsistent and contradictory.* The differences between the partisans begin even from the Ācārya's native-place and parentage. Kālaṭi in the Cochin State and Śivaguru and Āryāmbā

* The published biographical "Digvijayas" include the one in verse by Vidyāraṇya with a com. attributed to Dhanapati (Ānadāshram ed.), which labours under the suspicion of being spurious and unscrupulously tampered with; and another in *campu* style ascribed to Ānandagiri and included in the Bibl. Ind. Series, which, as being a downright forgery, possesses no independent value. The first is a partisan of the Śṛṅgeri Maṭha, as the second that of the Kāñchī or Kāmakoṭi Maṭha; while all the other so-called Prācīna, Bṛhat, or Keralīya Śāṅkaravijayas are prejudiced in favour of the one or the other Pontifical See, and so contain almost a shameless tampering of traditions and documents which is provable to the hilt even by the accusations on the score of falsification of records which each party finds it possible to bring against the other. When such is the case of the avowed followers of the School, it need hardly be wondered at if the pronounced opponents belonging to the Mādhva and the Rāmānujīya Schools have gone one better, and indulged in a merciless throwing of mud in the hope that some of it might stick. This has provoked reaction, and has given birth to some of the ugliest passages that have been clothed in Sanskrit. The few grains of facts that lie buried under all this stinking dèbris arehardly worth the trouble of gleaning, and never can one feel sure that what has been picked up is fact and not fiction.

are put forth by the one side, and Cidambaram in South-Arcot and Viśvajit and Viśiṣṭā by the other.* We can, we believe, safely accept the details first mentioned. Kālaṭī or Kāladī is described as a village occupying a healthy position at some height above the sea-level, surrounded by fields of paddy alternating with jungles of flowering plants studded with clumps of bamboos. A broad river broken by sand-banks winds through the district, and near the village of Kālaṭī it affords several beautiful vistas into avenues of magnificent shady trees. In recent times (A. D. 1910) one of the devoted successors of the Śṛṅgeri Pīṭha has arranged to clear the jungles that had grown around the place, built a *ghat* to the river, and erected a beautiful Maṭha and a monument to the memory of the great Ācārya. The problem of the birth-place may therefore be now considered as having been raised above the din of controversy. And as to the parentage, the abusive epithets of a widow's son or the son of a Saṁnyāsin used in that connection do not seem to deserve the weight that some people feel inclined to give to them by putting forth the suggestion that possibly Śaṅkarācārya may have been a posthumous child. He seems, however, to have lost his father rather early, and the whole burden of bringing up the gifted and somewhat precocious boy fell upon the patient shoulders of the young widow, who does not seem to have enlisted too much sympathy from her nearer neighbours and relatives in the village. Āryāmbā seems however to have been a great woman, who fully rose to the occasion, and

* Champions of the Kāmakoṭi Peeṭha assign the first-mentioned particulars about their so-called *ādya* or original Śaṅkarācārya to whom they give the date 508 to 476 B. C., the second set of particulars being associated with a so-called *abhinava* Śaṅkarācārya (Śaṅkara V or VI) for whom, curiously enough, 788 A. D. is duly given as the birth-date. It is true that this " new " Śaṅkara is made to die in 839 A. D. at the age of 51, but should not this anxiety to have a Śaṅkara to be born in 788 A.D. raise a legitimate suspicion as to the detailed chronological fabrications extending back upto the fifth century B. C. ?

discharged her responsibility with an unflagging devotion and religious selflessness altogether worthy of the mother of the greatest philosophical genius of India. And the climax of her motherly affection may be said to have been reached when, fondly believing—as we might well imagine her to do—in the great spiritual future that awaited her hopeful son, scarcely eight years of age, she, with an heroic wrench of the heart, agreed to the son's ambition to abjure marriage, to put on the ascetic's ruddy robes, and to seek salvation by turning a preacher and a prophet.* The youthful object of this exemplary and discerning adoration has expressed his gratitude for the mother in a manner equally exemplary and one that has shed undying glory upon Śaṅkara the man even though it may have been held to somewhat compromise his position as a religious reformer. Śaṅkara's writings are full of respectful adoration for the mother, whom he describes as the natural instructor of youth (*putrasya samyag anuśāstrī*, Bṛhad. Bhāṣya, Ānand. ed., p. 529) and whose innumerable devices for securing the true well-being and education of her son, for whom she is often capable of the noblest acts of silent self-sacrifice, Śaṅkara has emphasised as much by befitting words as by the still more befitting deed, as when (to follow the traditional account which is not contradicted by any of our sources) by performing—although himself a *saṁnyāsin*—the obsequies of his mother, he proved that he could rise superior

* Silly myth-mongering has here invented the episode of the false crocodile which caught hold of the boy's leg while he was swimming, and from which release followed only upon the mother's consenting to her son's taking *saṁnyāsa*. The incident can be fully explained as an act of the mother's devotion and self-sacrifice. We must not forget that it was an age of religious revival that had already produced some of the most soul-stirring lyrics of South-India; and the women-devotees of the day certainly played no small part in that general social and intellectual upheaval. In the particular case here before us, tradition speaks of the visit of some holy sages to Śaṅkara's native place and their prophecy of Śaṅkara's death at an early age; and that may have predisposed the mother to agree to her son's becoming a recluse.

to the letter of the Law, and yet obey it in spirit, as when he —according to some accounts—unfilially enough, cut his mother's corpse into pieces for the facility of removal and arrangement upon the funeral pyre. The significance of this latter part of the story seems to have been ignored by those who see in the episode a concession to human weakness and a violation of the stricter code for the recluse.

Śaṅkara seems to have been an extra-ordinarily gifted youth. Many are the references he makes in his writings to clever pupils possessing brilliant intellect and capacious memory, and his writings bear ample evidence to the depth and extent of his readings in the "orthodox" as well as the "heretic" philosophical literature.* And it is perhaps quite a legitimate supposition to make that Śaṅkara's mother, in the course of her long and uneventful wedded life with the pious and learned Śivaguru, prior to the birth of their famous son, had acquired a genuine taste for religio-philosophical speculations, which could have rendered her capable of sympathy and appreciation for the line of philosophical thought that Śaṅkara may be supposed to have started more or less dimly formulating for himself during the earlier part of his career as a student.† In spite of the strongly rationalistic bent of his mind, Śaṅkara shows, once in a while, and in his occasional and almost unguarded utterances, that he did

* Deussen has carefully collected together the data from the quotations occurring in the Vedāntasūtra-Bhāṣya. A similar examination of the other genuine works of the Ācārya is a crying need of our studies. That even where Śaṅkara is attributing to certain schools and teachers doctrines *prima facie* inconsistent with their other more usually known views, he is really drawing upon specific works of the school ignored by us, is proved by me in my note on the Śāṅkara Bhāṣya *apud* Vedānta-Sūtra II. ii. 23.

† Instances of such inborn philosophers even amongst the unlettered are not uncommon even in our own times. The Paurāṇik recitations and the popular expositions of the Scriptures in the Temples must have exercised a great influence in carrying philosophy to the humblest of Indian cottages.

realise how the approach to the Absolute by the Pathway of Devotion was capable of reaching exactly the same goal that was set up before the sterner follower of the Pathway of Knowledge, and that that Pathway was capable of yielding, besides, a joy and a solace that was all its own. The devotional fervour underlying the familiar line from the Ṣaṭpadīstotra—"Saty api bhedâpagame, Nātha, tavâhaṁ, na māmakīnas tvam"*—the Ācārya has echoed, in a more intellectualistic mood, in his commentary on Ved. Sūtra II. i. 9, where he declares—"Although there is non-distinctness in nature between the effect and the cause, it is the effect that is of the nature of the cause, and not the cause that is of the nature of the effect." And this mellower tune in the philosophy of Śaṅkarācārya would seems to have been the direct result of the teaching and the example of his noble mother, about whom tradition narrates the story as to how, although feeble in body, she insistsd upon going on foot to the distant river for her daily bath and worship at the temple, so that Śaṅkara was forced to perform the miracle of inducing the stream to flow nearer their residence. The incident in question brings also another aspect of Śaṅkara's teaching into prominence. You may have the best theoretical (Śāstric) knowledge of the Metaphysics of the Vedānta, but that knowledge needs to be translated into action and so *realised* by a regular code of discipline, which nothing should tempt you to slacken. This, we may very well believe, was the lesson which Śaṅkara owed to his mother, whose whole career was one act of a believing and life-long penance.

It is a pity that no definite information is available to us about the person or persons responsible for initiating Śaṅkara into the full-fledged Advaita Philosophy. We are indeed told that he commenced regular Vedic studies at the early age of five, resolved to lead the celibate life of an ascetic when eight,

* "Even when all the differences are annihilated, O Lord, it is I who am Thine, not Thou that art mine."

and left the household in search of a spiritual teacher two years later. This he found in Govinda the ascetic (Govinda-yati or Govinda-bhagavat-pūjyapāda), practising austerities in the mountain-recesses adjoining the Narmadā river. From Kālaṭi to Narmadā is a distance of several hundreds of miles, and Śaṅkara is reported to have been led to the place through a miracle. When we bear in mind what hardships and privations were endured by the Buddhist pilgrims in their hazardous journeys from Pekin to Pāṭaliputra just before the age of Śaṅkara, his few hundred miles of wandering in search of Illumination need not be considered as impossible, even at the tender age when he is supposed to have started for it. The journey might have occupied weeks and months, and Śaṅkara very likely did not miss some of the well-known intervening places of pilgrimage—amongst them, for instance, the Mallikārjuna temple on the Śrīśaila mountain on the banks of the Krishnā in the Kurnool District. If tradition be correct in ascribing the *Yogatārāvali* to the authorship of Śaṅkara,* we have a reference in that work to the Ācārya's intense longing to practise austerities on that mountain. If Śaṅkara ever visited the place, it must have certainly impressed him with its mystic grandeur, which, in later times, drove Shivāji, the saviour of Mahārāṣṭra, to so uncontrollable a religious frenzy as to tempt him by his own hand to cut off his head and to offer it at the feet of the God. Be the case as it may, it would seem that from Govinda-yati Śaṅkara received initiation into Yoga and Mysticism, rather than any definite instructions in the Metaphysics of the Advaita, for which the Ācārya was rather indebted to Gauḍapāda,† the

*Another tradition ascribes the work to the authorship of Suka and a third to that of Govinda-yati himself. Neither the style nor the contents vouch for its being Śaṅkara's genuine work.

† Śaṅkara explicitly calls him the revered Ācārya, the Master of the traditional Advaitic Philosophy. In the second verse in Upadeśa-sāhasrī, xviii, he has similarly expressed the depth of his reverence for Gauḍapāda.

reputed teacher of his teacher. After a very brief stay with Govinda-yati, Śaṅkara followed the latter's advice and repaired to Benares, famous then, as indeed it is even to-day, as the last touchstone for the professors of Hindu Śāstras and Darśanas. It was thus at Benares that Śaṅkara, like Gautama Buddha some thirteen hundred years before, started his regular career as a preacher and a prophet,* won his first disciples, and had his first successful disputation.†

A story preserved by tradition concerning Śaṅkara's encounter at about this time with an untouchable Cāṇḍāla (in reality, God Śiva) who challenged the consistency of the Ācārya's conduct in avoiding even the shadow of the pariah when, philosophically, he held on to rigorous Monism, is responsible for (or may even be the consequence of) a short poem called the Manīṣāpañcaka (Vāṇīvilās ed., vol. 16). The traditional antecedents of the poem, taken along with the circumstance that, right at the very start of his career, Śaṅkara had had to face the opposition of the Mīmāṅsists, would seem to prove that it is these latter exponents of the more rigorous orthodoxy in conduct and creed who—even more than the Sāṁkhyas and the Buddhists—constituted the greatest obstacle to a peaceful reorganisation of the Society on the basis of the Advaita Philosophy to which before long

* The realistic story which narrates how Saṅkara, upon hearing the daily recitations of Grammar which formed the sole occupation of life for several youthful students in some of the grammar schools of Benares, broke out into that forceful denunciation of such soul-less learning :—" Bhaja Govindam,—Bhaja Govindam,—Bhaja Govindam,—Mūḍhamate. Prāpte saṁnihite Mṛtyau na hi na hi rakṣati *Dukṛñ karaṇe.*" (Repeat the name of Govinda, O thou fool! Lists of Roots—like *Dukṛñ* to do—howsoever diligently conned, won't save thee from the clutches of Death!)—belongs to this period.

† With the author of the Brahma-sūtras, Bādarāyaṇa-Vyāsa himself, says the tradition. It was he who is said to have granted Śaṅkara a further lease of sixteen years of life, and advised him to make the Ritualists or Mīmāṅsakas his first butt of attack.

the Ācārya had to direct his attention and devote his energies. The story of Śaṅkara's encounter with the famous Kumārila just as the latter was about to undergo (by way of a self-imposed penance for having sought to destroy his *quondum* teachers, the Buddhists) self-immolation in fire, has at least this much of philosophical value in it that the teachings of Kumārila, even on the problem of the nature of the soul, were believed to lead on, by a short and easy step, to the position held by the Advaita Vedānta on the same point.* But the tougher fight here was of course with Maṇḍana and his wife, who typified in themselves all those naturally powerful forces—helped on by inertia and mass-superstition—that are seen ever to range themselves on the side of every established institution that is able to put forth a more or less justifiable claim to antiquity. The Mīmāṅsists of the day who championed the cause of Hindu Orthodoxy—and even succeeded in winning a victory over Buddhism itself and the other forces of Heterodoxy—did, however, unfortunately fall into the very same error that had been committed, as we saw (*ante*, pp. 135 f.), by the thinkers of the age of the Bhagavadgītā. For, having somehow managed to clear the field of their opponents, they could only think of the full-blown sacrificial ritualism as the only complete code of conduct for humanity, forgetting once more the wholesome lesson that we can never summon back "the good old times" exactly as they obtained —or were believed to have obtained—once. It was at this juncture, when the newer forces were conquered and were on the way of being assimilated, that the task of re-inforcing the old social machinery and of wheeling it on to the carefully laid down new-old track, it bcame the mission of Śaṅkara to accomplish—with what success will be noted in the sequel.

* Cf. the Ātmavāda section from the Slokavārttika, and particularly its concluding verses. Compare also the Drama called the Prabodhacandrodaya (Act vi, St. 19 and the preceding prose passage), where this rapprochement between Mīmāṅsā and Vedānta is most clearly indicated.

Tradition has preserved for us just the arresting preliminaries and the somewhat tame *finale* of the Śaṅkara-Maṇḍana controversy. The essential points around which the controversy raged have to be followed only in the philosophical writings of the Ācārya, and these we will set forth in the next Lecture. Having, by the defeat and conversion of Maṇḍana *alias* Sureśvara, secured an ally fully equipped with the armoury of logic—and one moreover that had perhaps already proved his mettle and won his spurs in the long-drawn out tustle with the Jainas of the South—it was a relatively easy task for the Ācārya to defeat the various sectional and sectarian opponents—the Śaivas, the Gāṇapatyas, the Bhāgavatas, the Kāpālikas, the Lokāyatikas, the Vaiśeṣikas, the Sāṁkhyas, the Jainas, the Buddhists and the rest—with all their divisions and sub-divisions. It must, however, be remembered that it was not metaphysical arguments that decided the contest everywhere. Tact and compromise—and where these failed, even the *argumentum ad baculum*—had to be tried in turn; the religious and political prejudices obtaining amongst the countless little States and Kingdoms into which India north as well as south of the Narmadā was parcelled out, had to be studied and harnessed for the service of the "national" religion; and fully alive to the follies and foibles of the masses who are incapable, in the absence of a qualified monitor at the elbow, of either sustained thinking or consistent conduct, adequate provision had also to be made — after reforming the code of conduct to suit the exigencies of the times—to provide for responsible itinerant interpreters of the code, who could, by enlisting the assistance of the secular arm where needed, achieve a uniformity in religious practice,* which would stand out as the visible symbol of the monistic Metaphysics of the Vedānta.

* The broader the scope of its operation, the thinner naturally became its contents, thus leading on to extremes of compromise and toleration, which was both the strength and the weakness of the movement.

The current biographies of the Ācārya give very little information of value after the Śaṅkara-Maṇḍana controversy. He indeed met a few minor opponents; travelled extensively; made several pupils;* and in his few spare moments composed his major and minor works. Tradition is persistent about Śaṅkara's visit to Nepal, where he is reported to have founded a Liṅga-temple, which is worshipped to the present day by a Brahman belonging to the Nambudri sect; and to Kāshmīr where he is said to have ascended the Sarvajñapīṭha or the Throne of Omniscience. Latterly, he seems to have been—like the Buddha himself—rather involved in the jealousies and bickerings amongst his favourite disciples, who could be restrained from flying apart only through the magnetic charm of the Master's personality. Śaṅkara died at the age of thirty-two, the victim, we are told, of an *abhicāra* or black magic set into operation by a Śākta opponent. According to one set of traditions Kāñcī in the South India is given as the place where the Ācārya breathed his last. According to other sources he died at Badarikāśrama, disappearing into a cave of the Himālayas. The weight of probability belongs to the first view.

This then is all that we know of the life of Śaṅkara, the Master. Fortunately he has left behind him his Works, and these—the genuine ones amongst them—ought to form the best commentary on the Ācārya's life and achievement. That will have now to form the subject of our next Lecture.

* One of the most notable of these was a dumb son of Prabhākara the Mīmāṅsist, who recovered the power of speech by the Ācārya's favour, and became, as Hastāmalaka, most proficient in all the Śāstras, so as even to excite the jealousy of the other pupils on account of the Teacher's great fondness for him. Another was Sanandana, whose loyalty to the Master, we are told, enabled him to perform the miracle of walking on the waters, in consequence of which he became celebrated as "Padmapāda."